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Abstract
Different from agency conflicts between managers and investors (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), interest conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders
tend to prevail facing a concentrated ownership structure (Faccio et al., 2010).
Notably, the problem of firm resources being transferred to controlling parties is
described as tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000).
In China, cash dividends are argued to be tunnelled by controlling shareholders
who had discounts for the subscription of non-tradable shares (Chen et al., 2009a).
My study adds further evidence by investigating the influence on dividends of the
non-tradable share (NTS) reform. Different from previous studies, I also consider the
heterogeneity of state and non-state shareholders.
Zhao et al. (2015) argue that cash dividends issued after private placements also
expose to tunnelling, especially with the subscription of controlling shareholders. Yet,
to preserve such an argument, further examination of the information effect of private
placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993) and the incentive held by participating
shareholders (Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007) appears necessary.
Whether controlling shareholders view dividends as an option of interests transfer
and whether events concerning controlling shareholders’ holdings alter their attitude
towards dividends motivate this research. These issues are addressed via the following
7

studies.
Using the NTS reform as an experimental setting, the first study of this thesis
looks into whether cash dividends are subject to influences of agency conflicts and
capital constraints associated with controlling shareholders. The result shows that
dividends decreased after the reform. This is in line with i) a reduced incentive to use
dividends to “materialise” non-tradable holdings and ii) a stronger alignment between
controlling and minority shareholders via the united pricing of their holdings. The
implications of the heterogeneity of controlling shareholders are examined next. The
evidence shows that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly controlled by
capital-constrained local governments pay higher dividends, suggesting a potential
remedy for local governments’ lack of income. Yet, family firms are shown to be
reluctant to pay dividends, possibly because of the tendency to transfer interests via
excessive cash holdings (Liu et al., 2015). It is inferred that controlling shareholders
would be inclined to demand (suppress) payouts if higher (lower) cash dividends
better serve their personal interests.
My second study examines the impact of private placements on cash dividends
using a multivariate difference-in-difference approach. Contrary to Zhao et al. (2015),
my results show that the placements reduce dividends. Further investigation reveals
that private placements enhance long-term stock performance. The opposite directions
of treatment effects on dividends and firm performance are in line with Hail et al.
(2014); an enhancement in the information environment, in this case private
8

placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993), lowers the need to signal profitability via
dividends. I also find that private placements result in higher announcement returns of
dividends. This further corroborates the signalling function of private placements, as
an improved information environment is shown to emphasise the announcement effect
of dividends (Dedman et al., 2015).
My third study addresses how participating investors’ affiliations with issuing
firms and offering discounts relate to post-offering dividends. Tracing 120 days after
announcements of private placements, I find that higher discounts for controlling
shareholders lead to better stock performance. This reflects the optimism of the
market. Further results document higher payouts, greater earnings and better corporate
governance when larger discounts are received by controlling shareholders. This
implies that discounts granted to controlling shareholders could be the reward for
incremental monitoring (Wruck, 1989).
Overall, this thesis examines whether dividends are exposed to tunnelling by
controlling shareholders. Though the discount of controlling shareholders’
non-tradable holdings once pointed to dividends as fund transfer, it seems that this
tendency was restrained after the NTS reform. Despite the concern that private
placements inviting controlling shareholders cause aggravated agency conflicts, when
examining the post-offering practice, evidence indicates higher discounts granted to
existing controlling shareholders result in higher dividends accompanied by greater
earnings. This thesis points to incremental monitoring provided by existing
9

controlling shareholders as the most likely explanation. In general, this thesis suggests
that following the NTS reform, controlling shareholders have a weak incentive
towards tunnelling via dividends. Also, controlling shareholders’ impact on dividends
could be influenced by their governance intentions and financial capability.

10
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation of research
The separation of control and ownership exposes shareholders to agency costs
which result from the misconduct of managers, forming a “manager-to-principal”
agency problem. In dealing with such conflicts, cash dividends may act as a solution.
The traditional agency theory argues that cash payouts can reduce discretionary funds
and invite active monitoring provided by creditors (e.g. Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen,
1986). Dispersed ownership structure is found to be less prevalent in European and
Asia markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio & Lang, 2002).
Instead, firms listed in these markets tend to exhibit a concentrated ownership
structure that grants control rights to large shareholders. This gives rise to the
“principal-to-principal” conflicts, as controlling shareholders are enabled to abuse
their power to pursue private interests regardless of how it affects minority
shareholders. Particularly, La Porta et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000) describe the
problem of firm wealth being transferred to controlling shareholders as “tunnelling”.
In the context of China, substantial evidence confirms that the tunnelling
problem is highly relevant given the concentration of control (e.g. Jiang et al., 2010;
Ma, Ma & Tian, 2013). Additionally, the literature also identifies the role served by
cash dividends in the face of the conflicts between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders (e.g. Lee & Xiao, 2003; Chen et al., 2009a; Wei & Xiao, 2009;
22

Huang et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2015). Despite the progress contributed by these
studies, some puzzling questions remain to be answered.
First, heated debates have been held around the question of whether cash
dividends add exclusive benefits to controlling shareholders in China. Before 2005,
the ownership of controlling shareholders was defined as non-tradable, meaning that
their holdings could not be exchanged on the open market. This indicates that
controlling shareholders were unable to realize capital gains and their investment
returns were limited to cash payouts. Several studies find a positive association
between the proportion of non-tradable shares and cash payouts (Lee & Xiao, 2003;
Chen et al., 2009a; Wei & Xiao, 2009; Huang et al., 2011). The argument of
tunnelling via cash payouts arose when the market-driven price of tradable shares was
usually higher than that of non-tradable shares. That is, dividend yields vary for
different categories of investors, with non-tradable/controlling shareholders being
able to enjoy higher yields than tradable/minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2009a).
However, Huang et al. (2011) argue that the tunnelling incentive is less likely to
explain controlling shareholders’ preference for cash dividends. This is because the
profitability of listed firms is shown to be a stronger determinant of cash payouts than
controlling shareholders. Therefore, whether the non-tradable feature and the price
difference of controlling shareholders’ holdings account for their attitude towards cash
dividends remain inconclusive. To address this question, this study used the NTS
reform as an experimental event. This reform not only eliminates non-tradable shares
23

and unites the pricing of outstanding shares, but also promotes more aligned interests
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Liu & Tian, 2010; Huo
et al., 2012; Jiang & Habib, 2012; Chen et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2017).
Second, the literature lacks attention to the heterogeneity of controlling
shareholders in term of their influence over cash dividend practice. Most dividend
studies divide Chinese controlling shareholders as state-related and non-state related,
which corresponds to the SOEs and non-SOE categories (e.g. Chen et al., 2009a;
Huang et al., 2011). Yet, such classification forms a less informative reflection of
institutional realities (Green, 2004; Wang, 2003). For one, some SOEs are found to
issue loans on behalf of their controlling shareholders, namely financially-distressed
local governments (Fan & Lv, 2012). This case is less likely to occur among
central-government-controlled SOEs which are associated with more effective
governance (Chen, Firth & Xu, 2009b). For another, among non-SOEs, family firms
are exposed to greater tunnelling risk (Liu et al., 2015). Yet, how differently local
government control and family control affect cash dividends remains an open
question.
Third, given the rapid growth of private placements as an option for equity
refinancing, some discussion on the determinant of cash dividend policy after private
placements began to emerge. The study of Zhao et al. (2015) documents that issuing
firms tend to pay higher cash dividends after private placements. Mainly, this
tendency is more likely when controlling shareholders participate in private
24

placements.
However, the above interpretations may overlook some alternatives. On the one
hand, private placements are shown to release positive information about issuing
firms (Hertzel & Smith, 1993), indicating a signalling function similar to that of cash
dividends. Based on a similar role served by private placement and cash dividends,
how private placements influence cash dividend policies is an empirical question. On
the other hand, private placements are demonstrated to invite incremental monitoring
performed by large shareholders given the close connection between investor wealth
and firm values (Wruck, 1989). Yet, the possibility that the enhancement in corporate
governance led by private placements influences cash dividends has not been
discussed.
With respect to the institutional realities in China, this study fills these gaps by
investigating the influences of the NTS reform, private placements, and most
importantly, the incentive of controlling shareholders on cash dividend practice.

1.2 Institutional background
The Chinese stock market has grown into one of the largest economies in the
world. The Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen stock exchange (SZSE) are
two stock exchanges operating independently in the mainland of China. By February
25

2019, there were 1463 firms listed on the SSE with a market capitalization of
￥ 32627 billion, making the SSE the world’s 4th largest stock market by market
capitalization. Around the same time, there were 2144 firms listed on the SZSE with a
market capitalization of ￥ 20716 billion, making the SZSE the world’s 8th largest
stock market by market capitalization.
When stepping into the modern corporate world, problems unavoidably occur
before institutional regulations are fully implemented for the market to grow. The
establishment and refinement of regulations, therefore, provide exogenous experiment
settings for this study. Additionally, one of the intentions behind the establishment of
the Chinese stock market was to increase the value of state-owned assets and so the
operation of this market reflects upon the Chinese government. This gives credence to
a unique institutional background of the Chinese stock market.

1.2.1 The split share structure and the non-tradable share reform
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government started to corporatize and partially
privatize SOEs through the establishment of the SSE and the SZSE. At that time, only
a minority of shares were issued to the general public. The majority of shares were
held by the government to maintain the state’s control over listed SOEs. State-owned
shares and individual-owned shares had two main differences. First, is the price
difference. The administrative position of the government enables its claim on
26

state-owned shares which were priced according to the face value ( ￥ 1). Individual
shareholders purchase the shares at the market value during the initial public offerings
(IPOs). This implies a higher subscription price paid by individuals compared to the
price paid by the state. Second, is the trading restriction. Because of the administrative
nature of the state holdings, state-owned shares did not have public trading rights. The
transfer of non-tradable state-owned shares was undertaken by private negotiations
between designated parties. These transactions also needed approval from the relevant
regulatory authorities before being executed. Apart from this non-tradable feature, the
shares held by the government are the same as those held by individuals in terms of
cash-flow rights and voting rights. In the later stage, privately-owned enterprises
started to go public. Similar to state-owned shares, holdings of founders and
individual controlling shareholders were also defined as non-tradable. Therefore, the
co-existence of non-tradable and tradable shares built a split share structure.
This split share structure is, however, exposed to severe agency problems. Being
unable to realize capital gains, controlling shareholders who held non-tradable shares
lacked concern about market performance (Liu et al., 2015). Investors investing in
tradable shares, however, showed a relatively short average holding period of two
months (Chen et al., 2002). Such speculative trading behaviours suggest active
monitoring by tradable shareholders is less likely.
Realizing that the split share structure failed to properly facilitate the best
interests of both non-tradable and tradable shareholders, in April 2005 the China
27

Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched the non-tradable share reform
(NTS reform). The direct function of this reform is the elimination of non-tradable
shares. At the executive level, the critical issue is to protect the interests of tradable
shareholders who paid a higher price than their counterparts during the IPO process.
Accordingly, before the trading right is granted, non-tradable shareholders were
required to provide compensations to tradable shareholders who decided if the
compensation was acceptable. The compensations may include extra shares and cash
payments transferred from non-tradable shareholders to tradable shareholders
(Bortolotti & Beltratti, 2007). The non-tradable shares transferred to tradable
shareholders as the compensation of the reform are immediately tradable. For the rest
of non-tradable shares that are still held by non-tradable shareholders, a problem is
that once the reform is completed, a dramatic increase in share supply would form.
This could result in great dilution of liquidity premium. To address this problem, the
CSRC imposed a lockup period totalling to 36 months for the trading of converted
non‐tradable shares, within this period the trading rights would be gradually released.
One direct outcome of the NTS reform is that after the execution of the
compensation, non-tradable shares were priced as tradable ones. This aligns the
financial interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as after the
reform their holdings are both subject to market fluctuations. Following the reform,
reductions in excessive debt (Liu & Tian, 2010), information asymmetry (Huo et al.,
2012), earnings management (Jiang & Habib, 2012) and stock price crash (Sun et al.,
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2017), and the improvement in the pay-for-performance sensitivity (Chen et al., 2015)
were documented. This indicates that the NTS reform has resulted in an upward shift
in the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, this present study adopted the NTS
reform as an exogenous experimental setting to examine its influence on cash
dividends.

1.2.2 Options for equity refinancing
Before the CSRC approved the use of private placement in 2006, public equity
offerings were the only viable option for listed firms to conduct equity refinancing in
the Chinese market. There have been two forms of public equity offerings. The first is
seasonal equity offering (SEO) which refers to additional securities issued by a listed
firm to the general public. New shares issued by SEOs adopt the market price. The
second form of public offerings is rights issue which can be viewed as a special form
of SEO. It allows a listed firm's existing shareholders to acquire additional shares in
proportion to their current holdings. Typically, in a rights issue, existing shareholders
enjoy a discount relative to the market price.
Contrary to the US market which runs a registration system for requests of equity
refinancing, the Chinese market runs an application system. When applying for equity
refinancing, firms are required to follow the CSRC’s regulation. Notably, eligibility to
conduct public offerings is harder to acquire compared to that of private offerings.
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Public offerings require prospective issuers to show a certain level of profitability
before the application. The eligibility to apply for rights issues includes a minimum
return on equity (ROE) of 10%, and this ratio is 6% for the case of SEOs. Additionally,
firms are required to have distributed cash dividends for three consecutive years
before they submit the application of SEOs. In contrast, private placements are
exempt from the requirements of profitability and dividend-paying status. Also,
private placements frequently provide a discounted subscription price to participating
shareholders. In short, for Chinese listed firms, private placements represent an easier
way to raise new equity compared to public offerings. Still, shareholders participating
in private placements are subject to a temporary trading restriction. Subsequent to the
subscription, participating investors face a lockup period during which they are
prohibited from trading their holdings. This lockup period is up to 36 months for
controlling shareholders, and 12 months for non-controlling shareholders. As targeted
equity issues, private placements can increase the holdings of existing large
shareholders or/and create new block shareholders.
To examine controlling shareholders’ influences over cash dividends, this study
considers two events, namely the NTS reform and private placements, both of which
can affect the holdings of controlling shareholders. The NTS reform is expected to
lead to a drop in controlling shareholders’ ownership while private placements that
invite controlling shareholders suggest the opposite.
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1.2.3 Controlling shareholders
According to La Porta et al. (1999), controlling shareholders may hold various
governance incentives. Given their substantial holdings, controlling shareholders can
be motivated to enhance a firm’s profitability, which helps to increase a firm’s value
and individual wealth. Alternatively, when the controlling power is misused to
expropriate a firm’s resources, minority shareholders are left to cover the costs while
controlling shareholders gain private interests.
One essential characteristic of Chinese listed firms is the concentrated ownership
structure which usually results in the holdings of the largest shareholders greatly
exceeding that of the second largest shareholders. Further, when the holdings of
controlling shareholders are above 30% of the total outstanding shares, they are
defined absolute controllers who can dominate the managerial work. Based on 8514
firm-year observations from 2004 to 2015, this research reports an average holding
percentage of about 37% for controlling shareholders. It indicates that controlling
shareholders of Chinese listed firms hold the key to determining firm policies and
corporate governance. This raises the concern of agency conflicts between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders.
The categorisation of the controlling ownership should go beyond the level of
holding percentage or the legal definition of shares, namely state-owned or
privately-owned. The incentive held by controlling shareholders when supervising firm
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operations is worth attention (Chen et al., 2009b). Being state-controlled naturally
forms a political connection that can ease the process of raising long-term debts and
public equity (Brandt & Li, 2003; Gul, 1999; Bradford et al., 2013). However, it is
difficult for SOEs to deviate from serving the goal of social welfare and increasing the
employment rate, even when pursuing such goals fails to maximise firm values (He, Li
& Tang, 2012). In addition, the impact of state control on corporate governance differs
between the central government and local governments. According to Jiang et al.
(2010), the central government acting as the controlling shareholder tends to cause less
severe agency conflicts. It is possible that SOEs controlled by the central government
usually serve a core function in the national economy, therefore inviting stricter
monitoring from the regulatory department.
As to non-state-controlled firms, individual controlling shareholders are more
motivated to devote to maximising shareholder values (He et al., 2012). Yet, facing the
risk of surrendering control rights to the state, individual controlling shareholders may
engage in tunnelling activities before they cash in their holdings (Liu et al., 2015).
Particularly, this tunnelling problem is more severe among firms controlled by a family
who may have a succession problem because of the one-child policy (Liu et al., 2015).
As a result, family business owners tend to hoard excessive cash and seldom make
capital investments or issue cash dividends (Liu et al., 2015).
Given the critical status of controlling shareholders in management and in
devising firm policies, this study establishes one of its research frameworks based on
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the segment of controlling shareholders. Four categories of controlling shareholders
are formed: the central government, local governments, family business owners and
non-family business owners. This segment is set according to the controlling
shareholders’ different governance intentions. Accordingly, this study investigates the
implication of this segment on cash dividend policies.

1.3 Research questions
Over the past decade, a large body of literature has emerged to address how the
concentration of control affects corporate governance. Despite the progress, evidence
of controlling shareholders’ influence over cash dividend policy and how that affects
minority shareholders is still mixed. To provide some clarity to the above issues, this
thesis establishes the following research questions.
First, studies that argue cash dividends are used for tunnelling by controlling
shareholders is based on the non-tradability and the subscription discount of
controlling shareholders’ holdings (Lee & Xiao, 2003; Chen et al., 2009a; Wei & Xiao,
2009). The fact that both features were removed by the NTS reform calls for further
investigation. Yet, as suggested by Liu, Uchida and Yang (2014), despite the reform of
non-tradable shares, controlling shareholders’ preference for cash dividends is
because of the inherent illiquidity embedded by “hold-to-control”. Therefore, whether
the discount or the inherent illiquidity of non-tradable shares is responsible for
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controlling shareholders’ preference for cash dividends is to be determined. This
research also considers an alternate case in which the incentive of cash payouts is to
regulate the practice of managers. All these are to be addressed by examining the
change in cash dividends after the NTS reform.
Additionally, this thesis investigates how various governance incentives of
controlling shareholders affect cash dividends. Questions to be addressed include
whether local governments’ financial burdens affect their controlling SOEs’ cash
payouts, the impact of family business owners on dividend policies, whether cash
dividends are still influenced by tunnelling by controlling shareholders after the
reform, and whether the answers vary depending on different categories of controlling
shareholders.
Second, this thesis looks at whether firms conducting private placements follow
a particular tendency in devising cash dividend policies before and after the offerings.
United States firms tend to announce cash dividends in the issuing year of public
equity offerings in order to gain better announcement returns for the offerings (Booth
& Chang, 2011). This motivates the question of whether Chinese firms adopt this
strategy for the case of private placements. Following a univariate propensity score
matching (PSM) approach, Zhao et al. (2015) find that Chinese firms tend to increase
cash dividends after private placements. Whether this effect of private placements on
cash dividends will remain valid under a multivariate PSM approach is of interest in
this study. The present study also considers the information-releasing effect of private
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placements and its potential impact on cash dividend policy. Accordingly, whether the
signal conveyed by private placements can be verified by stock performance and
whether the expected improvement in the firm-level information environment led by
private placements alters the announcement effect of cash dividends are examined. In
addition, this study examines whether private placements aggravate the tunnelling
problem as a consequence of the formation of new blocks or the increase in holdings
of existing blocks.
Finally, this study examined whether discounts offered to different categories of
investors result in differences in post-offering firm performance (stock performance
and profitability) and firm decisions of fund allocations (tunnelling, investments and
payouts). Private placements as targeted equity issues are suggested to create active
block shareholders, which suggests the offering discount as the compensation for
incremental monitoring (Wruck, 1989). Yet, the offering discount may serve various
functions depending on the affiliation between participating shareholders and issuing
firms. In the case of a lack of affiliation, discounts can be offered to passive investors
as compensation for protecting the entrenchment in place (Barclay et al., 2007). But,
for participating shareholders who have a pre-existing affiliation with issuing firms,
offering discounts may serve as a buffer against entrenchment. According to
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), the subscriptions of affiliated shareholders in private
placements are related to stronger firm performance as the risk of being sued for
insider trading may surface if discounts were offered to affiliated shareholders before
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stock underperformance. Despite the progress made by previous studies, the
implication of participating shareholders’ various incentives on post-offering cash
dividend policy remains an open question. Differentiating the affiliation between
participating shareholders and issuing firms, whether the market reaction around
private placements vary according to whom the discount is offered to is examined.
The examination is also extended to post-offering accounting performance and fund
allocations. By doing so, this present study addresses whether tunnelling or
incremental monitoring theory explains the observed market reactions, firm
profitability and firm decisions of inter-corporate loans, capital expenditure and cash
dividends.

1.4 Key findings and contributions
1.4.1 Key findings
This study investigates whether, and how, controlling shareholders affect cash
dividends with consideration given to the institutional realities in the Chinese market.
The findings show that following the NTS reform, controlling shareholders are less
likely to tunnel firm resources via cash dividends. Still, the impact of the concentrated
ownership structure may vary according to controlling shareholders’ governance
incentives. Additionally, cash dividends are also influenced by the institutional event
of the NTS reform, and firm event of private placements. Some of the key findings
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are listed below.
Using the NTS reform as the natural experiment setting, the study first examines
how controlling shareholders associated agency conflicts and capital constraints affect
cash dividend policy. The empirical evidence confirms that there has been a decrease
in cash dividends after the NTS reform. This finding supports the argument that the
non-tradability and discounts of controlling shareholders’ holdings influenced the
preference for cash dividends before the reform (Chen et al., 2009a; Huang et al.,
2011). And, the aligned interests between controlling and minority shareholders
reduce excessive cash dividends. Considering the financial distress experienced by
local governments, despite that their controlled SOEs may inherit this burden (Fan &
Lv, 2012), these SOEs are found to pay higher cash dividends. It is possible that cash
dividends are preferred by capital-constrained local governments as a feasible form of
income. Consistent with family business owners’ tunnelling via excessive
cash-holdings (Liu et al., 2015), a higher level of family control is associated with
lower cash dividends. Notably, neither local governments nor family business owners
seem to alter their attitude towards cash dividends after the NTS reform. This presents
two cases of cash dividends under the influence of tunnelling, which remain active
after the reform. These results indicate that whether or not cash dividends facilitate
tunnelling can be determined by the incentive and the identities of controlling
shareholders, and the impact of tunnelling on the level of cash dividends is
non-monotone.
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Turning to private placements, this study investigates whether issuing firms
follow particular patterns in paying cash dividends before and after the offerings.
Results show that firms tend to issue higher cash dividends when private placements
are in the near future. According to Booth and Chang (2011), this represents issuing
firms’ efforts to lower the information uncertainty before the offerings. Following a
multivariate PSM approach used in the present research, evidence suggests that
private placements lead to a downward trend for the payment of cash dividends and
act as a contributor for stronger long-term stock performance. These results indicate
that based on the signalling function served by private placements, the information
certification effect of private placements may contribute to the reduced demand for
cash payouts. Additionally, private placements are demonstrated to boost the
announcement returns of cash dividends. This lends support to the notion that an
improved firm-level information environment allows the announcement effect of cash
dividends to be more pronounced (Dedman et al., 2015).
Lastly, this study examined whether discounts offered to different categories of
investors result in differences in post-offering firm performance and firm decisions of
fund allocations. Results suggest that when firms offer higher discounts to existing
controlling shareholders, it leads to better stock performance within the long event
window, greater profitability, more regulated use of inter-corporate loans, higher
capital expenditure and higher cash dividends compared to when discounts were only
offered to passive investors. This supports the idea that the discount of private
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placements acts as a reward to participants who are likely to contribute to incremental
monitoring (Wruck, 1989). It also fits the notion that subscriptions of shareholders
who have a pre-existing affiliation with issuing firms are less likely to provoke
entrenchment (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005).

1.4.2 Contributions to the literature
The findings of this study make the following contributions to the literature. First,
this study helps to understand the association between controlling shareholders’
holdings and cash dividends. Chen et al. (2009a) find that more concentrated
ownership leads to higher cash dividends. Liu et al. (2014) report that the reduction in
the largest shareholder's ownership after the NTS reform is related to a reduction in
cash dividends. Both studies interpret the direct association between controlling
shareholders’ holdings and dividends as the consequence of the abuse of power by
controlling shareholders. Contrary to previous studies, the present study finds that this
association is not necessarily causal. The drop in cash-flow rights following the NTS
reform indicates that following the reform, controlling shareholders collect a smaller
proportion of the total cash dividends. To maintain the pre-reform level of cash
dividend incomes, controlling shareholders would demand higher total cash dividends
after the NTS reform. Yet, the observed drop in cash dividends after the reform
suggests otherwise. This study offers a possible explanation.
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Evidence supporting the enhancement in corporate governance led by the NTS
reform is extensive (Liu & Tian, 2010; Jiang & Habib, 2012; Sun et al., 2017; Chen et
al., 2015). It is plausible that the reduced tunnelling incentive of controlling
shareholders leads to the reduction in cash dividends that were influenced by a weak
governance incentive before the reform. This enriches the current literature by
showing that the change in ownership concentration may not be responsible for the
change in cash dividends, and the incentive of controlling shareholders can be
fundamental in interpreting their influence over cash dividends.
Second, previous studies mainly divide Chinese firms into SOEs and non-SOEs,
which reflects less institutional reality. The present study provides evidence that state
ownership and individual ownership are both heterogeneous, which has implications
for cash dividend practice. The direct control of capital-constrained local governments
incurs higher cash dividends, and since state agencies have limited sources of income,
cash dividends represent an accessible source of funds. Family control is associated
with lower cash dividends, as individuals have more efficient options for tunnelling,
such as inter-corporate loans and holding excessive cash (Liu et al., 2015). The study
adds to previous results that suggest controlling shareholders’ attitudes towards cash
dividends are influenced by their financial capability and governance intentions. This
also accounts for the heterogeneity of controlling shareholders.
Third, the information effect of private placements as a determinant of cash
dividends is largely overlooked in the current literature. The present study contributes
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to the literature by identifying that private placements lower cash dividends and
argues that this is due to their mutual function of signalling. Filling the void in
existing studies, the study shows that the positive signal conveyed by private
placements is in line with the offerings’ association with stronger long-term stock
performance. It also provides a new finding; that the announcement effect of cash
dividends is enhanced because of private placements. This informs that the
effectiveness of signalling via cash dividends is conditional on the quality of the
information environment. This has attracted little attention in previous studies.
Fourth, no previous studies investigate how discounts received by shareholders
participating in private placements affect post-offering cash dividends. Empirical
results show that unlike the case of offerings which grant discounts to multiple
non-controlling shareholders, offerings that grant higher discounts to existing
controlling shareholders are followed by stronger firm performance, less tunnelling,
more active capital investments and higher dividends. This result is consistent with a
strong affiliation leading to incremental monitoring provided by controlling
shareholders (Wruck, 1989). It is also in line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) who
suggest that the risk of being sued for insider trading can regulate affiliated
shareholders’ governance behaviours if substantial discounts were offered before
stock underperformance occurs. It is a different result to that of Liu et al. (2016) who
suggest that the discount offered to controlling shareholders implies tunnelling.
Corresponding to the results on the NTS reform, further evidence is provided for the
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notion that the size of holdings of controlling shareholders is a less effective indicator
of agency conflicts. The implication is that the Chinese market’s specific institutional
environment, and internal and external pressures faced by controlling shareholders,
should be considered when interpreting controlling shareholders’ influence over cash
dividend practice.

1.5 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines how various governance
incentives of controlling shareholders affect cash dividend practice. The NTS reform
is used as a natural experimental setting. Chapter 3 investigates whether, and how,
private placements alter issuing firm’s cash dividend policies, and what the nature of
this treatment effect of private placements is. Chapter 4 explores whether the identity
of participating shareholders and their granted discounts in private placements
determine the post-offering cash dividend practice and other firm characteristics.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
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Table 1.1 The logic-route map of Chapter 2
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Table 1.2 The logic-route map of Chapter 3
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Table 1.3 The logic-route map of Chapter 4
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CHAPTER TWO. TUNNELLING VIA CASH DIVIDEND
AND ITS RELATION WITH THE NTS REFORM AND
INTER-CORPORATE LOANS
2.1 Introduction
Why firms pay cash dividends and whether these payments benefit shareholders
have been frequent topics in the literature. Traditional agency theory, also known as
the free-cash-flow theory, suggests that cash dividends can mitigate agency conflicts
between shareholders and managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Another
growing body of research stresses that in a market characterised by a
principal-to-principal relationship, the primary agency conflicts consist of controlling
shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests (Faccio & Lang, 2002;
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Showing consistency with this
contention, cash distributions in China can come at the expense of minority
shareholders. This applies to cases in which higher cash dividends are paid after
public equity offerings that are not subscribed by controlling shareholders (Lee &
Xiao, 2004; Chen et al., 2009a).
Apart from the timing of cash payouts, Chen et al. (2009a) argue that the split
segments of tradable and non-tradable shares also leads to cash dividends becoming a
form of interests transfer to controlling shareholders. Three institutional facts underlie
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their contention. First, holders of non-tradable shares typically serve as controlling
shareholders, which enables them to pursue their preference at the expense of
minority shareholders when deciding cash dividend policies. Second, non-tradable
shareholders are unaffected by the fluctuations on the secondary market, thus
controlling shareholders tend to form a dormant governance incentive (Firth, Lin &
Zou, 2010). Third, non-tradable shares are priced according to the book value of net
assets, which usually leads to a price lower than the market price of tradable shares.
Though this price setting generates a lower price-earnings ratio for non-tradable
shares, it results in an exclusively higher implied dividend yield for controlling
shareholders. Accordingly, Chen et al. (2009a) demonstrate that firms with a larger
discount for non-tradable shares and a higher proportion of non-tradable shares tend
to have greater cash dividends. Given the setting of the split share structure, they
propose a causal link between controlling shareholders’ tunnelling incentive and cash
dividends.
A competing study from Huang, Shen and Sun (2011) suggests that the
propensity to pay dividends and the level of cash payouts in China have few
differences compared to those in other countries. This implies that cash dividends are
not particularly high in China and offers limited support to the view of tunnelling.
Alternatively, Huang et al. (2011) interpret the positive association between cash
dividends and the proportion of non-tradable shares as a form of compensation for
being unable to realize capital gains.
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In 2005, the Chinese government implemented the non-tradable shares reform
(hereafter the NTS reform) to enable the public trading of non-tradable shares. This
reform removed the discount applied to non-tradable shares and allowed the holdings
of controlling shareholders to circulate. That is, these changes eliminated the factors
considered to cause cash dividends to be used for tunnelling in Chen et al. (2009a).
Thus, the first purpose of this study is to examine how the NTS reform influences
cash dividend payments.
This study starts from the origin of principal-to-principal agency conflicts
generated when controlling shareholders’ roles are pronounced under a concentrated
ownership structure, to identify the incentive behind the issue of cash payouts. The
study considers that cash distributions display the nature of tunnelling when the
decision of such payments depends on the need of controlling shareholders rather than
on the motivation to reward all investors equally. Therefore, the second research
question is, after the NTS reform which eliminated the chance to exploit price
difference to acquire higher effective dividend yields, whether cash dividends are still
influenced by the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholders. The last research
question is how cash dividends interact with a form of direct tunnelling known as
inter-corporate loans (Jiang, Lee & Yue, 2010). Given that cash payouts and
inter-corporate loans compete for a given level of free cash flows, how the tunnelling
incentive affects the association between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans is
worth investigating.
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Empirical studies of dividend policies of Chinese firms tend to focus on issues of
ownership structure, such as intervention from independent directors (Bradford, Chen
& Zhu, 2013) and the degree of ownership concentration (Chen et al., 2009a; Huang
et al., 2011). Extending the impact of structural characteristics, this study
demonstrates the importance and implications of the incentive of controlling
shareholders when determining dividend policies. One essential feature of the Chinese
market is the common presence of state ownership. Accordingly, Chinese firms can be
divided into two categories: SOEs and non-SOEs. SOEs have different operating
objectives and agency framework compared to non-SOEs (Lin et al., 1998). Further,
sub-categories within state ownership and sub-categories within private ownership are
devised to reflect various agency conflicts, capital constraints and their implications
on cash dividends.
Testing the impact of the NTS reform on cash dividends, results show a decrease
in dividends at the market level after the reform. This is consistent with: First, united
pricing of shares removes high implied yields for controlling shareholders; Second,
controlling shareholders are more willing to reserve more cash to invest so as to
increase the value of their holdings which are now priced by the market.
This study examined the impact of various categories of controlling shareholders
on cash dividends. Local government control is distinguished from central
government control, as local governments are relatively capital constrained (Fan & Lv,
2012; James, Qi & Zhang, 2015) and are less active monitors (Cheung et al., 2006)
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compared to the central government. The results show that local government control
influences firms to pay more cash dividends compared to central government control,
and this tendency is less influenced by the NTS reform. This suggests that cash
dividends might serve as the solution to the financial distress of local governments,
for which the NTS reform has not been an effective remedy. Notably, the evidence
showing unregulated uses of cash dividends is more apparent when SOEs are directly
owned by local governments than the case when they have an administrative
relationship with local State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commissions (SASACs hereafter). This part of evidence including cash distributions
are weakly tied to firms’ financial conditions and the NTS reform when local
governments act as direct control. This further highlights the preference of local
governments in cash dividends, which is more pronounced when local SASACs are
not in the chain of demand, forming less resistance for the abuse of power by local
governments. This also indicates a case of tunnelling via cash dividends, which is still
active with the control of local governments after the NTS reform.
For the case of private control, families acting as controlling shareholders have
been found to cause more severe tunnelling because of a succession problem (Liu,
Luo & Tian, 2015). Particularly, tunnelling by family owners can take the form of
holding excessive cash which is ready to be transferred to related parties (Liu et al.,
2015). Consistent with previous findings, this present study finds that the level of
family control negatively affects cash payouts compared to other types of private
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control. A possible explanation is that free cash-flows can be transferred to family
owners in more efficient options such as inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010; Liu
et al., 2015) which can direct 100% of cash outflows to families’ related parties.
Here is a summary of the impacts of various categories of controlling
shareholders on cash dividends. Serving the function of a convenient source of
revenue, high cash dividends are pursued by capital-constrained local governments.
As a buffer against interests transfer, lower cash dividends are observed with higher
control of tunnelling prone family owners. That is, the impact of tunnelling on cash
dividends appears to be primarily influenced by what best fits the personal agenda of
controlling shareholders.
Lastly, this study examined the interaction between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans which are a form of direct tunnelling via cash outflows (Jiang et
al., 2010). Results show that non-SOEs tend to suppress cash dividends in order to
issue higher inter-corporate loans. Inter-corporate loans instead of cash dividends can
better serve the tunnelling intention of private controlling shareholders, hence forming
a competitive relationship between the two for a given level of free cash-flows. For
the case of government control, inter-corporate loans as private lending cannot incur
financial interests for public organizations. Still, this does not stop cash dividends
from competing with inter-corporate loans among local SOEs. This might be that
local governments demand high cash dividends and therefore passively suppress the
cash available to be issued as inter-corporate loans. For the category of central
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government control, cash dividends are weakly related to inter-corporate loans. This is
expected. The central government is less likely to rely on dividends to replenish
incomes and the rigid monitoring on central SOEs indicates regulated uses of
inter-corporate loans.
This study contributes to the literature by showing that the NTS reform has
helped to regulate the excessive issues of cash dividends. It also shows that this
beneficial influence of the NTS reform might be invalid given tunnelling incentives of
local governments and family business owners. Notably, this study is among the first
to embrace the heterogeneity of local government control within the category of state
control and the heterogeneity of family control within the category of private control
in a dividend study. The results are consistent with the view that the capital constraint
of local governments and the succession-problem-induced tunnelling of family
owners, both of which cannot be addressed by the NTS reform, lead to higher cash
dividends for local SOEs and lower cash dividends for family firms, respectively. This
demonstrates that the impact of tunnelling on cash dividends varies, depending on
whether these payouts add to or obstruct the optimal private interests of controlling
shareholders. Unlike previous studies such as that of Chen et al. (2009a) and Huang et
al. (2011), this study follows the agency conflicts and capital constraints associated
with controlling shareholders rather than the level of cash distributions (alone) as the
intrinsic indication of tunnelling.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
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relevant institutional backgrounds. Section 2.3 lists relevant literature review and
hypothesis development. Section 2.4 describes the research sample, variables, and
methodology. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results and interpretations, and
Section 2.6 summarises and concludes this chapter.

2.2 Institutional background
2.2.1 The non-tradable share reform
The Chinese domestic stock market was established in 1990, with the goal to
help under-performing SOEs to gain easier access to financing resources (Sun & Tong,
2003). At the beginning of this market, only a minority of shares were issued to
individual investors who are allowed to trade their holdings on the open market. The
majority of shares, however, were distributed among different levels of governmental
agencies, legal person entities and founders, and they were all defined as non-tradable.
As the name suggests, non-tradable shares cannot be traded on the open market. All
the other features remain identical in regard to cash-flow rights, voting rights and
dividend rights. Under this arrangement, the co-existence of non-tradable and tradable
shares built a split-share structure.
Apart from preserving a controlling position, Liao, Liu and Wang (2014) have
discussed other reasons why the Chinese government designed state-owned share as
non-tradable. First, the transfer of state-owned shares appeared impractical when they
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were meant to grant administrative power to the government. Second, during the
initial stage of the Chinese stock market, greater focus was put on the administration
and management of SOEs. The listing of SOEs was to raise capital and to perform
trial tests for government-controlled management mechanisms rather than to conduct
complete privatization.
The reality was non-tradable shareholders who owned about two-thirds of the
total outstanding shares could not realize capital gains because their holdings were
non-tradable (Chen, Firth & Gao, 2002). This leads to a lack of incentive for
non-tradable shareholders to monitor corporate governance as stock performance does
not affect non-tradable shareholders in the way it affects tradable shareholders (Firth
et al., 2010; Kuo, Ning & Song, 2014; Liao et al., 2014). On top of that, non-tradable
shareholders cannot be threatened by adverse market reactions because: first, their
financial gains are not directly affected by stock price fluctuation which is a direct
measurement of tradable/minority shareholders’ wealth and, second, the power of
tradable shareholders is limited when control dilution, mergers and acquisition are
less common practice.
Apart from the concern that non-tradable shareholders cannot be held
accountable for monitoring; the circumstance could get worse when these investors
also own a controlling position that grants access to private interests. Facing
unattainable capital gains, non-tradable shareholders are argued to have an incentive
to receive cash dividends as a way to materialize their holdings (Chen et al., 2009a;
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Huang et al., 2011; Wei & Xiao, 2009). Non-tradable shares were priced according to
a firm’s net assets, which leads to lower price-earnings ratios and higher (implied)
dividend yields for non-tradable shareholders exclusively. Thus, Chen et al. (2009a)
ascribe non-tradable shareholders' preference for cash payouts as an opportunistic
transfer of firm resources. In summary, the presence of non-tradable shares created a
less functional governance system which invites passive investment strategies and
controversial payments of cash dividends.
After a few failed attempts to promote in-depth privatization and a market
economy (Liao et al., 2014), the Chinese government gradually accepted that to
liberalize state-owned shares in full circulation was essential. Accordingly, the NTS
reform was introduced in 2005 to grant trading rights to non-tradable shares. This
transformation needed tradable shareholders’ approval after the execution of
negotiated compensation terms. The most common compensations for tradable
shareholders included receiving additional shares and cash payments from
non-tradable shareholders, and supplementary compensations including stock options
and warrants (Bortolotti & Beltratti, 2007). By the end of 2007, 1260 firms had
accomplished the NTS reform (Liao et al., 2014).
With non-tradable shareholders transferring part of their holdings to tradable
shareholders, the concentrated ownership in China started to show signs of dilution.
This study finds that the NTS reform led to a decrease in the mean of the largest
shareholders' holding from 41.84% in 2004 to 36.10% in 2007. Beltratti and Bortolotti
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(2007) evaluated the market reaction around announcements of the NTS reform
conducted by 368 firms. They find that the market reacted favourably to the reform
with an average abnormal return amounting to 8% cumulated within the event
window of [-1, +1] in relation to the announcement day 0. They identify this outcome
was contributed by the anticipation of improved corporate governance given by the
circulation of non-tradable shares.
Market expectation revealed by the positive announcement returns of the NTS
reform is consistent with the post-reform growth in firm financial and operational
performances. Liao et al. (2014) find that after the reform, listed firms experienced
boosted outputs, increased profits and employment rates, with SOEs significantly
outperforming non-SOEs. They attribute the success of SOEs to government agents’
incentive to raise the value of state-owned shares.
Given the expected relief in principal-to-principal agency conflicts, this study
relies on the NTS reform as the exogenous shock to test how a shift in corporate
governance affects cash dividend practice. Notably, by investigating the specific
direction of change in cash dividends after the NTS reform, some clarity is expected
for the question about whether higher or lower cash dividends were in favour of
minority shareholders’ interests within the pre-reform period.

2.2.2 Heterogeneity of controlling shareholders
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Prior studies of the attitude of investors towards cash dividend policies mostly
adopt the categories of tradable and non-tradable shareholders (e.g. Chen et al., 2010;
Huang et al., 2011) or the categories of state and non-state shareholders (Bradford et
al., 2013). The above classification mainly relies on the legal definition of shares to
categorize the types of owners and is questioned to be a less reliable reflection of
institutional realities (Green, 2004; Wang, 2003). Thus, this study delivers a more
detailed assessment of the categorization of controlling shareholders that is more
appropriate for dividend study.
State versus non-State controlling shareholders
At first glance, the distribution of firms’ controlling rights can be either across
the hierarchical organisations of government agencies or among individuals in the
Chinese stock market. Precisely, to avoid reputational costs, the state, as a controlling
shareholder, is supposed to monitor the operations of SOEs strictly. To do so, the
central government controls SOEs via its institution of central SASAC. The SOEs
owned by the central government (hereafter central SOEs) are usually nation-wide
and have substantial economic significance. Their crucial status is expected to invite
stricter monitoring from the authority. Still, the state as the controlling shareholder
might put the macro objectives of social welfare and employment rate ahead of the
operational goal of maximising firm values and this compromises the efficiency of
SOEs (He, Li & Tang, 2012). As to the performance evaluation, SOEs’ stock
performance was not a big concern for the state compared to the book value of assets
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before the NTS reform. Also, government agencies, especially the central government,
are usually very large organisations that have limited ways to generate revenues other
than through taxes. This setting further separates the performance of SOEs from the
financial condition of the state. One other problem underlies the fact that the market
value of SOEs was not linked to the performance of the relevant government officials
prior to the reform.
Compared to the case in which the state is a controlling shareholder, non-state
shareholders are more attached to operational goals rather than to political concerns.
Also different from state shareholders, non-state controlling shareholders can benefit
from firm operations. Still, being manager-controller, private interests are directly
applicable to non-state controlling shareholders with the presence of abuse of power.
Consistent with this concern, the use of inter-corporate loans, a form of private
lending, indicates that Chinese non-SOEs are subject to more fund embezzlement than
are SOEs (Jiang et al., 2010).
Non-state shareholders also differ from state-shareholders in terms of their
influence over cash dividend policy. Because they receive fewer preferential
treatments from banks which are mainly state-owned, non-SOEs face more obstacles
in raising long-term debts (Brandt & Li, 2003; Gul, 1999). The resulting pressure
makes non-SOEs rely more on the internal financing system, thus further limiting the
funds available to be distributed as cash dividends.
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With regard to public equity refinance, seasonal equity offerings and rights issues
are regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) which is an
institution of the Chinese State Council. The CSRC uses a merit-based system, such
as to meet a series of requirements for accounting performance, to evaluate a firm’s
eligibility to conduct public equity refinance. These evaluations can be flexible, as
firms that fail to comply with the requirements can still be allowed to issue new
shares after providing an acceptable explanation. The CSRC as a state agency lends
support to SOEs when such flexibility is needed (Bradford et al. 2013). Under this
setting, Chinese non-SOEs stand a smaller chance of acquiring eligibility for public
offerings (Green, 2003). Given the substantial obstacles when refinancing via debts
and equity, non-SOEs are shown to issue lower cash payouts compared to SOEs
(Bradford et al., 2013).
The segment of state control
The official website (English version) of SASAC states that “SASAC is
responsible for ... directs and supervises the management work of local state-owned
assets according to law.”. Following this regulatory setting, the central government,
represented by the central SASAC, is in charge of funding and managing the
operations of central SOEs, while the case for local SOEs is slightly different. The
jurisdiction of local SASACs goes to local governments, but the course of action
followed by local SASACs is entirely determined by the central SASAC. Thus, local
governments only have administrative power over SOEs owned and managed by local
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SASACs.
In the meantime, local governments are also allowed to make investments in
firms without involving local SASACs. In this case, local governments are equity
holders acquiring ownership through commercial investments. This study conjectures
that SOEs funded by local governments should receive more commands from local
governments. In the meantime, local governments also face external supervision. In
the administration system of the Chinese government, local governments are at a
lower level than the central government. Facing pressure to accomplish the quota set
by the central government, the competition among local governments for national
resources is unavoidable. On top of that, local governments are not granted full fiscal
freedom. For example, they are not allowed to issue national bonds regardless of their
financial situation. The impact of the pressure experienced by local governments on
the cash dividend policy among local SOEs, especially those directly controlled by
local governments, is one of the research questions addressed in this study.
The segment of the non-state control
Within the category of non-state firms, family firms are distinctive. He et al.
(2010) have summarised five advantages of firms operated by a family. First, family
wealth is closely attached to firm performance (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
Therefore, family business owners are considerably active in pursuing maximized
firm values and avoiding possible losses. Second, family control can alleviate the
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agency conflicts caused by the separation between ownership and management,
particularly among large firms (e.g., Berle & Means, 1932). Third, the dual setting of
ownership and management granted by family control imposes fewer internal
constraints for managerial discretion, such as investment flexibility (e.g., Carney,
2005). Fourth, family businesses normally want to be continuous for future
generations. This requires a dedicated and long-term investment strategy for a firm’s
operations (e.g., Reynolds 1992). Fifth, a family business is often the signature of the
area where the family resides (e.g., Mandl 2008). Family business owners would try
not to damage their reputation while running the family business.
However, the advantages of family firms might not be fully exploited in China.
According to Liu et al. (2015), the protection of property rights of family firms is
weakly enforced, and their founders could face substantial risk of surrendering their
control rights under the pressure of government intervention. These obstacles point to
a lower possibility of family business being handed to founders’ descendants. Instead,
family business owners have a strong incentive to transfer firm wealth to their
descendants who reside in other countries, which results in expropriation activities
(Liu et al., 2015). Also, family business owners’ dominance of boards and
management make external monitoring almost dormant.
Under the less ideal institutional environment, Liu et al. (2015) find that Chinese
family firms tend to hoard cash when the families enjoy excessive control rights. With
substantial cash-holdings at hand, inter-corporate loans issued to other entities
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controlled by family members, more tunnelling-prone related-party transactions,
fewer capital expenditures and scant issues of cash dividends are found among family
firms. Liu et al. (2015) suggest that family business owners in China, unlike those
from other countries, can invite more tunnelling activities from controlling
shareholders.
Based on the heterogeneous nature of controlling shareholders regarding their
associated agency conflicts and capital constraints, this study establishes the
following investor categories: i) the central government, ii) local governments, iii)
local SASACs; iv) family firms and v) non-family firms to test the impact of
controlling ownership on cash dividend practice.

2.3 Literature review and hypothesis development
2.3.1 Free-cash-flow theory and tunnelling theory
In a practical sense, managers do not always act to maximise shareholder wealth.
Managers can obtain substantial perks via over-investing, which is frequently
facilitated by excessive free cash flows. In such a case, cash payouts can confine
managers' investment flexibility (Easterbrook, 1984). When payout ratios rise, higher
liquidity risk presents, and this can lead to higher interest rates and stricter monitoring
by creditors (Jensen, 1986). Thus, the free-cash-flow theory predicts that cash
dividends can force managers to choose a decrease in agency costs over an increase in
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transaction costs for external financing, and are in favour of outside shareholders
(Easterbrook, 1984). Later literature adds to this theory; cash dividends may not help
shareholders curb managers’ self-seeking activities unless there is active enforcement
of investor protection laws (La Porta et al., 2000).
The free-cash-flow theory is widely applied to firms with diffusely-held
ownership structures that are common in the US market. Thus, this theory might reach
its limit for firms with concentrated ownership structures. In Asia and Eastern Europe,
a substantial number of listed firms grant controlling rights to large shareholders (La
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Similar to the interest
conflicts presented in the relationship of principal-to-manager, agency conflicts also
underlie the relationship of principal-to-principal. Controlling shareholders might not
view the overall profitability as their primary concern, as the abuse of power can
provide on-the-job consumption. Specifically, large shareholders may gain private
interests from the apparent theft and fraud, and hard-to-detect ones include assets
sales, transfer price of related-party transactions and favourable loan guarantees for
their affiliated firms. The problem of firm resources being transferred to controlling
parties is described by La Porta et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000) as tunnelling.
Notably, the misaligned interests of controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders are caused by the concentration of control rights, rather than by
management (La Porta et al., 1999).
In China, concentrated ownership highlights the role of controlling shareholders
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as their private agenda could be decisive in determining firm policies. With respect to
cash dividend policy, Wei and Xiao (2009) identify a positive relationship between
state control and cash payouts. This finding is consistent with the findings of Lee and
Xiao (2004). To explain why the state as the controlling shareholder prefers cash
dividends, Lee and Xiao draw a link between cash payouts and the difficulty of
transferring state ownership. The holdings of controlling shareholders were defined as
non-tradable within the sample of Lee & Xiao. That is, neither state nor non-state
controlling shareholders could realize capital gains on the open market. The transfer
of their holdings required negotiated contracts. Still, the state-owned non-tradable
shares were even harder to liquidate compared to privately-owned shares, as the
authorization to transfer state-owned holdings normally involves a third-party
governmental organization. Under this circumstance, Lee and Xiao (2004) suggest
that holders of state-owned shares are inclined to higher cash payouts as the
compensation for bearing a higher liquidity risk.
Lee and Xiao also conducted an event study to measure the abnormal stock
returns around announcements of unexpected dividend increases. They view this part
of the results as evidence of how Chinese tradable shareholders respond to seemingly
positive cash dividend surprises. Conditional on the positive role of cash dividends in
alleviating agency conflicts, a price premium should be carried for stocks that pay
higher cash dividends (Dewenter & Warther, 1998). However, this notion is not
supported by the results of Lee and Xiao. They find insignificant announcement
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returns cumulated around the event window for unexpected dividend increases. They
conjecture that the absence of price premiums for dividend-increasing stocks indicates
a lack of preference for cash payouts among tradable shareholders. This adds more
weight to the idea that the issue of cash dividends is a better fit for the interests of
controlling shareholders who held non-tradable shares before the NTS reform.
Lee and Xiao also relate the level of cash payouts to the timing of these
payments in China. The timing of cash dividends could be problematic when
payments are issued after recent equity offerings to which controlling shareholders
choose not to subscribe. Such payments divert funds from operations in need and
transfer firm wealth to controlling shareholders. The tunnelling argument also
receives support from later studies. Given the differential pricing for tradable and
non-tradable shares, lower-priced non-tradable shares (as measured by net asset per
share) held by controlling shareholders stipulate high cash dividends to exploit the
implied dividend yields.
The studies mentioned above analyse how controlling shareholders’ preference
in cash dividends is formed. However, they tend to overlook the overall level of cash
dividends in the Chinese market. Using data from La Porta et al. (2000) as the
baseline, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) find that the cash dividends in China are
comparably lower. They attribute this observation to the weak internal and external
governance mechanisms in the Chinese stock market. Also, this finding casts doubt on
the tunnelling argument. If cash dividends are used to acquire private interests, they
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should be higher than payouts that are used to mitigate principal-manager agency
conflicts. Otherwise, the financial gains from tunnelling via cash dividends would be
economically trivial.
The results from empirical studies of the tunnelling theory are mixed. After
tracing data for an 11-year period, Huang et al. (2011) do not find evidence of
abnormal cash dividends following equity refinances. This result renders the argument
of tunnelling via cash dividends issued after equity refinances (e.g. Lee & Xiao, 2004)
less plausible. Although Huang et al. (2011) re-confirm the preference for cash
payouts among non-tradable shareholders, they do not consider this to be the
consequence of tunnelling. This is because they find little difference in the tendency
to pay cash dividends between China and other countries. More importantly, the level
of cash dividends in China is heavily influenced by firms' financial conditions.
Chinese listed firms tend to issue lower dividends and even skip payments because of
loss of revenue. Thus, Huang et al. (2011) argue that cash dividends are less likely to
be used for wealth transfer in China, as controlling shareholders do not, or cannot,
increase cash dividends when facing weakened profitability.

2.3.2 The impact of the non-tradable share reform on corporate governance
Studies that characterize Chinese firms’ cash payouts as tunnelling-induced are
mostly predicated on the features of non-tradability and the lower prices of the
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holdings of controlling shareholders. The fact that both features are embedded in
non-tradable shares calls for a close examination of the NTS reform. Since controlling
shareholders are able to sell their holdings after the reform, they are expected to be
more concerned about stock performance, which invites proactive monitoring. The
benefits of the NTS reform apply to non-controlling shareholders as well. When
ownership becomes dispersed, the voice of minority shareholders can have a greater
impact. A large body of literature suggests that the NTS reform can improve corporate
governance in light of the alignment of interests between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders.
Liu and Tian (2010) tested to see if the NTS reform affects the debt-financing
decisions of Chinese non-SOEs. Controlling shareholders of non-SOEs do not seem to
avoid debt that can bring in external pressure, which might relate to the weakly
enforced legal protection for creditors. Accordingly, Liu and Tian document a positive
association between controlling shareholders’ excessive control rights and leverage.
This leads to the problem that the funds provided by debt financing are tunnelled
rather than properly invested among non-SOEs. Following the NTS reform, the
authors find a decrease in excessive debts taken by non-SOEs. This may indicate that
tunnelling via borrowed funds by controlling shareholders with excessive control
rights is reduced among non-SOEs after the reform. Notably, Liu and Tian (2010)
suggest that the drop in excessive leverage after the reform is more pronounced
among firms suffering from tunnelling by controlling shareholders. Additionally, the
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improved market reactions to the announcement of related-party transactions also
support the positive influence of the NTS reform.
The literature also provides evidence for the positive impact of the NTS reform
on the performance of SOEs. For example, Huo, Kuo and Lee (2012) examined the
influence of the NTS reform over information asymmetry experienced by outside
investors. The separation of ownership and control puts external stakeholders at an
information disadvantage (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Carrying self-serving
incentives, managers and controlling owners tend to withhold the relevant information
or exaggerate firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Such behaviours should be
reduced if the NTS reform enhanced corporate governance. Using firm-specific stock
return variation relative to market-wide variation as a proxy for corporate
transparency, Huo et al. (2012) confirm that share price informativeness is enhanced
after the NTS reform. Their results also reveal that for firms with a higher proportion
of state ownership, a more significant enhancement in their information environment
is identified following the reform. They attribute this outcome mainly to the aligned
interests of controlling and minority shareholders among SOEs, but not necessarily to
changes in ownership structure or the replacement of control. This is because such
alignment is not impeded by the gradual implementation of the reform or state
shareholders who intend to maintain the controlling position.
Departing from previous studies which follow a financial economists’ approach,
Jiang and Habib (2012) focus on the quality of accounting information to determine
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the effect of the NTS reform. They choose the magnitude of earnings manipulation
which is measured by the absolute discretionary accruals. Controlling shareholders
might use earnings management to cover their interests transfer or to meet earnings
thresholds promulgated by the CSRC in applications for initial public offerings (IPOs),
rights issues or to avoid delisting (Yu, Du & Sun, 2006; Kao, Wu & Yang, 2009). To
analyze this issue, they divide the research period into before, during and after the
NTS reform. Consistent with this argument, Jiang and Habib (2012) find that the
proportion of controlling shareholders’ holdings is positively related to the extent of
earnings manipulation in the pre-reform period. In light of the NTS reform, this
positive association starts to wear off and becomes insignificant during the process of
the reform. Ultimately, Jiang and Habib (2012) notice that given the rise in the weight
of tradable shares, earnings manipulations are significantly reduced in the post-reform
period.
Chen, Lin, Lu and Zhang (2015) examine how the NTS reform affects managers’
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Higher pay-for-performance sensitivity is preferred
as an indication of a stronger alignment of interests between management and
shareholders. The presence of large shareholders can either increase the
pay-for-performance sensitivity given their monitoring incentive (Shivdasani, 1993;
Hartzell & Starks, 2003) or weaken this sensitivity because they pursue private
interests (Johnson et al., 2000). When holdings cannot be liquidated at will, Chinese
controlling shareholders are suggested to use inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010)
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and cash dividends (Chen et al., 2009a) to add to personal gains. Thus, Chen et al.
(2015) predict that controlling shareholders are less likely to contribute to the
pay-for-performance sensitivity before the NTS reform.
Chen et al. (2015) use the logarithm of the cash compensation (base salary and
bonus) for a firm’s top three executives as the dependent variable to investigate the
collective impact of the NTS reform and firm performance (measured by return on
assets, ROA). They first use the ordinary least square regression to demonstrate that
post-reform ROAs simulate higher compensation for executives than ROAs in the
pre-reform period. Given that firms did not complete the NTS reform all at the same
time, Chen et al. (2015) introduce year-fixed and firm-fixed effects to run a general
difference-in-difference test. The results re-confirm an increased pay-for-performance
sensitivity after the NTS reform. Further, Chen et al. (2015) find that the NTS reform
results in a stronger improvement in the pay-for-performance sensitivity for firms that
show a higher risk of tunnelling from controlling shareholders given the latter’s
excessive control rights. They also confirm that firms which suffer from weak
corporate governance tend to receive greater benefits from the reform. For example,
firms having a larger post-reform reduction in excessive cash holdings and
tunnelling-prone related-party transactions tend to experience a more substantial
improvement in the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
The study of Sun, Yuan, Cao and Wang (2017) investigates a trigger of stock
price crash, bad news hoarding, before and after the NTS reform. The market can go
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through a confidence crisis if firms are found to withhold bad information for an
extended period. This prevents investors from choosing the best time to end losses.
When all the previously hidden bad news comes to light, investors are eager to cut the
loss by dumping shares all at once, thus causing a steep crash in stock price (Hutton,
Marcus & Tehranian, 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006). Unlike previous studies which
examined the formation of a stock price crash from a principal-agency problem, Sun
et al. (2017) test this issue according to the principal-to-principal conflicts.
Before the NTS reform, the financial status of controlling shareholders was not
influenced by stock price fluctuations in the secondary market. Therefore, they had a
weak incentive to avoid stock price crashes as long as their interests were not
involved. The NTS reform as an exogenous event provides a natural test setting when
the financial interests of controlling shareholders start to unite with those of minority
shareholders. That is, controlling shareholders should be more concerned about stock
performance after the reform. Accordingly, the results of Sun et al. (2017) verify that
the risk of a stock price crash is significantly reduced after the reform. This positive
effect is more frequently observed among firms that grant larger cash-flow rights to
controlling shareholders. That is, the NTS reform helps to form and strengthen the
governance incentive of controlling shareholders.
Despite the difference in research subjects, the above studies support the
enhancement of corporate governance led by the NTS reform. As an exogenous event,
this reform builds a stronger alignment of interests between controlling and minority
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shareholders, which can be verified by reductions in excessive debt (Liu & Tian,
2012), less information asymmetry (Huo et al., 2012), less earnings management
(Jiang & Habib, 2012), fewer stock price crashes (Sun et al., 2017) and improvement
in the pay-for-performance sensitivity (Chen et al., 2015).

2.3.3 The impact of the non-tradable share reform on cash dividends
Controlling shareholders can directly influence a firm’s cash dividend policy.
Also, the governance incentive of controlling shareholders, which is particularly
relevant under concentrated ownership, can affect the level of cash payouts (e.g., Lee
& Xiao, 2004; Chen et al., 2009a). In this circumstance, the NTS reform is considered
as the exogenous shock that has weakened the power of controlling shareholders by
transferring a part of their holdings to tradable (minority) shareholders (Bortolotti &
Beltratti, 2007). The reform also fundamentally affects the incentive of controlling
shareholders by linking their financial gains to stock performance. As a result, an
enhanced corporate governance system has been identified after the reform (Liu &
Tian, 2012; Hou et al., 2012). Hence, the NTS reform serves as adequate research
setting to test how a shift in corporate governance affects in firm cash dividend
practice.
This study follows two competing agency theories to predict the changes in cash
dividends after the NTS reform. Notably, the free-cash-flow theory is tested against
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the tunnelling theory. Before the NTS reform, controlling shareholders’ holdings were
priced by the accounting measurement of net asset per share. After the reform,
controlling shareholders’ holdings became to be priced by the market. While
accounting records are subject to manipulation, fluctuating market performance
makes it more difficult for controlling shareholders to manipulate the value of their
holdings. This external pressure might urge controlling shareholders to attach more
importance to corporate governance. Following the free-cash-flow theory, controlling
shareholders might demand higher cash dividends to promote a more effective
internal financing system. Increased cash dividends can also bring in the attention of
creditors, which invites additional monitoring on managers. That is, because of the
inspired monitoring incentive of controlling shareholders, the NTS reform should lead
to increases in cash payouts. Therefore, this study offers the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a. Under the influence of the NTS reform, there will be higher cash
dividends in the Chinese stock market after the reform.

Still, this may not be the case when non-tradable/controlling shareholders could
only claim investment returns from cash payouts rather than capital gains before the
reform. Based on the pre-reform observations, Huang et al. (2011) interpret the
positive association between the proportion of non-tradable shares and cash dividends
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as demonstrating that controlling shareholders prefer payouts because of the lack of
liquidity. Consistent with this notion, Liu et al. (2014) report that firms reduced
dividends around the NTS reform when there was a simultaneous reduction in
non-tradable shares. However, further evidence suggests that the decrease in cash
dividends is less related to the drop in non-tradable shares but is in direct association
with the reduction in largest shareholders’ holdings. Liu et al. (2014) argue that
controlling shareholders favour cash payouts since the incentive to maintain control
leads to inherent illiquidity, which suggests dividends are the only way to yield cash.
That is, to simply reform non-tradable shares to be tradable might not fundamentally
change controlling shareholders’ preference of cash dividends as long as the case of
hold-to-control remains.
In Liu et al. (2014), the argument that the controlling position leads to the
preference for cash dividends, however, has a potential flaw. According to Liu et al.
(2014), the decrease in controlling shareholders’ holdings has a smaller magnitude
relative to the reduction in non-tradable shares. Also, the NTS reform is not aiming to
replace the controlling ownership, especially among SOEs. If controlling shareholders
rely on cash dividends to gain private interests, such as using payouts to transfer firm
wealth, this reliance should always be present as long as their control is maintained.
Since controlling shareholders are less likely to surrender their position under the
NTS reform, their incentive, as well as their capacity to devise cash dividend policies
according to their private interests, are likely to remain intact. If this is true,
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controlling shareholders would have a weak incentive to regulate the issue of cash
dividends regardless of the NTS reform. Instead, given the observation that
controlling shareholders have lower cash-flow rights after the reform, to maintain the
pre-reform level of private interests in the form of cash dividends there should be an
increase in payouts after the reform. Notwithstanding this argument, Liu et al. (2014)
find a decrease in payouts after the reform. The result shown in Liu et al. (2014)
suggests that the change in controlling shareholders’ holdings may not account for the
simultaneous change in cash dividends. Therefore, the present study argues that the
change in cash dividends led by the NTS reform might have a different cause,
considering the change in the governance incentive of controlling shareholders.
Given the non-tradability, and the lower price of non-tradable shares held by
controlling shareholders, cash dividends have been questioned to pave the way for
tunnelling at the expense of minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2009a). The NTS
reform assigned trading rights and removed the differential pricing. These changes
could reduce the chance of higher cash dividends being issued to take advantage of
the lower pricing of non-tradable shares. More importantly, the united pricing of
tradable and non-tradable shares makes the market value of firms a measurement of
controlling shareholders’ wealth. To maximize firm value, controlling shareholders
might be willing to curb the excessive cash payouts and choose to retain cash
internally to invest in positive net present value (NPV) projects. This predicts a
decrease in cash dividends after the NTS reform. Accordingly, the present study has
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the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b. Under the influence of the NTS reform, there will be lower cash
dividends in the Chinese stock market after the reform.

2.3.4 The agency conflicts arising from local government control
The impact of having state agencies as controlling shareholders might vary
across different levels of the intra-government system. Therefore, merging all types of
state controls simply adopts the legal definition of shares as a proxy for ownership
category and may not adequately reflect essential institutional realities (Green, 2004;
Wang, 2003).
The SOEs owned by the central government (hereafter central SOEs) are
considered to have more desirable corporate governance (Jiang et al., 2010; Cheung et
al., 2006). An institutional fact is that central SOEs typically serve a crucial function
in essential industries. This subjects central SOEs to strict regulations and rigorous
monitoring. Consistent with this point, Chen, Firth and Xu (2009b) find that the
performance of central SOEs’ is superior in almost every aspect to that of firms
dominated by other types of ownership. However, the same expectation is unlikely to
be met when local governments are in control.
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Local governments are more concerned about regional economic development
since this gives their officials an advantage in competing for national resources and
higher political positions. As a result, to pursue apparent economic growth local
governments may purposely overlook misconducts among local SOEs. Consistent
with this notion, Cheung et al. (2006) reveal that local SOEs tend to have a higher
level of expropriation than do central SOEs in manipulating the terms of related-party
transactions. Hence, concerning state control, local governments are argued to have a
weaker incentive to monitor or correct the misconduct of local SOEs (Cheung et al.,
2006). Similar to the problem of related-party transactions (Cheung et al., 2006), there
is also room for doubt about whether local governments use SOEs’ cash dividends for
private agendas. In particular, this doubt appears more relevant given the financial
burden faced by local governments.

2.3.5 The capital constraints of local governments
Among prior dividend studies, the intra-government system of China, regardless
of its complexity, is considered homogeneous with respect to giving SOEs advantages
in raising capital (e.g. Brandt & Li, 2003; Bradford et al., 2013). However, different
financial conditions exist across various government agencies and should be taken
into account when analysing the cash dividend policy of SOEs.
While each party collects half of the national revenue, the current tax system
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(established in 1994) allows the central government to shift the major weight of
responsibility for governmental expenditure to local governments. Under this
mismatch, local governments have not been able to cover their debts for over a decade
(James et al., 2015). Additionally, local governments are not allowed to issue bonds.
To compensate for the ever-present fund shortage after the 1994 tax reform, local
governments are found to use SOEs as a borrowing platform to take loans from banks
or from the public (Fan & Lv, 2012). Thus, although the state connection grants local
SOEs easier access to the capital market, it also costs them to be the inheritor of the
financial burdens of local governments.
As discussed above, local SOEs can face higher debt obligations after taking
over the financial burden of local governments, which might weaken local SOEs’
ability to distribute cash payouts. However, this assumption appears less compelling
when considering the setting of the Chinese credit market. In China, the primary
source of debt financing is banks. Zhu and Yang (2016) report that in 2013, the central
government exclusively owned about 43.34% of banking assets and this figure was
16.47% for local governments. The regulation of Chinese banks implies that the state
is higher up in the chain of command, which gives credence to the relief of debt
pressure on SOEs. Accordingly, undertaking loans for local governments may not
necessarily make local SOEs financially constrained to a point where it damages their
ability to issue cash dividends. On top of that, even with local SOEs serving as a
borrowing platform, local governments still failed to meet their debt obligation for up
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to ten years (James et al., 2015). The need for extra incomes might increase local
governments’ demands for cash dividends. That is, local governments as controlling
shareholders could influence local SOEs to pay higher cash dividends.
Compared to the central government, local governments are more likely to view
cash dividends as replenishment of incomes. This is because of the vertically-oriented
bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government. With the central government being
higher up in the chain of command and therefore disconnected from firm operations, a
large proportion of local governments are at an executive level for the operation of
SOEs. Notably, local governments can exert direct influence over SOEs when they
obtain control rights through investments rather than administrative power (via local
SASACs).
Capital constraints and tunnelling are both considered relevant when analysing
the ultimate impact of having local governments as controlling shareholders. Given
local governments' tendency to use local SOEs as a borrowing platform (Fan & Lv,
2012), if the resulting debt obligation is overwhelming, that is if the capital constraint
hypothesis dominates, the cash dividends of local SOEs are expected to be lower than
that of central SOEs. On this basis, Hypothesis 2a asserts:

Hypothesis 2a. Local government control rather than central government control will
result in lower cash dividends.
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However, the argument conveyed by Hypothesis 2a might be challenged if local
governments have the authority to regulate banks, which overcomes the pressure from
creditors. Compared to the central government, the heavier financial burden faced by
local governments points to a greater need for extra income which can be provided by
SOEs’ cash dividends. Hence, if the incentive of local governments to exploit (tunnel)
SOEs’ resources dominates, cash dividends of local SOEs should be higher than that
of central SOEs. Accordingly, this study offers Hypothesis 2b below:

Hypothesis 2b. Local government control will result in higher cash dividends than
would be the case with central government control.

As discussed above, local governments’ attitude towards cash dividends can be
affected by their lack of tax revenues and their less active monitoring intention
(Cheung et al., 2006). Unfortunately, the NTS reform does not affect the tax
distribution system and therefore might not be able to address local governments’
financial distress. As a result, the reform might deliver a weak impact on curbing local
governments’ reliance on cash dividends. Therefore, this study offers Hypothesis 3
below:
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Hypothesis 3. The impact of local government control on cash dividends will be
weakly influenced by the NTS reform compared to the case of central government
control.

2.3.6 The agency conflicts and capital constraints associated with family control
Because they receive less preferential treatments from banks, non-SOEs face
more obstacles in raising long-term debts and allocating the right to issue new shares
(Green, 2003; Bradford et al., 2013). Bradford et al. (2013) consider that other things
being equal, as a consequence of facing a higher level of capital constraints,
non-SOEs should issue lower cash dividends than SOEs. An implication of this
argument is that when tunnelling activities harm a firm’s ability to distribute cash
dividends, non-SOEs might not be capable of using loans to maintain a certain level
of cash dividends as some SOEs might.
Apart from financial characteristics, the agency conflicts associated with
non-state control are of a different nature to those associated with state control.
Non-state controlling shareholders, as natural persons instead of organizations, can
claim the private interests of control from multiple sources. For example, Jiang et al.
(2010) report that a higher level of tunnelling-prone inter-corporate loans is observed
81

among non-SOEs than among SOEs. This threat of tunnelling appears more concrete
when considering the fact that the private interests of control are more concentrated
around individual shareholders than is the case in governmental organizations.
The control rights of non-SOEs may take various forms; diffusely distributed, or
concentrated in a family, or with an individual. In particular, firms with the last two
forms of control rights are considered as family firms (Bunkanwanicha, Fan &
Wiwattanakantang, 2013). A strand of literature suggests that family business owners
can lead to more aligned interests between managers and outsiders, thus contributing
to a better quality of corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, this
result might not apply to cases in which less protection is provided to minority
shareholders (Faccio & Lang, 2002).
Chinese family firms are different from their peers in other markets. First, the
highly regulated institutional environment and the weakly enforced property right
protection both add complexity to firm operations (Liu et al., 2015). Second, the
one-child policy results in the difficulty of locating an adequate family successor (Liu
et al., 2015). Family firms that only last for one generation inevitably diminish the
role of monitoring that is more likely to be formed by a long-term investment horizon.
Under substantial pressure from both external and internal environments, Chinese
family firms invite more tunnelling activities from their controlling shareholders
compared to non-family firms (Liu et al., 2015).
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Liu et al. (2015) report that family firms tend to issue lower cash dividends with
the intention to hoard excessive cash which they can use for tunnelling at a lower cost.
Given the capital constraints commonly experienced by non-SOEs (Bradford et al.,
2013), a slimmer chance exists for Chinese family firms to use external financing to
revive cash dividends. Under the co-existence of capital constraints and tunnelling,
this study anticipates a negative association between the concentration of family
control and the amount of cash dividends. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 asserts:

Hypothesis 4. Family control should lead to lower cash dividends compared to
non-family control.

2.3.7 Interactions between inter-corporate loans and cash dividends
Tunnelling by controlling shareholders may vary in its forms (Cheung et al.,
2006; Claessens et al., 2000). Liao et al. (2014) report that controlling shareholders
tend to exploit raised funds through related-party transactions and therefore harm the
interests of minority shareholders. These transactions might include asset sales and
product purchases between listed firms and entities owned by controlling shareholders.
Liao et al. (2014) find that 29.7% of their sample firms engaged in questionable
related-party transactions under the background of the split-share structure.
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As with related-party transactions, inter-corporate loans have also been criticised
for being a form of direct expropriation by controlling shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010;
Liao et al., 2014). Given a lack of monitoring mechanism established by a fair value
test, inter-corporate loans may be misused. Liao et al. (2014) observe that 42.3% of
their sample firms have granted loans to their controlling shareholders’ related parties,
and some might also issue loan guarantees. These transactions are not favoured by the
market. Jiang et al. (2010) report significantly adverse economic consequences for
firms with a high balance of inter-corporate loans. The CSRC had issued several
warnings to curb the use of inter-corporate loans, including taking legal actions if top
managers fail to resolve the outstanding loans before 2007 and demanding mandatory
disclosure of such transactions. However, the weakly enforced regulation means that
the misuse of inter-corporate loans has not abated entirely (Liu and Tian, 2012).
The severity of tunnelling via inter-corporate loans can be conditional on
controlling shareholders. Jiang et al. (2010) report that non-SOEs tend to have more
inter-corporate loans than SOEs do. Also, Jiang et al. (2010) find that higher excessive
control rights for ultimate controlling shareholders stimulate more uses of
inter-corporate loans. This is problematic, as the misuse of inter-corporate loans
indicates a significant threat to minority shareholders who are at the receiving end of
the financial consequences caused by controlling shareholders’ corrupt practices.
As a commonly accepted measurement of tunnelling, inter-corporate loans are
expected to impede or even have an adverse impact on the optimal payout policy. This
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is because, first, inter-corporate loans and cash dividends are both cash outflows,
suggesting a contest between the two for a given amount of funds. Second,
inter-corporate loans can direct up to 100% cash outflows to controlling shareholders
via their controlled entities. However, the payment of cash dividends is proportional
to controlling shareholders’ cash-flow rights. The present study finds that controlling
shareholders’ cash-flow rights averaged around 32% from 2004 to 2015. That is,
wealth transfer via inter-corporate loans represents a more efficient tunnelling option
for controlling shareholders. Accordingly, to accumulate discretionary funds for the
issue of inter-corporate loans, entrenched controlling shareholders might demand
managers to suppress cash dividends.
This study assesses the interaction between inter-corporate loans and cash
dividends. The aim is to test whether firms’ cash dividend behaviours are indicative of
the concurrent issues of inter-corporate loans. Additionally, this present study is
interested in whether the relationship between payouts and inter-corporate loans is
affected by which of them better serves the private interests of controlling
shareholders.
Jiang et al. (2010) find that non-SOEs tend to issue higher inter-corporate loans.
And, the analysis of this present study shows that inter-corporate loans are a more
efficient option of tunnelling compared to cash dividends. To transfer firm wealth,
non-state controlling shareholders should show a stronger preference in issuing
inter-corporate loans to their related parties rather than distributing cash dividends to
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all shareholders. Thus, non-state controlling shareholders might suppress cash payouts
to reserve more cash to issue inter-corporate loans, forming a negative relationship
between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans. Accordingly, this study offers
Hypothesis 5 as follows:

Hypothesis 5. There should be a negative relationship between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans among non-SOEs.

Inter-corporate loans as a form of private lending cannot incur financial interests
for organizations, such as the state. Therefore, inter-corporate loans issued by local
SOEs are less likely to be used for providing funds to local government agencies.
However, for financially constrained local governments, their preference in cash
dividends is likely to result in lower free cash-flows. This leaves fewer funds
available to be issued as inter-corporate loans, which should form a negative
relationship between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans. Therefore, this study
offers Hypothesis 6 as follows:

Hypothesis 6. There should be a negative relationship between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans among local SOEs.
86

The central government is neither financially constrained nor able to acquire
funds from inter-corporate loans. On top of that, central SOEs receive strict
monitoring because of their crucial status in the national economy. This leaves less
room for unregulated issues of cash dividends and inter-corporate loans, as neither of
them is likely to be used for tunnelling by the central government. In other words,
neither cash dividends nor inter-corporate loans would be preferred as a form of
tunnelling by the central government, indicating the absence of a causal relationship
between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans for central SOEs. Therefore, this
present study expects a weak relationship between cash payouts and inter-corporate
loans among central SOEs. This leads to Hypothesis 7 below:

Hypothesis 7. There should be a weak relationship between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans among central SOEs.

2.4 Data, measurement of variables and methodology
2.4.1 Sample selection
Data used in this study consists of all publicly listed A-share firms on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2004 and 2015. This was the largest
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sample obtainable when this study commenced. All the data is extracted from the
China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The sample begins in
2004 because it was the year when the CSRC required all Chinese listed firms to
disclose the identity and the divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights of
their ultimate controlling shareholders in annual reports. The time frame (2004 to
2015) also covers the data before and after the NTS reform. The selected firms only
include those that had implemented the reform within the sample period and had at
least one year count as pre-reform and post-reform, respectively. Particularly, the
post-reform observations cover the period from the year of the NTS reform to 2015.
For the selected sample firms, the earliest year of the conduction of the NTS reform
was 2005 and the latest year was 2009. Therefore, the longest post-reform period is
from 2005 to 2015 and the shortest one from 2009 to 2015. After excluding firms that
have been labelled as special treatment shares (stock codes start with *ST) and
particular transfer shares (stock codes start with PT), and firms with missing data or
from the financial industry, the final sample consisted of 8514 firm-year observations
comprised of 717 firms in total. Data used in this study are all firm-year observations.
This violates the independence assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
To produce robust results in the presence of the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation,
all the multivariate results use and report Newey-West adjusted t-statistics. The
industrial fixed effect is controlled for in all models.
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2.4.2 List of variables
Dependent variables
DY: Following Bradford et al. (2013), dividend yield (DY) is used to quantify cash
dividend policy because this measurement avoids distortions from extreme payout
ratios when firms have close to zero or negative net incomes (Gul, 1999; Schooley &
Barney, 1994). According to Eckbo and Verman (1994) and Gul (1999), dividend
yield is calculated as cash dividend per share divided by stock price at the end of the
year.
ORTA: Inter-corporate loans are adopted to measure a direct form of tunnelling which
is driven by the agency conflicts associated with controlling shareholders. Following
Jiang et al. (2010), inter-corporate loans are measured by other receivables scaled by
total assets at the end of the year (ORTA).
Controlling Shareholder identity
The sampled firms are organised into four main categories based on the identities
of their ultimate controlling shareholders. This study kept analysis of SOEs and
non-SOEs separately, as these firms pursue different operational objectives and follow
different agency frameworks (Lin et al., 1998). Within the category of SOEs, SOEs
controlled by the central government (central SOEs) are used as the base/control
group to examine the impact of local governments on determining the firm policies of
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their controlling SOEs (local SOEs). Accordingly, LOCAL is equal to one if a SOE is
ultimately controlled by local governments and other local government agencies in
the year, and zero indicates it is ultimately controlled by the central government.
Within the category of non-SOEs, family firms are defined as non-SOEs that are
ultimately controlled by a family or an individual who owns more than 30% shares
(Bunkanwanicha et al., 2013) in the year; non-SOEs that do not fit the above
definition are viewed as non-family firms. Accordingly, FAMILY is equal to one if a
non-SOE is ultimately controlled by a family or an individual who owns more than
30% shares in the year, and zero indicates otherwise.
From 2004 to 2015, 182 sample firms have been found to receive ultimate
control from the central government, 450 sample firms from local government
agencies, 140 sample firms from families and 209 sample firms from other private
controllers. During this 12-year period, some changes of control had occurred among
listed firms. To accurately reflect the nature of the ultimate control of firms, this study
collected and organized this information based on firm-year observations. Among the
total 8514 firm-year observations, 1735 observations are of the category of the central
government control, 4413 are of the category of local governments and other
local-level government agencies’ control, 928 are of the category of family control
and 1438 are of the category of other private control. Notably, no joint controls from
different categories of controlling shareholders were found in firm-year observations.
Ownership structure
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The holding percentage of the largest shareholder (LARGEST) is a proxy for the
level of control of controlling shareholders (see Chen et al., 2009a). Following Jiang
et al. (2010), this study uses the difference between control (voting) rights and
cash-flow rights to measure ultimate controlling shareholders' excessive control rights
(EXCESS), and as an indicator for the level of principal-to-principal agency conflicts.
Concerning the potential monitoring role of non-controlling large shareholders
(NC_LARGE), the ratio of the sum of percentage shareholdings from the second to the
fifth largest shareholders to the largest shareholder’s holding percentage was chosen
(Zhao et al., 2015).
Other key indicators and control variables
REFORM is a dummy variable which receives a value of one when a firm has
completed its non-tradable share transformation, and zero when this firm is still in the
stage of pre-reform. A firm’s earning ability (ROA) is measured by total profits plus
financial expenses divided by the total assets at the end of the year. Firm cash level
(CASH) is calculated as cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets at the
end of the year. The ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of the year
(LEVERAGE) is used to control for the effect of firm debt obligation. Firm size (SIZE)
is proxied by the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the year. Market to
book ratio (MB) is applied to depict a firm’s growth opportunity. NEW-FIRM is a
dummy variable that equals one when a firm has been listed for fewer than three years,
and 0 otherwise. SD equals the stock dividend per share issued by a firm in a
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particular sample year. DY-1 is the dividend yield in the previous year. Price-earnings
ratio (P/E) as a descriptive measurement is calculated as market value per share
divided by earnings per share. Following Jiang et al. (2010), when analysing the use
of inter-corporate loans, this present study also controls for the regional disparity that
is caused by the difference in progress towards a market economy across each
province. According to Fan et al. (2001), MARKETISATION is measured on a 0-to-10
scale, and each firm is assigned to the value of the province where it is registered. The
industrial segment is also controlled for according to the industry classification
provided by the CSMAR database.
Instrument variables (IV) used in two-stage least square (TSLS) regressions
Payout ratio (PAYOUT) is calculated as cash dividend per share divided by earning
per share. DY-1 and DY-2 are lagged dividend yields. FCF/TA is the alternative of
PAYOUT as an IV used in this test. It is measured by free cash-flows scaled by the
total assets at the end of the year.
Variables designed for robustness tests
The industry-adjusted dividend yield DY(-1)-adjusted replaces DY(-1) as the new
dependent variable in robustness tests.

2.4.3 Models
92

The impact of the NTS reform on cash dividends
This study first examines the impact of the NTS reform on cash dividend
practice at the market level (Model 2.1). The equation that explicitly investigates this
impact is as follows:
u ri = α

β

羨뻀 蒨 ri

β
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ܽ ܽ݅ ܽ
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ε
(Equation 2.1)

Model 2.1 tests Hypothesis 1a & 1b, which covers the pre-reform and
post-reform periods. The key variable is REFORM. If cash dividend policy is heavily
influenced by management discretion through which over-investment might occur
(e.g. Easterbrook, 1984), an enhanced monitoring incentive of controlling
shareholders following the NTS reform might effectively regulate the misconduct of
managers. Therefore, the NTS reform should lead to an increase in cash dividends,
indicating a positive coefficient of REFORM.
Alternatively, the non-tradable holdings of controlling shareholders can lead to
their reliance on cash dividends as a convenient source of liquidation (Wei & Xiao,
2009). The lower price of non-tradable shares also creates a higher implied dividend
yield exclusively for controlling shareholders (Chen et al., 2009a). When the NTS
reform allowed non-tradable shares to be circulated and eliminated their implied
dividend yields, controlling shareholders’ preference of cash dividends should
decrease accordingly. This supports a negative coefficient of REFORM, which is
93

consistent with Hypothesis 1b. The control variables used in Model 2.1 are LARGEST,
NC-LARGE, EXCESS, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM, SD, DY-1
and industry fixed effect.
The impact of local government control on cash dividends among SOEs
This study next looks into the cash dividend practice within SOEs (Model 2.2).
Testing Hypothesis 2, the focus is to test if capital constraint or tunnelling is the main
factor that differentiates the payout policies of central SOEs and local SOEs. The
relevant equation is as follows:
u ri = α
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(Equation 2.2)
The key variables are LOCAL, LOCAL*LARGEST, LOCAL*REFORM for Model
2.2. Particularly, LOCAL captures the cases in which local governments serve as the
ultimate controlling shareholders; LOCAL*LARGEST measures the level of local
government control and LOCAL*REFORM informs the tendency of local SOEs after
the reform. If the capital constraint faced by local governments is managed by local
SOEs (Fan & Lv, 2012), the resulting financial difficulty might lead to lower cash
dividends for local SOEs than for central SOEs (Hypothesis 2a). If this is true, the
coefficient of LOCAL will be negative.
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A competing argument arises if the financial burden of local SOEs can be largely
solved by local governments’ authority over banks. On top of that, the role cash
payouts of local SOEs plays in solving the capital constraints of local governments
might still be present. Under such pressure, local SOEs can be expected to pay higher
cash dividends to supplement the incomes of local governments (Hypothesis 2b). If
this is true, the coefficient of LOCAL will be positive. Additionally, Model 2.2 also
examines if local governments have altered their attitude towards cash dividends after
the NTS reform. Given that local governments are likely to remain financially
distressed without changes in the tax distribution system, the reform might have
limited impact on their preference of cash dividends (Hypothesis 3). The control
variables used by Model 2.2 are NC-LARGE, EXCESS, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE,
SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM, SD, DY-1 and industry fixed effect.
The determinants of cash dividends of different categories of SOEs
This study also investigates the determinants of cash dividend policy within a
sub-category of SOEs. The equation used for this purpose is as follows:
u ri = α
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(Equation 2.1)

This equation is used to test observations of central SOEs (Model 2.3), local
SOEs (Model 2.4), LSOE-GOVs (Model 2.5) and LSOE-SASACs (Model 2.6). The
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control variables of Model 2.3 to 2.6 are LARGEST, NC-LARGE, EXCESS, ROA,
CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM, SD, DY-1 and industry fixed effect.
The impact of family control on cash dividends among non-SOEs
This study next turns to non-SOEs with the focus on how family business owners
affect cash dividend practice (Model 2.7). The equation that tests a joint sample of
family and non-family firms and uses the latter as the control group is shown below:
u ri = α
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The

key

variables

of

Model

2.7

are

FAMILY*LARGEST

and

FAMILY*LARGEST*REFORM. Particularly, FAMILY*LARGEST measures the level
of family control and FAMILY*REFORM highlights the level of this control after the
reform. Family firms are distinct from other non-SOEs as family business owners are
prone to tunnelling because of the obstacles to protecting property rights and to
identifying a successor (Liu et al., 2015). Accordingly, family business owners tend to
hoard excessive cash to tunnel (Liu et al., 2015), suggesting there will be less cash
available to be distributed as dividends. This study expects the coefficient of
FAMILY*LARGEST to be negative as a higher level of family control indicating a
stronger ability to acquire private interests (Hypothesis 4). If the governance intention
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of family business owners changes from tunnelling to active monitoring after the NTS
reform, the coefficient of FAMILY*REFORM is less likely to be negative. The control
variables used in Model 2.7 includes NC-LARGE, EXCESS, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE,
SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM, SD, DY-1 and industry fixed effect.
The determinants of cash dividends of different categories of non-SOEs
This study also examines the active factors that affect cash dividend policy
within sub-categories of non-SOEs. The equation used for this purpose is as follows:
u ri = α
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This equation is used to test observations of family firms (Model 2.8) and
non-family firms (Model 2.9). The control variables of Model 2.8 and 2.9 are
LARGEST, NC-LARGE, EXCESS, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM,
SD, DY-1 and industrial effect.
The interaction between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans of different
categories of firms
The equation that is used to examine the determinants of the issue of
inter-corporate loans within a category of firms is as below:
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(Equation 2.4)
This equation is used to test observations of central SOEs (Model 2.10), local
SOEs (Model 2.11), family firms (Model 2.12) and non-family firms (Model 2.13).
For non-SOEs, under the presence of active tunnelling from non-state controlling
shareholders, firms might adopt a low cash dividend policy to reserve cash for the
issue of inter-corporate loans (Hypothesis 5). If this is the case, coefficients of DY in
Model 2.12 and 2.13 will both be negative. For local SOEs, local governments’
reliance on cash dividends to replenish revenues is expected to suppress
inter-corporate loans which compete for the same given free-cash flows (Hypothesis
6). If this holds, the coefficient of DY in Model 2.11 will be negative. For central
SOEs, the central government control is likely to regulate the issues of both cash
dividends and inter-corporate loans. If this is true, there should be a less competitive
relationship between the two (Hypothesis 7), which should lead to an insignificant
coefficient of DY in Model 2.10. The control variables used by Model 2.10 to Model
2.13 are LARGEST, EXCESS, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, MB, NEW-FIRM, SD,
DY and industry fixed effect.

2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. As
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presented in this table, 8514 firm-year observations show an average dividend yield of
0.010 for the period from 2004 to 2015. This figure is much lower than for US firms
which maintained an average dividend yield around 0.034 from 1950 to 2008
(Engsted & Pedersen, 2010). It seems that cash dividends in China are less than those
paid in developed markets. This also implies that the tunnelling-induced cash
dividends, which should be higher compared to normal circumstance, might only
account for a small number of Chinese firms.
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of continuous variables. Statistics reported are the number
of observations, mean, median, standard deviation (STDV), minimum (Min.), 25% percentile (P25),
75% percentile (P75) and maximum (Max.).
Variables

NO.

Mean

Median

STDV

Min.

P25

P75

Max.

LOCAL

8514

0.518

1

0.500

0

0

1

1

FAMILY

8514

0.109

0

0.312

0

0

0

1

DY

8514

0.010

0.005

0.013

0.000

0.000

0.014

0.069

ORTA

8514

0.025

0.012

0.035

0.000

0.005

0.028

0.203

LARGEST

8514

0.369

0.349

0.156

0.088

0.243

0.488

0.750

NC_LARGE

8514

0.500

0.300

0.517

0.010

0.110

0.750

2.360

EXCESS

8514

0.060

0.000

0.084

0.000

0.000

0.116

0.300

ROA

8514

0.037

0.031

0.051

0.000

0.013

0.056

0.191

CASH

8514

0.157

0.131

0.107

0.013

0.083

0.204

0.545

LEVERAGE

8514

0.507

0.519

0.180

0.809

0.385

0.642

0.864

SIZE

8514

22.139

21.986

1.198

19.950

21.265

22.866

25.571

MB

8514

2.996

2.301

2.210

0.691

1.523

3.692

12.719

SD

8514

0.016

0.000

0.073

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.500

DY-1

8514

0.010

0.006

0.013

0.000

0.000

0.015

0.235

Inter-corporate loans are used as a proxy for tunnelling activities. The sample
used by this study reports the average use of inter-corporate loans scaled by the total
asset as 2.5% from 2004 to 2015. This figure was as high as 8.1% from 1996 to 2004
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according to Jiang et al. (2010). This comparison indicates that inter-corporate loans
which can be used for tunnelling by controlling shareholders have decreased; possibly
in response to a series of regulations from 2004 to 2006 (Jiang et al., 2010). However,
despite the determined attitude of the CSRC in curbing the issue of inter-corporate
loans, weakly enforced regulations have been found to be less effective to fulfil this
request (Liu & Tian, 2012). In line with Liu and Tian (2012), this present study finds
that sample firms still have an average balance of inter-corporate loans of ￥ 256
million on the firm-year level from 2007 to 2015. This observation from the
post-regulation period indicates that the use of inter-corporate loans, which can
transfer firm wealth to controlling shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010), is still a very
serious problem in China.
Table 2.2 lists the results of univariate tests for dividend yields (DY) and
inter-corporate loans (ORTA). Specifically, Panel A shows changes in DY and ORTA
before and after the NTS reform. As evidenced by tests of difference in means,
Chinese firms have lower dividend yields after the NTS reform, regardless of firm
categories. This result is in line with the prediction in Hypothesis 1b which predicts
lower cash payouts after the reform. Local SOEs have experienced an average
decrease of 0.5% in dividend yields after the NTS reform. This decrease is significant
at the 1% confidence level and is the highest level of decrease of all categories of
firms. Still, further results are needed to verify the role served by local governments in
the decreased cash dividends. Despite the tendency of decreased cash dividends, local
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SOEs remain to have higher dividend yields compared to other firms (a t-statistic of
5.90) after the NTS reform. It is noted that, within non-SOEs, family firms experience
a minor change in dividends after the reform given the observation of an insignificant
difference in medians of dividend yield before and after the reform.
Also shown in Panel A, all categories of firms reduced the level of
inter-corporate loans (scaled on the total asset) after the NTS reform. This is
consistent with the notion that the NTS reform leads to improved corporate
governance. Notably, family-firms used to have the highest level of inter-corporate
loans before the reform. They also experienced the greatest decreases (0.52 - 0.21 =
0.31) in these transactions after the reform.
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the results of cross-category and within-category
comparisons in cash dividends controlling for various degrees of ownership
concentration. The within-category analysis shows a trend that is shared by all groups
of firms, that is, greater holdings of controlling shareholders are associated with
higher dividend yields. For the cross-category analysis, for both higher and lower
ownership concentrations, SOEs tend to issue higher cash dividends than non-SOEs.
Within SOEs, evidence mainly suggests that local government control is associated
with significantly higher cash dividends than is the case with central government
control, regardless of the level of ownership concentration. This result is more
consistent with the prediction made by Hypothesis 2b.
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As to the comparison between family firms and non-family firms, insignificant
differences are found in dividend yields when both categories of firms have a lower
degree of ownership concentration. However, family firms are reported to distribute
greater cash dividends than do non-family firms when the degree of ownership
concentration is higher. This observation is against the argument made by Hypothesis
4, and therefore casts doubt about this hypothesis.
Panel C of Table 2.2 presents the results of cross-category and within-category
comparisons for the use of inter-corporate loans controlling for various levels of
excessive control rights for controlling shareholders. Non-SOEs are shown to have
higher of inter-corporate loans than do SOEs. This applies to both cases of higher and
lower degrees of excessive control rights. This result is consistent with Jiang et al.
(2010) who suggest that individual controlling shareholders can realize the private
benefits of inter-corporate loans, and therefore lead to their preference for these
transactions. For central SOEs and local SOEs, different degrees of excessive control
do not lead to different tendencies in the use of inter-corporate loans. The use of
inter-corporate loans of central SOEs and local SOEs is very similar regardless of the
level of excessive control rights for their controlling shareholders.
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Table 2.2 Univariate tests of cash dividends and inter-corporate loans
Panel A. DY and ORTA before and after the NTS reform
This panel presents the results of tests of equality in DY and ORTA before and after the NTS reform.
“Difference tests” columns report the results of difference in mean and median, using T-test and
Wilcoxon test, respectively. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Before NTS
After NTS
Difference tests
Mean

Median

Mean

Median

T value

Z value

Central SOEs
DY

0.013

0.009

0.009

0.005

-5.14***

-2.46**

ORTA

0.048

0.025

0.020

0.010

-12.49***

-9.83***

Local SOEs
DY

0.015

0.011

0.010

0.006

-10.05***

-5.83***

ORTA

0.042

0.022

0.019

0.009

-18.20***

-14.13***

Family firms
DY

0.013

0.007

0.009

0.005

-3.61***

-1.05

ORTA

0.052

0.024

0.021

0.011

-8.79***

-6.81***

0.007

0.003

-4.61***

-1.90*

Non-family firms
DY

0.011

0.004

ORTA

0.048
0.032
0.027
0.013
-7.71***
-7.56***
Panel B. Tests of DY with subject to higher and lower degree of ownership concentration
This panel presents the results of tests of equality in DY for firms with higher and lower levels of
ownership concentration, respectively. “Higher (lower) concentration” refers to values of LARGEST
being higher (lower) than the median of the full sample. “Difference tests” columns report the
differences in mean and median between comparing groups using T-test and Wilcoxon test.
“Differences” rows list the within-group differences along the dimension of ownership concentration.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
DY
Difference tests
Mean

Median

SOEs
Higher
concentration
Lower
concentration
Differences
Higher
concentration
Lower
concentration
Differences
Higher
concentration
Lower
concentration

Mean

Median

Non-SOEs

T value

Z value

Differences

0.013

0.008

0.010

0.006

5.56***

5.91***

0.008

0.004

0.007

0.002

3.47***

4.53***

13.44***

6.10***

7.35***

13.05***

Central SOEs

Local SOEs

Differences

0.012

0.008

0.013

0.008

-1.83*

1.11

0.007

0.003

0.009

0.004

-4.04***

-2.37**

8.83***

9.42***

11.23***

11.17***

Family Firms

Non-family firms

Differences

0.010

0.007

0.009

0.003

2.18**

3.95**

0.008

0.004

0.007

0.002

1.16

1.63
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Differences

2.86***
3.94***
2.29**
1.86*
Panel C. Tests of ORTA with subject to higher and lower level of excessive control rights
This panel presents the results of tests of equality of ORTA for firms with higher and lower levels of
excessive control right, respectively. “Higher (lower) excess” refers to the value of EXCESS being
higher (lower) than the median of the full sample. “Difference tests” columns report the differences in
mean and median between groups using T-test and Wilcoxon test. “Differences” rows list the
within-group differences along the dimension of excessive control rights. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
ORTA
Difference tests
Mean

Median

SOEs

Mean

Median

Non-SOEs

T value

Z value

Differences

Higher excess

0.023

0.010

0.028

0.014

-4.24***

-5.90***

Lower excess

0.024

0.011

0.027

0.013

-2.78***

-2.26**

Differences

-1.42

-1.95*

0.29

1.57

Central SOEs

Local SOEs

Differences

Higher excess

0.025

0.012

0.023

0.010

1.25

1.40

Lower excess

0.024

0.011

0.023

0.011

0.43

1.48

Differences

0.49

0.03

-0.31

-0.22

Family Firms

Non-family firms

Differences

Higher excess

0.027

0.013

0.030

0.016

-1.49

-2.94***

Lower excess

0.022

0.010

0.029

0.014

-3.40***

-3.92***

Differences

2.14**

3.01***

0.41

2.32**

Within non-SOEs, it is largely supported that non-family firms use more
inter-corporate loans than family firms use. Higher excessive control rights for family
business owners are associated with significantly higher inter-corporate loans. This
observation is consistent with the tunnelling argument raised by Liu et al. (2015).
The present study also conducts partial covariance analysis between DY and
ORTA with the rest of explanatory variables used in Equation 2.8 for conditioning. For
the sample of non-SOEs, the correlation coefficient between DY and ORTA is -0.096
with a t-statistic of -4.67 (significant at the 1% level). This is expected as stated in
Hypothesis 5. For non-state controlling shareholders who can financially benefit from
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inter-corporate loans which can divert a higher proportion of given cash outflows
compared to cash dividends, these loans should be preferred over dividends as a
method of tunnelling. For the sample of local SOEs, the correlation coefficient
between DY and ORTA is -0.093 with a t-statistic of -6.17 (significant at the 1% level),
which is consistent with Hypothesis 6. It appears that when local governments cannot
accrue the financial interests of inter-corporate loans, such transactions are passively
suppressed by local governments’ reliance on cash dividends. Lastly, for central SOEs,
the correlation between DY and ORTA is insignificant (a t-statistic of -0.93). This
supports Hypothesis 7. A possible explanation is that both the issues of cash dividends
and inter-corporate loans are likely to be regulated under the control of the central
government.

2.5.2 Multivariate analysis
2.5.2.1 Cash dividend practice after the NTS reform
This study also used multivariate analysis to investigate the changes in dividend
yields led by the NTS reform. Firstly, this issue was examined using the full sample
(Model 2.1). Shown by REFORM in Panel A of Table 2.3, its significantly negative
coefficient (with a t-statistic of -6.61) indicates that Chinese listed firms’ dividend
yields generally decreased after the reform. The result suggests that cash dividends are
reduced when controlling shareholders’ holdings are tradable and priced by the market.
This supports that the NTS reform reduces the case when dividends are paid to
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compensate for unobtainable capital gains or to gain exclusive dividend yields led by
the lower price of non-tradable shares. This is also in line with the notion that with the
aim of maximising firm value, controlling shareholders choose to retain more cash,
for example to invest in positive NPV projects, instead of paying out excessive cash
dividends. After all, the value of controlling shareholders’ holdings is directly
determined by the market value of firms after the reform. This fits the prediction of
Hypothesis 1b and is consistent with results from the univariate analysis. In the
meantime, the absence of an increase in cash dividends given the improvement in
corporate governance provided by the reform (Jiang et al., 2010; Liu & Tian., 2012) is
not consistent with the prediction of the free-cash-flow theory (Hypothesis 1a).

2.5.2.2 Determinants of cash dividend policy among central SOEs and local
SOEs
Panel B of Table 2.3 provides the results on a lumped sample of SOEs using
central SOEs as the control group (Model 2.2). Given the significantly positive
coefficient of LOCAL (a t-statistic of 2.29), local SOEs tend to issue significantly
higher dividends compared to the payouts of central SOEs. This result suggests a
causal link between local government control and higher cash dividends, which is
more in line with the prediction of the tunnelling argument (Hypothesis 2b) than that
of the inherited capital constraint argument (Hypothesis 2a). It appears that compared
to central SOEs, local SOEs can still issue relatively high cash dividends despite
facing the possible financial constraints formed by being a borrowing platform for
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local governments (Fan & Lv, 2012).
This study further tested for the connection between the holdings (the level of
control) of local governments and cash payouts by looking at the coefficient of
LOCAL*LARGEST (Panel B of Table 2.3). Larger stake inside SOEs indicates a
higher level of discretion as well as accountability for local governments. The study is
also interested in whether the impact of local government control on cash dividend
policy changed after the NTS reform (shown by LOCAL*REFORM).
The insignificant coefficient of LOCAL*LARGEST indicates that the level of
control is less relevant than the type of control (LOCAL) in determining the cash
payouts of local SOEs. This could be that the power to demand payouts is determined
by the controlling status (LOCAL) rather than the level of cash-flow rights
(LOCAL*LARGEST).

As

evidenced

by

the

insignificant

coefficient

of

LOCAL*REFORM, the cash dividend practice of local SOEs received a weak
influence from the NTS reform compared to the influence of the reform on the cash
dividend practice of central SOEs. This fits Hypothesis 3 which suggests that the NTS
reform is less likely to alter local governments’ preference in cash dividends without a
change in the tax distribution system.
Next, this study takes a closer look into whether features of ownership structure
and financial characteristics affect the dividend policies of central SOEs (Model 2.3)
and local SOEs (Model 2.4). As shown in Panel C of Table 2.3, stronger profitability
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(ROA), larger firm size (SIZE) and lower need to support growth opportunity (MB)
lead to higher cash dividends for both central SOEs and local SOEs. NC_LARGE
testing on the sample of local SOEs (the last column of Panel C) has a significantly
positive coefficient. This suggests that, for local SOEs, a more balanced ownership
structure formed by multiple large shareholders leads to higher cash dividends (as
well as for central SOEs as shown in the first column of Panel C). If non-controlling
large shareholders are still inclined to high cash payouts when they have the power to
restrain the discretion of local governments, this questions if tunnelling via cash
dividends is dominant for local SOEs. It is possible that local SOEs’ unregulated
issues of cash dividends are mainly driven by a sub-sample. The observation that the
coefficient of REFORM for the sample of local SOEs is significantly negative also
raises the concern of a sub-sample effect (the coefficient of LOCAL*REFORM is
insignificant when testing on a joint sample of central and local SOEs). To address
this concern and produce more robust results, this study identifies a group of local
SOEs that is subject to more command from local governments.
The hand-collected data on the controlling ownership shows two ways for local
governments to obtain controlling rights. In most cases, it is through local SASACs.
Local governments have administrative power for SOEs owned and managed by
SASACs operating in their areas. The second way is through direct commercial
investments. In this case, local governments are equity investors of SOEs.
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Table 2.3 The effects of the NTS reform and controlling shareholders on cash dividend policy:
Full sample and sub-samples of SOEs
This table presents the results showing the impacts of the NTS reform and controlling shareholders
on cash dividends, using the full sample and sub-samples of SOEs. The dependent variable is
dividend yield. The definition of variables is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is
controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are
reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A.

Panel B.

Sample

Full sample

SOEs

Central SOEs

Local SOEs

Variable

DY

DY

DY

DY

C

-.021***
(-6.81)

-.024***
(-6.16)

-.022***
(-2.94)

-.023***
(-5.53)

LOCAL

—

—

—

-.002**
(-1.98)
.013***
(4.94)

-.003***
(-5.55)
.007***
(3.98)

—

—

—

—

.002***
(3.35)
.003
(.91)
.063***
(7.19)
-.001
(-.42)
-.004**
(-2.01)
.001***
(3.36)
-.001***
(-9.18)
.002
(.80)
.011**
(2.15)
.301***
(9.64)
1735
.351

.001***
(2.98)
-.003
(-1.02)
.068***
(11.46)
.001
(.42)
-.001
(-1.23)
.001***
(6.87)
-.002***
(-14.26)
.005***
(2.66)
.008***
(2.94)
.343***
(16.50)
4413
.357

REFORM
LARGEST
LOCAL*
REFORM
LOCAL*
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

-.003***
(-6.61)
.007***
(5.85)
—
—
.001***
(3.92)
-.002
(-1.47)
.054***
(13.68)
.001
(.94)
-.002**
(-2.56)
.001***
(8.53)
-.001***
(-17.31)
.005***
(3.77)
.010***
(5.10)
.367***
(24.15)
8514
.349

.003**
(2.29)
-.002**
(-2.09)
.011***
(4.96)
-.001
(-1.43)
-.003
(-1.10)
.002***
(4.25)
-.001
(-.30)
.066***
(13.71)
.000
(.28)
-.002**
(-2.07)
.001***
(7.21)
-.002***
(-16.96)
.004***
(2.68)
.008***
(3.61)
.336***
(19.07)
6148
.356

Panel C.

Overall, this study found 441 local SOEs that had been owned by local SASACs
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(indicating administrative power only for local governments), and 85 that had been
funded and directly controlled by local governments.
Given that the course of action of local SASACs is entirely determined by the
central SASAC, this study conjectures that the management of local SOEs controlled
by local SASACs should be similar to that of central SOEs regulated by the central
SASAC. Notably, the authority of local SASACs should invite consistent monitoring
and less discretion from local governments. Hence, it is expected that higher cash
dividends are a sign of desirable corporate governance among SOEs managed by local
SASACs rather than by local governments. To examine this, this study divides local
SOEs into ones managed by local SASACs (LSOE-SASACs hereafter) and ones
directly controlled by local governments (LSOE-GOVs hereafter).
As a point of interest, this study first performed a test of difference in means of
DY between LSOE-GOVs and LSOE-SASACs. The comparison shows that
LSOE-GOVs tend to issue higher cash dividends than LSOE-SASACs (with a
t-statistic of 1.90). Next, this study conducted a multivariate analysis of both
categories of local SOEs, and the results are shown in Table 2.4. This analysis
provides two instructive observations. First, only the results of LSOE-SASACs report
a significantly positive coefficient (a t-statistic of 3.29) for NC_LARGE (Model 2.6 in
Column 2). This observation indicates that the monitoring function served by multiple
large shareholders, or non-controlling large shareholders to be specific, can promote
higher cash dividends when firm management is performed by SASACs. As to
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LSOE-GOVs (Model 2.5 in Column 1), the insignificant coefficient of NC_LARGE
suggests that non-controlling large shareholders are less relevant in determining the
cash dividend policy when local governments are direct controlling shareholders. This
observation provides little evidence that non-controlling large shareholders of
LSOE-GOVs form a coalition with local governments to demand cash dividends. Still,
these large shareholders are also inactive in reducing cash payouts that might be
tunnelling-induced because of the financial stress of local governments. This result is
in line with Lin et al. (1998) who suggest a lack of managerial autonomy among
SOEs points to shirking as a particular agency problem.
The second instructive observation in Table 2.4 is that the coefficient of
REFORM is insignificant for the sample of LSOE-GOVs. This shows that cash
dividends of LSOE-GOVs are insensitive to the implementation of the NTS reform.
The results are consistent with the view that cash dividends among LSOE-GOVs are
less influenced by the non-tradability or the low price of non-tradable shares but are
more affected by the capital constraints and the abuse of power of local governments.
Particularly, neither the financial distress nor the controlling position of local
governments can be altered or removed by the reform. This, again, supports that the
tunnelling-induced cash dividends still exist among local SOEs after the NTS reform
when the financial constrained local governments are in direct control of these firms.
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Table 2.4 The determinants of cash dividends of LSOE-GOVs and LSOE-SASACs
This table presents the results on the sub-samples of LSOE-GOVs and LSOE-SASACs, with a
specific focus on the various impacts of administrative ownership and commercial investment on
cash dividends. The dependent variable is dividend yield. The definition of variables is detailed in
Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are
omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1).

(2).

Sample

LSOE-GOVs

LSOE-SASACs

Variable

DY

DY

-.035*
(-1.71)
-.002
(-1.03)
.025**
(2.48)
.001
(.70)
-.024**
(-2.05)
.072***
(3.11)
-.005
(-.62)
-.003
(-.62)
.001
(1.32)
-.001***
(-3.33)
.007*
(1.80)
-.006
(-.61)
.408***
(4.84)
227
.524

-.025***
(-5.84)
-.003***
(-5.46)
.007***
(3.68)
.002***
(3.29)
-.001
(-.55)
.050***
(8.96)
.002
(1.07)
-.003**
(-2.55)
.002***
(7.37)
-.001***
(-12.98)
.005**
(2.37)
.009***
(3.50)
.342***
(16.10)
4186
.340

C
REFORM
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

This study also searched for a connection between cash dividends and stock
dividends as the concurrent issue of the two is believed to send out a reliable signal of
strong future performance in China (Anderson et al., 2011). As shown in Column 2 of
Table 2.4, the coefficient of SD is significantly positive. That is, for LSOE-SASACs
112

(and central SOEs in Table 2.3), higher stock dividends are associated with higher
concurrent cash dividends. However, this is not the case for LSOE-GOVs.

2.5.2.3 Determinants of cash dividend policy among family firms
Next, this study turns to an investigation of the cash dividend practice of Chinese
non-SOEs with a particular focus on family firms. The literature suggests that Chinese
family firms foster a tunnelling risk arising from unfavourable institutional settings
and a succession problem flowing from the one-child policy (Liu et al., 2015). This
background indicates less desirable corporate governance concerning the issue of cash
dividends among family firms.
Panel A of Table 2.5 displays the results for the sample of non-SOEs (Model 2.7).
Using non-family firms as a control group, the significantly negative coefficient of
FAMILY*LARGEST indicates that a more intensive family control results in lower
cash distributions. This observation confirms family business owners’ lack of
preference for cash dividends (Liu et al., 2015), and is supportive of Hypothesis 4.
The rationale behind the negative link between family control and cash dividends
might be that cash distributions occupy discretionary funds which can be tunnelled by
family business owners in convenient forms, such as through inter-corporate loans
(Liu et al., 2015).
To deepen the findings on family firms, this study examined whether the NTS
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reform affects the impact of family control on cash dividends. Given the insignificant
coefficient of FAMILY*REFORM in Panel A of Table 2.5, family firms’ cash
distributions seem to be less affected by the NTS reform compared to non-family
firms. A plausible explanation is that Chinese family firms are prone to tunnelling
because there is weak protection of property rights and a succession problem (Liu et
al., 2015) for which the NTS reform does not seem to have been an adequate remedy.
It also appears that this reform’s expected outcome of an improvement in corporate
governance (Liu & Tian, 2012) fail to deliver a change in payouts of family firms.
This study considers that cash dividends are less likely to be used for interests
transfer among family firms whether before or after the NTS reform. Compared to
cash dividends that are proportional to cash-flow rights, family business owners might
prefer inter-corporate loans which can divert a greater proportion of funds to their
controlling parties (Jiang et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015). In this case, cash dividends
may serve as an adverse tunnelling measurement for family firms. Still, given the
insignificant coefficient of REFORM for the sub-sample of family firms (in the first
column in Panel B of Table 2.5) the NTS reform, again, is shown to have an
insignificant impact on their cash dividends. Thus, although family firms are found to
reduce tunnelling via excessive cash-holdings after the NTS reform (Liu et al., 2015),
the transition from reserving cash for tunnelling to distributing higher cash dividends
does not seem to have happened.
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Table 2.5 The determinants of cash dividends of non-SOEs, family firms and non-family
firms
This table presents the results on the lumped sample of non-SOEs and sub-samples of family
firms and non-family firms. The dependent variable is dividend yield. The definition of variables
is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the
results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A.

Panel B.

Sample

Non-SOEs

Family firms

Non-family firms

Variable

DY

DY

DY

-.020***

-.000
(-.00)

-.034***
(-4.76)

—

—

-.001
(-.60)
.001
(.37)

-.004***
(-3.31)
.008**
(2.43)

—

—

—

—

-.000
(-.53)
-.007*
(-1.88)
.033***
(3.05)
.008**
(2.15)
.002
(.71)
.000
(.87)
-.001***
(-6.83)
.006**
(2.01)
.010**
(2.34)
.396***
(9.08)
928
.262

.001
(1.11)
-.002
(-.40)
.028***
(4.56)
-.000
(-.03)
-.005**
(-2.47)
.002***
(5.43)
-.001***
(-4.42)
.006*
(1.94)
.017***
(2.84)
.454***
(12.06)
1438
.390

C
FAMILY
REFORM
LARGEST
FAMILY*
REFORM
FAMILY*
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

(-3.86)
.001
(.44)
-.003***
(-2.82)
.009***
(2.69)
.001
(.58)
-.007*
(-1.78)
.001
(1.14)
-.006**
(-2.03)
.030***
(5.42)
.003
(1.53)
-.002
(-1.35)
.001***
(4.82)
-.001***
(-7.70)
.006***
(2.83)
.013***
(3.66)
.435***
(15.42)
2366
.337
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This study reports an insignificant coefficient for LARGEST in the sample of
family firms. Liu et al. (2015) show that most family firms in China are still in the
hands of founding families. For the sample of family firms used by this present study,
the number of family firms ranges from 63 to 88 from 2004 to 2015. Additionally,
during this period, the average holdings of the largest owners of family firms range
from 44.20% to 36.83% (the main variations are led by the NTS reform). This lack of
significant variation in the degree of family control across family firms and through
time may preclude the identification of a statistically significant relationship between
family holdings and cash dividends in the family firm data alone.

2.5.2.4 The interaction between inter-corporate loans and the concurrent cash
dividends
This section examines whether cash dividends interact with inter-corporate loans
and whether this interaction varies according to the incentive of controlling
shareholders. A potential endogeneity issue may arise from a reverse causality
existing between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans. That is, they compete for
the same given amount of free cash-flows and therefore might be jointly determined.
To address this simultaneous influence, this study applied a two-stage least squares
(TSLS) estimation for all regressions that use ORTA as the dependent variable and DY
as an explanatory variable. This estimation uses payout ratio (PAYOUT) and lagged
DYs (DY-1 and DY-2) as IVs for DY. Results of both stages are reported and the
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Stock-Yogo weak instrument test is performed for all TSLS regressions to examine
the validity of IVs.
This study keeps separated analysis of SOEs and non-SOEs for the examination
on inter-corporate loans. Public organisations, such as government agencies, cannot
accrue the financial benefits of inter-corporate loans, as these transactions are in the
form of private lending. Therefore, this study considers that inter-corporate loans are
more likely to be misused by non-SOEs with the presence of individual controlling
shareholders who can seize private interests via these transactions. Further, this study
remains to categorise non-SOEs into family and non-family firms, as family firms are
found to have more severe misuse of inter-corporate loans compared to other
privately-held firms (Liu et al., 2015).
The results from sub-samples of non-SOEs, namely family (Panel A) and
non-family firms (Panel B) are listed in Table 2.6. The first column of Panel A reports
the results of the first stage OLS regression estimation on DY for family firms.
Coefficients of IVs, namely PAYOUT, DY-1 and DY-2, are all positively significant at
the 1% level. The adjusted R-square of this regression is 0.541. In the second column,
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic reports a value of 276.19 which is larger than the
Stock-Yogo critical values using the bias method and the size method (Stock & Yogo,
2002). These results reject that the IVs for DY are invalid or weak. The results of the
second stage IV regression estimation on ORTA report a significantly negative
coefficient of DY. This confirms that lower payouts from family firms tend to be
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associated with higher inter-corporate loans. This evidence is also consistent with
previous findings of Liu et al. (2015).
In Panel B, IVs of DY are shown to be valid with a Cragg-Donald F-statistic
greatly exceeding the critical values of the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test (Stock &
Yogo, 2002). Further, in the second column of Panel B, the significant and negative
coefficient of DY indicates that the negative interaction between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans applies to non-family firms as well. The findings on DY from
sub-samples of family and non-family firms provide support to Hypothesis 5 which
predicts that lower cash dividends tend to be associated with higher levels of
inter-corporate loans among non-SOEs. Inter-corporate loans are able to direct 100%
of the cash out-flows to non-state controlling shareholders’ related parties while cash
dividends are to be shared by all registered shareholders. Therefore, under the
dominance of private controlling shareholders’ tunnelling, inter-corporate loans would
be preferred over cash dividends, forming a negative relationship between the two.
This can account for the observation that lower dividends are predictive for higher
concurrent issues of inter-corporate loans among non-SOEs.
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Table 2.6 The interactions between inter-corporate loans and cash dividends: Sub-samples of family firms and non-family firms
This table presents the TSLS regression results in testing the concurrent interaction between inter-corporate loans and cash dividends, using sub-samples of
family firms (Panel A) and non-family firms (Panel B). In each panel, the first column reports the results of the first stage OLS regression estimation of DY; the
second column reports the results of the second stage IV regression estimation of ORTA. The definition of variables is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry
fixed effect is controlled for in models but the results are unreported. To test the validity of IVs, values of Cragg-Donald F-statistic, critical values of
Stock-Yogo weak instrument tests using the bias method (5% level) and using the size method (10% level) are reported. The decision rule is that reject that IVs
are weak if Cragg-Donald F-statistic is higher than the critical values of Stock-Yogo tests. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted
t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Sample
Variable
C
DY
REFORM
MARKETISATION
LARGEST
EXCESS
ROA

Panel A.

Panel B.

Family firms

Non-family firms

1st stage OLS regression

2nd stage IV regression

1st stage OLS regression

2nd stage IV regression

estimation of DY

estimation of DY

-.004

estimation of ORTA
.144***

-.023***

estimation of ORTA
.131***

(-.69)

(3.94)

(-3.73)

(3.41)

—

-.471***
(-2.95)

—

-.489***
(-2.85)

-.001

-.030***

-.003***

-.021***

(-1.37)

(-4.66)

(-3.21)

(-4.47)

.000

-.002*

.000

-.001

(.89)

(-1.68)

(.55)

(-.92)

-.001

-.003

.004

.000

(-.31)

(-.21)

(1.47)

(.02)

-.000

.030*

-.001

.011

(-.16)

(1.68)

(-.42)

(.60)

.055***

-.093**

.039***

-.032

(5.16)

(-2.34)

(5.92)

(-.87)
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CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
PAYOUT

.005*

-.030**

-.001

-.009

(1.88)

(-2.47)

(-.36)

(-.75)

.008***

.008

.001

-.002

(3.51)

(.64)

(.43)

(-.12)

.000

-.003*

.001***

-.003

(.13)

(-1.89)

(4.25)

(-1.51)

-.001***

.000

-.000***

-.000

(-6.88)

(.08)

(-3.94)

(-.12)

.005**

-.009

.005**

-.003

(2.34)

(-1.23)

(2.02)

(-.29)

.014***
(8.89)
.198***

DY-1

(5.94)
.139***

DY-2

(3.92)

Cragg-Donald

—
—
—

.014***
(8.87)
.258***
(7.66)
.130***
(4.52)

—
—
—

—

276.19

—

350.34

—

13.91

—

13.91

—

22.30

—

22.30

No. obs.

928

928

1438

1438

Adj. R

.541

.178

.560

.115

F-statistic
Stock-Yogo CV
(relative bias)
Stock-Yogo CV
(size)
2
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The second column of Panel B in Table 2.7 reports a significantly negative
coefficient of DY for the sample of local SOEs. This shows the negative interaction
between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans among local SOEs. At first glance,
inter-corporate loans are less likely to incur financial benefits for local governments
and therefore could be subject to fewer distortions from local governments. However,
these loans are shown to be passively suppressed by cash dividends which might be
paid to alleviate the financial pressure of local governments. The “competitive”
relationship between cash payouts and inter-corporate loans among local SOEs is due
to the situation that the benefit of dividends, instead of that of inter-corporate loans, is
more obtainable for local governments. This confirms the contention in Hypothesis 6.
In the second column of Panel A in Table 2.7, the coefficient of DY is
insignificant for the sample of central SOEs. This indicates that cash payouts show a
weak connection with inter-corporate loans among central SOEs. With the active
monitoring associated with the control of the central government, issues of these
transactions should be regulated. Additionally, the central government is not
financially constrained and therefore is less likely to rely on cash dividends to provide
extra incomes. These account for the lack of “competition” between cash payouts and
inter-corporate loans among central SOEs, which is consistent with Hypothesis 7.
As a point of interest, this study next examines if the composition of
shareholders’ control rights predicts the use of inter-corporate loans. Given the
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significantly negative coefficient of LARGEST for the sample of central SOEs (the
second column of Panel A in Table 2.7), the level of central government control has an
adverse impact on the use of inter-corporate loans. This is expected for the case of
central SOEs, as controlling shareholders who value firm performance should try to
avoid inter-corporate loans which are documented to have adverse economic
consequences (Jiang et al., 2010). This mitigating role, however, is found to be absent
given insignificant coefficients of LARGEST among observations of local SOEs (the
second column of Panel B in Table 2.7), family firms (the second column of Panel A
in Table 2.6) and non-family firms (the second column of Panel B in Table 2.6).
For family firms, the significantly positive coefficient of EXCESS in the second
column of Panel A in Table 2.6 indicates that inter-corporate loans are higher when
families have greater excessive control rights. This result confirms the evidence in Liu
et al. (2015). That is, the use of inter-corporate loans by family owners can be
exaggerated when their excessive control rights are prominent. This suggests a higher
risk of tunnelling. It is also congruent with the notion that family business owners’
tunnelling stems from the composition of pyramid ownership structure (Liu et al.,
2015). The significantly positive relationship between excessive control rights and
inter-corporate loans is found for family firms only. This is supportive of the notion
that given the presence of excessive control rights, family firms tend to make more
questionable use of inter-corporate loans compared to non-family firms and SOEs.
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Table 2.7 The interactions between inter-corporate loans and cash dividends: Sub-samples of central SOEs and local SOEs
This table presents the TSLS regression results in testing the concurrent interaction between inter-corporate loans and cash dividends, using sub-samples of central SOEs (Panel
A) and local SOEs (Panel B). In each panel, the first column reports the results of the first stage OLS regression estimation of DY; the second column reports the results of the
second stage IV regression estimation of ORTA. The definition of variables is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in models but the results are
unreported. To test the validity of IVs, values of Cragg-Donald F-statistic, critical values of Stock-Yogo weak instrument tests using the bias method (5% level) and using the
size method (10% level) are reported. The decision rule is that reject that IVs are weak if Cragg-Donald F-statistic is higher than the critical values of Stock-Yogo tests.
Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.

Panel A.
Sample
Variable
C
DY
REFORM
MARKETISATION
LARGEST
EXCESS
ROA
CASH

Panel B.

Central SOEs

Local SOEs

1 stage OLS regression

2 stage IV regression

1 stage OLS regression

2nd stage IV regression

estimation of DY

estimation of ORTA

estimation of DY

estimation of ORTA

-.019***

.120***

-.020***

.150***

(-2.86)

(3.93)

(-5.24)

(8.80)

st

—

nd

-.236
(-1.25)

st

—

-.393***
(-4.85)

-.003***

-.029***

-.004***

-.024***

(-2.94)

(-5.35)

(-6.68)

(-10.21)

-.000

.003***

.000**

-.001

(-.67)

(2.94)

(2.31)

(-1.42)

.005***

-.022**

.003**

-.006

(2.89)

(-2.32)

(2.20)

(-1.18)

.002

.003

-.003

-.010

(.75)

(.23)

(-1.16)

(-.99)

.071***

-.061**

.075***

-.042**

(7.57)

(-2.36)

(12.42)

(-2.12)

-.001

-.015

.003

-.003
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LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
PAYOUT

(-.45)

(-1.57)

(1.52)

(-.48)

.001

.013

.001

.020***

(.32)

(1.59)

(1.20)

(3.91)

.001***

-.003**

.001***

-.004***

(3.40)

(-2.13)

(6.05)

(-5.72)

-.001***

.000

-.001***

-.000

(-9.14)

(.08)

(-13.79)

(-.54)

.002

-.002

.005***

-.018***

(.93)

(-.26)

(2.62)

(-4.45)

.009***
(9.40)
.177***

DY-1

(5.95)
.123***

DY-2

(4.65)

Cragg-Donald

—
—
—

.007***
(12.29)
.243***
(12.37)
.127***
(7.02)

—
—
—

—

219.39

—

636.19

—

13.91

—

13.91

—

22.30

—

22.30

No. obs.

1735

1735

4413

4413

Adj. R

.467

.198

.478

.158

F-statistic
Stock-Yogo CV
(relative bias)
Stock-Yogo CV
(size)
2
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2.5.2.6 Robustness check
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the longest post-reform period of a sample firm is
from 2005 to 2015. This extended period raises the concern of a sub-period effect that
the impact of the NTS reform on cash dividends fades as time goes by. If this is the
case, then the findings on the NTS reform might be mainly led by the observations
from years when the reform was recently executed. To address this concern, this
present study designed a robustness test excluding observations from the first three
years following the conduction of the NTS reform, which decreased the tested
observations from 8514 to 5660. This design also excludes observations from years
when trading restrictions were imposed on the reformed non-tradable shares.
Accordingly, in this robustness test, the longest post-reform period is from 2008 to
2015, the shortest post-reform period is from 2012 to 2015.
Shown in Table 2.8, the coefficient of REFORM is significantly negative with a
t-statistic of -8.49. This indicates that the impact of the NTS reform on cash dividends
is still valid/consistent even when the reform was conducted at least three years ago.
This also removes the concern of a sub-period effect. It appears that aligning the
interests of controlling and minority shareholders via the united pricing of outstanding
shares has served as a sustained force to regulate the issue of cash dividends.
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Table 2.8 The robustness test on the effect of the NTS reform on cash dividends
This table presents the results showing the impact of the NTS reform on cash dividends, using
observations from the pre-reform period and from the fourth year after the conduction of the reform
to 2015. The dependent variable is dividend yield. The definition of variables is detailed in Section
2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted.
Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, ** and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A.
Sample

Full sample

Variable

DY

C
REFORM
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

-.026***
(-7.60)
-.004***
(-8.49)
.004***
(3.04)
.001***
(2.59)
-.000
(-.26)
.051***
(12.45)
.000
(.10)
-.002**
(-2.43)
.001***
(8.73)
-.001***
(-10.73)
.004***
(2.85)
.012***
(4.87)
.482***
(20.90)
5660
.411

Despite that the course of actions followed by local SASACs is regulated by the
central SASAC, local SASACs may be affected by local governments as they are both
state agencies operated in the same administrative district. Therefore, for the first
robustness check, this study examined the association between the holdings of
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non-controlling large shareholders (NC_LARGE) and cash dividends based on the
sample of LSOE-SASACs. Non-controlling large shareholders as tradable
shareholders are typically compensated with additional shares during the NTS reform.
As a result, the submission, if present, is likely to fade after the reform because of a
more balanced ownership structure. Hence, this robustness test uses observations after
the NTS reform to investigate if the preference for cash dividends is still held by
non-controlling large shareholders among LSOE-SASACs.
The results of the first robustness test are shown in Table 2.9. To be thorough, the
test on post-reform observations was also performed on the sub-samples of
LSOE-GOVs (Column 1) and central SOEs (Column 3). As suggested by the
significantly positive coefficients of NC_LARGE in Columns 2 and 3, the function of
non-controlling large shareholders in promoting cash payouts appears to be active for
LSOE-SASACs and central SOEs even after the reform, rendering the account of
submission (coalition) less plausible. For the case of LSOE-GOVs, the insignificant
coefficient of NC_LARGE indicates that the enhanced status of non-controlling large
shareholders after the reform still fails to affect cash dividend policies that may be
dominated by decisions of local governments.
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Table 2.9 Robustness tests on the effects of administrative ownership and commercial
investment on cash dividends using post-reform observations
This table presents the results of testing the robustness of the effects of administrative ownership and
commercial investment on cash dividends, featuring post-reform observations from the sub-samples
of LSOE-GOVs, LSOE-SASACs and central SOEs. The dependent variable is dividend yield. The
definition of variables is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all
regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West
adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1).
(2).
(3).
Sample
LSOEs-GOV
LSOEs-SASAC
CSOEs
Variable
C
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

DY

DY

DY

-.025
(-1.26)
.022*
(1.93)
-.000
(-.16)
.002
(.17)
.048*
(1.91)
.003
(.30)
.000
(.01)
.001
(1.15)
-.001***
(-3.82)
.014***
(3.88)
-.005
(-.53)
.244**
(2.21)
146
.457

-.023***
(-4.95)
.007***
(3.82)
.002***
(3.33)
-.002
(-.87)
.065***
(10.54)
.000
(.22)
-.002
(-1.14)
.001***
(5.78)
-.002***
(-14.21)

-.018**
(-2.37)
.014***
(5.29)
.002***
(3.29)
.003
(.69)
.060***
(7.26)
-.002
(-.79)
-.003*
(-1.79)
.001***
(2.73)
-.001***
(-9.03)
.013
(1.07)
.007
(1.51)
.278***
(8.25)
1457
.354

—
.009***
(3.12)
.291***
(12.87)
3479
.332

Lastly, this study investigated whether the findings on determinants of cash
dividend policies are robust to an alternative measurement of cash payouts. This test
then adopts the industry-adjusted dividend yield. To be consistent, this study also
updated explanatory variables DY-1 to be industry-adjusted. Given the results listed in
Table 2.10, the main findings of this study are robust to an alternative measurement of
cash dividend policy.
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Table 2.10 Robustness tests using an alternative measurement of cash dividends
This table presents the results using industry-adjusted dividend yields when testing the impacts of the NTS reform and controlling shareholders. The dependent variable is
DY-adjusted. The definition of variables is detailed in Section 2.4.2. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized
beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A.

Panel B.

Panel C.

Full Sample

SOEs

Private Firms

DY-adjusted

DY-adjusted

DY-adjusted

C

-.025***
(-8.14)

-.021***
(-4.08)

-.028
(-1.33)

-.030***
(-7.03)

LOCAL

—

-.029***
(-7.50)
.003**
(2.28)

—

—

—

FAMILY

—

—

-.003***
(-6.61)
.007***
(5.85)

-.002**
(-2.10)
.011***
(4.96)
-.001

REFORM
LARGEST
LOCAL*
REFORM
LOCAL*
LARGEST*
FAMILY*
REFORM

—

(-1.41)

-.002
(-1.03)
.025***
(2.48)

-.003***
(-5.46)
.007***
(3.68)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

.001
(.60)

NC_LARGE

.001***
(3.92)

.002***
(4.25)

DY-adjusted

—

—

—

DY-adjusted

LSOE-SASACs

—

-.002
(-1.08)

—

LSOE-GOVs

.001
(1.46)
-.003***
(-2.87)
.009***
(2.68)

—

FAMILY*
LARGEST*

Panel D.

-.007*
(-1.81)
.000
(1.08)

.001
(.70)

.002***
(3.29)
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EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
NEW_FIRM
SD
DY-1-adjusted
No. Obs
Adjusted R2

-.002
(-1.47)
.054***
(13.68)
.001
(.94)
-.002***
(-2.56)
.001***
(8.53)
-.001***
(-17.31)
.005***
(3.77)
.010***
(5.10)
.367***
(24.15)
8514
.345

-.001
(-.30)
.066***
(13.68)
.000
(.28)
-.002**
(-2.06)
.001***
(7.21)
-.002***
(-16.95)
.004***
(2.68)
.008***
(3.61)
.335***
(19.03)
6148
.353

-.005**
(-1.99)
.030***
(5.13)
.003
(1.50)
-.002
(-1.22)
.001***
(4.79)
-.001***
(-7.87)
.006***
(2.78)
.013***
(3.71)
.441***
(15.16)
2366
.330

-.024**
(-2.05)
.072***
(3.11)
-.005
(-.62)
-.003
(-.62)
.001
(1.32)
-.001***
(-3.33)
.007*
(1.80)
-.006
(-.61)
.408***
(4.84)
227
.500

-.001
(-.55)
.050***
(8.96)
.002
(1.07)
-.003***
(-2.55)
.002***
(7.37)
-.001***
(-12.98)
.005**
(2.37)
.009***
(3.50)
.342***
(16.10)
4186
33.73
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2.6 Concluding remarks
This study examined cash dividend practice of Chinese firms under influences of
the NTS reform and various governance incentives of controlling shareholders.
Following 8514 firm-year observations which cover pre-reform and post-reform
periods, empirical evidence shows that cash dividends are reduced at the market level
following the NTS reform. This verifies the notion conveyed by Hypothesis 1b: Cash
dividends are paid less when controlling shareholders can realize capital gains and are
no longer entitled to high implied dividend yields. This also reflects that with the aim
of increasing the value of holdings, controlling shareholders are more willing to
reduce excessive cash dividends possibly to invest in value-building projects.
The prevalence of concentrated ownership underlies the conflicts between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders that may incur distortion of cash
dividends. This motivated the examination of how controlling shareholders affect cash
dividend policy and whether this impact has been altered by the NTS reform. By
categorising controlling shareholders according to their associated agency conflicts
and capital constraints, this study devised the following categories of controlling
shareholders: the central government, local-level government agencies (local
governments and local SASACs), family firms and other privately held firms.
This study kept analysis of SOEs and non-SOEs separately, as these firms serve
different operational objectives and adopt different agency frameworks (Lin et al.,
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1998). Within the category of SOEs, a comparison is held between central SOEs and
local SOEs. The results show that payouts are statistically higher when local
governments act as controlling shareholders. It is possible that local governments rely
on dividends to alleviate their financial pressure caused by the tax distribution system.
It is worth mentioning that local governments’ preference in cash dividends may be
accompanied by local SOEs serving as a borrowing platform for local governments
(Fan & Lv, 2012). This further reveals the tunnelling risk signified by the higher cash
dividends issued by local SOEs, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2b.
Also, compared to the central government control, local governments as
controlling shareholders weakly react to the NTS reform in adjusting their reliance on
cash dividends. This supports Hypothesis 3. Without a change in the tax distribution
system, the reform is less likely to address the financial pressure of local governments
or to alleviate their tunnelling via cash dividends. This study also finds that the cash
dividend practice of local SOEs displays a sense of heterogeneity. Particularly, SOEs
directly controlled by local governments tend to have higher cash dividends compared
to SOEs controlled by local SASACs. Cash dividends issued by SOEs directly
controlled by local governments are weakly accounted for by firms’ financial
conditions and are insensitive to the NTS reform. This highlights a case of tunnelling
via cash dividends under the direct control of local governments, which remains
active even after the NTS reform.
Within the category of non-SOEs, a comparison is conducted between family
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firms and other privately held firms. The results show that a larger degree of family
control results in lower cash dividends compared to other privately held firms. This
shows consistency with Hypothesis 4. Family owners are prone to tunnelling because
of a succession problem (Liu et al., 2015). Compared to cash dividends, family
owners have more efficient ways to engage in fund transfer, such as through private
lending of inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010, Liu et al., 2015). This might be
why family owners show an aversion in cash payouts which are to be shared by all
registered shareholders. In addition, the cash dividend practice of family firms
receives insignificant influence from the NTS reform. A likely explanation is that the
NTS reform has not been an effective remedy for the succession-problem-induced
tunnelling among family firms.
This study investigated how inter-corporate loans, a form of private lending
known to be tunnelling-related (Jiang et al., 2010), interact with cash dividends. This
study is interested in this interaction, as they both can be used for tunnelling by
controlling shareholders and they compete for a given level of free cash-flows. Given
that cash dividends and inter-corporate loans might be jointly determined, this study
followed a TSLS approach when examining the causal link between the two. The
evidence suggests that for non-state controlling shareholders who are known to gain
more private interests from inter-corporate loans than from cash payouts, lower cash
dividends are indicative of higher inter-corporate loans. This verifies Hypothesis 5.
Though inter-corporate loans are less likely to be driven by the private agenda of the
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government, they can be suppressed by cash dividends when these payouts are subject
to tunnelling by local governments. This evidence finds support for Hypothesis 6.
Lastly, the interaction between cash dividends and inter-corporate loans is statistically
insignificant among central SOE. This is expected as Hypothesis 7. The issues of
these two types of cash outflows should be regulated under the desirable corporate
governance associated with the control of the central government which is in a sound
financial condition. The findings on the interaction between cash dividends and
inter-corporate loans further support that the impact of controlling shareholders’
tunnelling on cash dividends depends on what better fits the private interests of
controlling shareholders. Cash dividends are preferred by local governments as they
have limited ways to generate incomes, while family owners show an aversion in
payouts as they have more efficient options of transferring firm wealth.
Overall, this study finds that the NTS reform contributes to reducing excessive
cash dividends. Further, by comparing firms that vary in levels of agency conflicts
and capital constraints associated with their controlling shareholders, this study
provides direct evidence that tunnelling has a non-monotone impact on cash dividends.
Local government control leads to higher cash dividends so as to replenish the
incomes of financially distressed local governments. Family control results in lower
payouts as dividends represent a much less efficient way of tunnelling for family
owners. The implication is that the concentrated ownership structure points to
controlling shareholders as an intrinsic determinant of the cash dividend practice in
134

China. Given the specific tunnelling incentives of controlling shareholders, the
authority may consider customized regulations to restrain the discretion of controlling
shareholders in devising cash dividends.
One limitation of this study is that it only analyses the association between cash
payouts and one type of tunnelling, namely inter-corporate loans. Later studies may
consider examining the interaction between cash dividends and other forms of
tunnelling which may not directly occupy discretionary funds. This can help to
identify tendencies of cash dividend practice under different qualities of corporate
governance, especially when firms’ cash-holdings (payout ability) are not interfered
by tunnelling.
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CHAPTER THREE. CASH DIVIDEND BEHAVIOURS
AROUND PRIVATE PLACEMENTS: INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN TWO INFORMATION-RELEASING EVENTS
3.1 Introduction
It is a long-standing theory that cash dividends are used by investors to predict
future performance (Kane, Lee & Marcus 1984; John & Williams, 1985; Miller &
Rock, 1985). This signalling function can also be served by other firm events. For
example, private placements have been demonstrated to be indicative of participating
shareholders’ confirmation of firm values, which accounts for the positive
announcement effect (e.g., Hertzel & Smith, 1993, for the US; Kang & Stulz, 1994,
for Japan; Wu et al., 2005, for the Chinese Hong Kong Market). This present study
finds that private placements provided about 82.48% of the funds raised by equity
refinance between 2006 and 2015 in China, which proves the popularity of private
offerings.
Chapter 3 intends to identify the interaction between two information events of
cash dividends and private placements. Suggested by Booth and Chang (2011), the
payouts prior to public equity offerings can relieve the concern of information
asymmetry about the offerings and therefore help to obtain a higher offering price.
This finding motivates this study to examine the role of cash dividends before private
placements in China. Conditional on the assumption that cash dividends contribute to
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higher prices of seasonal equity offerings (SEOs), Loderer and Mauer (1992) raise the
hypothesis that all issuing firms should try to declare prior to SEOs. When examining
if this would be the case for private placements, this present study observed a larger
proportion of dividend-paying firms among issuers of private placements in China. Of
953 private-placement-conducting (PPC) firms examined, 695 (about 73%)
distributed dividends within the 365-day period before the offerings. Also, similar to
the finding of Lin, You and Lin (2008) that firms tend to time SEOs after
announcements of payouts, this present research suggests that Chinese PPC firms are
more likely to increase cash dividends when private placements are in the nearer
future.
Apart from the pre-offering interaction which highlights the tendency of issuing
firms to distribute higher cash dividends before private placements, the post-offering
interaction may lie in the notion that both private placements and cash payouts can
convey positive information about a firm’s future performance (e.g. signal of cash
dividends: John & Williams, 1985; signal of private placements: Hertzel & Smith,
1993). If managers consider that private placements are efficient in filling the
information gap about the prospect of firms, cash dividends that provide a similar
signalling function might be less needed. This leads to the hypothesis that with the
information released by private placements, firms might issue lower cash dividends
given the potential information overlap between private placements and cash
dividends.
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It is noted that the post-offering interaction between private placements and cash
dividends might be affected by the regulatory setting in China. Compared to other
markets, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires a longer
resale restriction (lockup of trading rights) on shares acquired from private
placements. It is up to 36 months for controlling shareholders and 12 months for other
shareholders. One concern that arises is that firms announce higher cash dividends
within the lockup period to ease the concern of illiquidity faced by participating
shareholders of private placements. Still, this concern is challenged by two arguments:
i) the presence of a lockup period is pre-acknowledged and therefore can be managed
before a buying decision is made and ii) shareholders are privileged to be offered a
discount when buying privately-issued shares. Therefore, whether the resale
restriction increases the demand for cash dividends as the solution for lack of liquidity
is an empirical question.
The post-offering cash dividends may also be affected by the change in
ownership structure led by private placements. Zhao et al. (2015) examined private
placements between 2006 and 2009 in China and reported an increase in post-offering
cash dividends. Yet, controlling for the presence of lockup periods, the resale
restriction is not suggested to be responsible for this increase. Instead, they find that
the increase in post-offering cash dividends is more pronounced when controlling
shareholders subscribe to private placements. This leads to their conclusion that cash
dividends are used as interests transfer to large shareholders after substantial funds are
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raised by private placements. Apart from the unsolved puzzle about why large
shareholders would engage in tunnelling despite the amount of invested equity at risk,
Zhao et al. (2015) pay less attention to the change in post-offering firm performance.
This present study emphasizes the establishment of a link between the changes in
cash dividends and the concurrent variations in firm performance to determine the
justification of a revision in payout policy. The study uses propensity score matching
(PSM) tests to estimate the outcome of control of condition and then to isolate the
effect of the treatment, namely private placements. The main prediction relies on the
signalling function of private placements; participating investors can assert their
confidence in a firm’s prospects by becoming block shareholders (Hertzel & Smith,
1993). Therefore, if a decrease in cash dividends is conditional on the already-in-place
information released by private placements, a corresponding enhancement in stock
performance should be observed because of the information certified by private
placements. The other prediction is based on the theory that private placements
intensify the conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders by
causing a more concentrated ownership structure. If a rise in cash dividends is a form
of fund transfer to participating shareholders, the negative impact of tunnelling should
be associated with weaker stock performance that is also a result of private
placements.
Following a multivariate PSM approach, the results are more in line with the
signalling hypothesis. Private placements tend to cause a drop in cash dividends even
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within lockup periods, suggesting that participating shareholders are less likely to rely
on cash payouts to alleviate illiquidity. This observation is contrary to the tunnelling
argument as the drop in cash dividends does not fit the incentive of interests transfer
via payouts. In the meantime, evidence shows that private placements have a causal
link with an improvement in firm performance, which is consistent with the positive
information conveyed by private offerings. The robustness test further suggests that
the information certification effect of private placements is more applicable to firms
in a healthy financial condition. Financially constrained firms, which are more likely
to rely on private offerings to solve their cash problems rather than signal prospect,
show little to no change in payouts and firm performance associated with private
placements.
To further examine this information-inspired interaction, this study combines an
event study with PSM tests to check if private placements affect the announcement
effect of cash dividends. This question is motivated by the results of Dedman, Jiang
and Stark (2015) that suggests cash dividends became a stronger predictor for firm
values after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was adopted by
the Chinese market in 2007. The implication is that the improvement in the
information environment can allow cash dividends to be more informative in
assessing the prospects of firms. Therefore, the market may view post-offering cash
dividends as more favourable events given the alleviation of information asymmetry
contributed by private placements. Consistent with this prediction, the study finds that
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cash dividends issued by PPC firms earn higher announcement returns because of
private placements.
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that managers are
more likely to increase cash dividends with private placements in the nearer future.
Unlike the study of Zhao et al. (2015), this study finds that PPC firms tend to drop
cash dividends following private offerings and argues that this adjustment is
information-based. Given that private placements are followed by stronger long-term
performance, which is in line with the positive information sent by private placements,
managers may find conveying information via higher dividends redundant. A more
profound finding to support the signalling argument of private placements lies in the
enhanced announcement effect of cash dividends after private placements. This
verifies the notion that the expected improvement in the firm-level information
environment enhances the signalling function of cash dividends (Dedman et al., 2015).
This present study is among the first to cover a 10-year event period to verify the
information-based link between private placements and cash dividends.
The remainder of Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
institutional background of the equity offerings in China. Section 3 describes the
existing literature that motivates the discussion on private placements and cash
dividends. Section 4 lists the theoretical path of testable hypotheses. Section 5
describes data selection, definitions and methodology. Section 6 discusses the results,
and Section 7 concludes the findings.
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3.2 Related institutional settings

Chinese listed firms have three main channels to conduct equity refinancing:
rights issue (otherwise known as allotment of shares), seasoned equity offering (SEO)
and private placement. Liu et al. (2016) have summarized the key features of each
type of equity refinance in China. Unlike the US which runs a registration system for
requests for equity refinancing, China has followed an approval system to regulate the
issuing requests. Within the category of public equity offerings, rights issue was
introduced in 1992. Rights issue is distinct from other forms of equity refinance in its
ability to maintain ownership balance while expanding capitalization. Apart from this
universal feature, rights issues in China also show peculiarities in its regulation.
The regulation “Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed
Companies”1 (AMISLC), requires prospective issuers to earn positive net profits for
three consecutive years and to maintain an average return on equity (ROE) of no less
than 10% before the application of rights issues. The size of rights issues is limited to
no more than 30% of the firm’s outstanding shares at the year-end prior to the issuing.
The restriction on issuing frequency is that for a given firm, rights issues cannot be
held in two consecutive accounting cycles. Still, no regulation is imposed on the
discount potentially available to shareholders, and the selection of the benchmark date
This regulation (2018 version) is available on the official English website of the CSRC. View this regulation at:
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201804/P020180427401543857135.pdf
1
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for pricing is flexible.
In 1994, the CSRC updated the 1992 version of AMISLC and SEOs were put
into a trial implement. Unlike rights issues, an SEO has no restriction on the size of
funds that can be raised in a single offering. Still, the price offered by an SEO cannot
be higher than the average closing price of the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark
day. This helps to protect minority shareholders from price manipulation. During the
past decade, the CSRC has gradually tightened the assessment of SEO applications. In
2001, the AMISLC was further revised, and prospective issuers were required to
maintain a ROE above 6% and distribute cash dividends for each one of the three
consecutive years prior to the application. In 2006, an extra restriction was made.
Issuers were required to pay cash dividends totalling no less than 20% of the average
allocable profits in each of the three years preceding the offering. In 2008, this
threshold was raised to 30%. The intention behind the increased threshold is to
motivate firms to issue cash dividends. Although cash payouts might contribute to
more efficient cash-flow management, firms in a high-growth stage or with weak
accounting performance might be impeded from SEOs when extra funds are much
needed.
The rapid development of the capital market during the past decade calls for
more diversified financing channels for Chinese listed firms. With the aim to optimise
the allocation of marketable resources, the CSRC initialized the use of private
placements in 2006. To protect the interests of both existing and prospective investors,
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issuing firms are forbidden to withhold inside information or to manipulate the price
prior to the offerings. Although the requirements of issuers’ accounting performance
to conduct private placements are less rigid than those for public offerings, Chinese
firms still need to meet specific requirements to issue equity privately.
The AMISLC states that private placements permit up to 10 participating
investors, with no restrictions on their identities or credentials. The subscription price
can be subject to a maximum discount of 10% using the benchmark of the average
closing price in the 20 trading days prior to the announcement day. Potential issuers
must also submit an offering proposal to the CSRC as part of the application. This
proposal needs to state an offering price of private placements based on the fair
principles of justice. This requirement aims to protect the interests of both
participating and non-participating shareholders. Other details listed in the proposal
include the purpose of the offering, the number of new securities, the pricing method
and the range of the offering price, the identity of prospective investors and their
affiliations with the issuing firm, the amount of funds and the type and value of assets
that need to be raised, whether the proposed offering is a part of the reallocation of
major assets, and other relevant information. The proposal also needs to be approved
by the board of directors and prospective investors who intend to participate in private
placements before it is submitted to the CSRC. The CSRC evaluates the legitimacy of
the need for refinancing of the issuing firms and assesses whether the offering terms
present a threat to the interests of non-participating and minority shareholders before a
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decision is made. The CSRC has the ultimate discretion to accept or deny the
application. Without the mandatory approval from the regulator, firms need to
announce a withdrawal of the proposal and cannot proceed with the offering.
Private placements usually have a resale restriction referred to as a lock-up
period. Within this period, shares obtained from private placements cannot be
transferred. Compared to the US which requires a minimum 6-month lockup,
subscription of private placements in China incurs a minimum of 12-month resale
restriction (Liu et al., 2016). If the stocks are bought by existing direct or ultimate
controlling stockholders or shareholders that gain control rights via private
placements, then this restriction is extended to 36 months.
One of the main benefits of private placements is to grant access to the capital
market for firms that are less likely to be approved for public equity offerings. This
benefit is more pronounced in China, as the eligibility for conducting public issues
depends on accounting performance plus the level and the frequency of cash payouts.
Another significant advantage of private placements is that information can be
exchanged directly from managers to prospective investors. This setting offers more
initiatives to shareholders than the initiatives offered by SEOs. Additionally, private
placements provide a chance to assess the true firm value (Hertzel & Smith, 1993),
maintain existing relationships and build new relationships (Wruck & Wu, 2009).
Positive information may also be sent by raising funds to gain a competitive
advantage.
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As suggested by Table 3.1, private placement has become the most frequently
used equity refinance to the point that the refinancing options of SEO and rights issue
have almost been entirely replaced by private placement. In 2015, nearly all the
requests for equity refinances were finalised by private placements. For the period
2006 to 2015, this study finds that private placements provided up to￥2.59 trillion to
the Chinese stock market, which accounts for 82.48% of the total funds raised by all
concurrent equity finances. Notably, the funds provided by private placements
increased from ￥ 89.66 billion in 2006 to ￥ 1.47 trillion in 2013 with an average
annual growth rate of 36.44% suggesting its popularity in China.
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Table 3.1 Summary of equity refinances conducted by Chinese listed firms from 2000-2015
This table presents a summary of equity refinances conducted by Chinese listed firms from 2000
to 2015. The data source is the CSMAR database. The figures below display the number of each
type of equity refinances by year.
Year

SEO

Private Placement

Rights issue

2000

16

—

160

2001

22

—

126

2002

28

—

22

2003

18

—

25

2004

13

—

23

2005

5

—

2

2006

7

49

2

2007

24

142

7

2008

34

105

9

2009

14

120

10

2010

10

155

18

2011

10

182

15

2012

5

154

8

2013

6

266

12

2014

1

447

15

2015

0

770

4
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3.3 Related literature
3.3.1 The information-based interaction between public equity offerings and the
pre-offering cash dividends
For the past few decades, scholars have been keen to interpret the commonly
observed stock-price drop around public equity offerings (Myers & Majluf, 1984;
Miller & Rock, 1985). A popular explanation is that better-informed insiders have the
incentive to exploit the overvaluation of firms by issuing new shares. Rational
outsiders, then, would adjust their expectation downward, which lowers the price they
are willing to pay for the new shares. Therefore, the risk of asymmetric information
may relate to stock underperformance around public offerings.
Dierkens (1991) examined the existence of information asymmetry of issuing
firms by adopting four proxies: the market reaction to earnings announcements, the
residual variance of stock returns, the number of public announcements per period
made by the firm and the trading intensity. Her cross-sectional tests prove that the
level of information asymmetry has a prominent and direct relationship with the price
drop observed at announcements of public equity issues. Dierkens also used
time-series tests to confirm these issues as information-releasing events. Lastly,
timing tests show that to lower the price-drop around announcements of public
offerings, firms tend to announce the issues when the risk of asymmetric information
is relatively low.
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A later study by D’Mello and Ferris (2000) used two measurements of analyst
activities to describe an issuing firm’s information environment. The first
measurement uses an issuing firm’s number of analysts following as a direct
measurement of its accessible information. The second measurement calculates the
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for analyst consensus and,
therefore, the quality of information available to the market. Their observations
conclude that the announcement effect of public equity issues is significantly more
negative for firms with a greater level of information asymmetry proxied by fewer
analysts following and less consensus among analyst forecasts.
In a theoretical world with symmetric information, it may seem redundant to
simultaneously arrange another information event to occur before the issue of new
stocks. But, asymmetric information is a common reality that highlights the rationale
presented by Dierkens (1991) and D’Mello and Ferris (2000). Less information
uncertainty can create a friendlier time to conduct public equity issues.
Several studies attempt to determine if managers make an effort to drive up the
announcement returns of public equity issues via seizing the timing of the most
informed market. For instance, Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) chose the
period subsequent to regular information discloses as a timing proxy for the least level
of uncertainty in assessing true firm values. Their choices of regular information
events include annual reports, quarterly earnings announcements and dividend
declarations. The findings mainly feature earnings announcements and report that
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public equity issues are heavily clustered after such information releases. This
supports the view that to reduce valuation uncertainty firms tend to time SEOs after
regular information releases.
Apart from earnings announcements, cash dividends are also well accepted as
information-releasing events. The supporting evidence shows that increases in cash
dividends tend to result in stock-price appreciation and decreases to result in
stock-price declines (e.g., John & Williams, 1985). It is implied that given the
signalling function of cash dividends, the market should react less negatively to
dividend payers’ public equity offerings than to equity offerings from nonpayers. Also,
it would be more plausible for managers to arrange a public issue to occur after
dividend announcements.
Loderer and Mauer (1992) and Booth and Chang (2011) attempted to address
whether cash payouts improve an issuing firm’s information environment before
public offerings. Using the US data from 1973 to 1984, the results from Loderer and
Mauer’s study do not support the argument that firms time cash dividends to obtain a
higher price for SEOs. Booth and Chang (2011) provide two explanations for this
evidence. First, the period 1973 to 1974 is when dividend payments were frozen
under legal administration. Second, the proportion of dividend-payers decreased
sharply from 1978 to 1999 (Fama & French, 2001). Fama and French also suggest a
possible cause for the disappearing cash dividends; US firms shift in composition
toward smaller firms with lower earnings and greater growth opportunities.
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The study of Booth and Chang (2011) tested cash dividend behaviours in the US
market between 1975 and 2002, which covers the period analyzed by Loderer and
Mauer (1992) and the period of disappearing dividends suggested by Fama and
French (2001). They first found a change in the general trend of payout policy. In the
1970s and early 1980s, the distribution of cash to shareholders was mainly finalized
by dividends. After the mid-1980s, firms showed a greater reliance on share
repurchases. Booth and Chang report that the proportion of firms that rely on
dividends as the only option of payouts declined from 69% in 1972 to 20% in 2000.
This change intensifies the disparity between the information environment of
dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers, with the former having distinguishably less
information asymmetry since the mid-1980s. In line with this structural change, Booth
and Chang found that the difference in SEO announcement returns between dividend
payers and non-payers changed from being at a minimum before the mid-1980s to
being significant after the mid-1980s. Notably, the pronounced role in signalling
served by cash payouts leads dividend payers to experience less negative market
reactions to SEO announcements.
Lin et al. (2008) discuss whether pre-issue information releases, such as major
investments, financial forecast revisions and dividends, affect the price and the
trading volume reaction around SEOs in the Taiwan stock market. They first
demonstrate that the time interval between pre-issue dividends and SEOs are
negatively related to the probability of conducting SEOs. In other words, Taiwanese
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firms time their public equity offerings after dividend announcements, possibly to
lower the information asymmetry and to improve market reactions to SEOs. However,
none of the tested signalling events is found to help alleviate the negative market
returns around SEOs. Still, it is noticed that increased cash dividends are the only
category of information release that can reduce the negative trading volume reactions
following SEOs.

3.3.2 The agency-conflict-based interaction between private placements and
post-offering cash dividends
Some attention is paid to search for a causal relationship between private
placements and post-offering cash dividends in China. For example, Zhao et al. (2015)
have investigated the cash dividend practice from 2006 to 2009. These were the first
three years after private placements were allowed in China. Zhao et al. mainly used a
univariate approach to isolate the effect of private placements on PPC firms’ cash
distributions. They set PPC firms as the treatment group, and non-PPC firms as the
control group, and then they matched each PPC firm with a comparable non-PPC firm.
The matching rules include being in the same industry, having a comparable firm size
and similar earning ability. Zhao et al. found that a higher cash dividend per share is
paid by PPC firms after private placements and PPC firms are shown to be more
generous in cash distributions than matching non-PPC firms in the post-offering
period. Given these results, the researchers conclude that private placements increase
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cash dividends in China.
Zhao et al. (2015) argue that higher post-offering cash payouts generate private
interests for shareholders who participate in private placements. Generous cash
payouts shift funds back to participating shareholders and therefore lower the
effective price of new shares. Although the increases in cash dividends could signal
positive information about the outcomes of private placements, Zhao et al. (2015)
believe that these payments are a cover for interests transfer.
P. Li and G. Li (2014) examined the effect of private placements on cash
dividends during the period from 2010 to 2011 in China. Their conclusions are highly
consistent with the conclusions proposed by Zhao et al. (2015). P. Li and G. Li agree
that immediate increases in cash dividends following private placements reveal more
of a tunnelling incentive than a signalling purpose. Private placements are usually
conducted by firms that lack connections to the public capital market but are still in
need of additional funds. P. Li and G. Li argue that if firms are too financially
constrained to issue cash dividends or maintain a 6% ROE rate (to be eligible for
public issues), then raising cash dividends right after private placements is a
contradicting move. They stress that an increase in cash dividends should be
associated with stable growth in earnings, but this is less likely to be confirmed within
a relatively short period. They describe an immediate increase in cash dividends after
private placements as improper and conflicted, especially considering that these
outflows weaken a firm’s ability to fund new projects.
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Zhao et al. (2015) and P. Li and G. Li (2014) focus on the short-term effect of
private placements on cash dividends, perhaps because of lack of data. Both studies
capture the change in cash dividends by using baseline data from the control group
and the pre-offering period of the treatment group. This setting facilitates vertical and
parallel comparisons in their research. Still, several potential deficiencies are evident
in their empirical design. For one, the increases in cash dividends led by private
placements might be insufficient as evidence of tunnelling without considering the
concurrent changes in firm performance. The present study proposes a further step to
examine whether the change in cash dividends is accompanied by a consistent change
in firm performance. That is, an examination of the simultaneous change in long-term
stock performance could facilitate an investigation of the nature of change in
post-offering cash payouts.
Zhao et al. (2015) and P. Li and G. Li (2014) might have overlooked alternative
explanations for their observations. Both studies report that PPC firms tend to
out-perform their matching non-PPC firms, which are viewed as the reason why many
controlling shareholders are willing to enlarge investments via private placements.
Also, they both find that private placements with participation from controlling
shareholders are followed by higher cash dividends than cases without such
participation. Their interpretation of this observation is that the enhanced controlling
position intensifies the chance of power abuse and therefore increases the risk of fund
embezzlement via cash distributions. Still, both studies seem to pay less attention to
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the fact that a more substantial holding of controlling shareholders also indicates that
more equity is at stake. It seems irrational for controlling shareholders to embezzle
funds from firms in which they have just enlarged investments based on a promising
outlook, especially considering the potential long-term payback.
There is also room for further refinement in the methodology used by Zhao et al.
(2015) and P. Li and G. Li (2014). In their studies, univariate analysis is the only
method adopted to examine the differences between PPC and non-PPC firms2
concerning their cash dividend practices before and after private placements. A more
robust multivariate analysis could be conducted using an approach such as a
difference-in-difference test. This regression typically includes one dummy variable to
differentiate the event period, another one to capture variations between groups and,
most importantly, a cross-term grouped by these two dummy variables. The
cross-term is fundamental in this PSM test as it can subtract the noise from the
dimensions of group and time to show the actual changes generated by the treatment
event, in this case, private placements.
Zhao et al. (2015) and P. Li and G. Li (2014) both argue that private placements
can further intensify ownership concentration and therefore raise the concern about
the abuse of power by block holders. This makes an increase in post-offering cash
dividends questionable. However, the interactions between private placements and
cash dividends go beyond the account of agency conflicts. For example, one of the
The treatment group (PPC firms) and the control group (non-PPC firms) of P. Li and G. Li (2014) are not
matched. The control group is four times larger than that of the treatment group.
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possible connections underlies the notion that both private placements and cash
dividends can signal positive information about a firm’s future performance.

3.3.3 The information effect of private placements
Apart from the facts that public offerings are open to the whole market and
private placements are offered to a small number of pre-specified investors, public
offerings and private placements are similar in term of being equity refinancing
options for listed firms. Still, the market reacts to these two types of events differently.
Public offerings are typically followed by adverse market reactions, while private
placements tend to gain positive announcement reactions (the US market: Wruck,
1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; the Hong Kong market: Wu, Wang & Yao, 2005; the
Chinese mainland market: Liu et al., 2016).
Conditional on the concern that prospective investors are disadvantaged in
assessing firm value, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that public issues signal
that an issuing firm’s stocks are currently overvalued. The rational investors who
believe that managers are issuing new shares at an inflated price will revise their
expectation downwards and cause a drop in stock price around announcements of
public offerings. According to Myers and Majluf, undervalued firms would avoid
public offerings when the existing assets transferred to new shareholders exceed the
increased firm value retained by existing shareholders. That is, managers from
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undervalued firms will forego investment opportunities to protect the interests of
existing shareholders. Ideally, if managers can find a costless way to convey their
belief that firms are undervalued, this underinvestment problem should disappear.
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), Hertzel and Smith (1993) propose that
undervalued firms can use private placements to avoid the problem of wealth transfer
that could occur when raising equity publicly. Through private placements, a
well-informed investor buying a block of securities verifies approval of firm value,
and it is expected to send out a positive signal. As a result, the downward adjustment
in stock price around public equity offerings is replaced by an upward shift when
managers decide to issue new equity privately. Hertzel and Smith (1993) hold the
view that such a shift in firm value assessment can be contributed by the alleviation of
asymmetric information or signalling previously unavailable information to the
market. On the contrary, a public offering issued to diversified investors is unlikely to
form definitive certification of firm value. Instead, it might raise the doubt that
managers are taking advantage of the overvaluation to raise new equity from less
informed investors. These notions of Hertzel and Smith are in line with their
observations of positive stock-price reactions to private placements and negative
reactions to public offerings.
Hertzel and Smith outline that investors in private placements are informationally
active because private issuers are usually small firms. Compared to large firms, small
firms tend to have a higher level of information asymmetry but are easier and cheaper
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to assess given the scope of the underlying asset. This makes small firms inclined to
rely more on private placements when they attempt to access the equity market.
Hertzel and Smith emphasise the notion that private placements build effective
communications with managers by inviting a small group of investors. This relieves
information

asymmetry

and

represents

a

solution

to

the

Myers-Majluf

under-investment problem.
Hertzel and Rees (1998) tested whether the positive signal released by private
placements is in line with an issuing firm’s post-offering earnings. They find that firm
earnings increase significantly after private placements. Specifically, the improvement
in industry-adjusted earnings is particularly strong and significant in the offering year.
For the following two years, though not significant, the change in earnings remains
upward relative to the pre-offering observations. That is, despite the variations in the
level of growth in post-offering earnings, the tendency of this growth is continuing
and indicates that the signal sent by private placements is relatively consistent.
Hertzel and Rees provide evidence that the positive announcement returns of
private placements are indicative of the increase in post-offer earnings. As to public
equity offerings, their negative announcement returns can be viewed as an indication
of post-offering accounting underperformance. From the perspective of capital
budgeting, they assert that public equity offerings are used to reduce leverage,
whereas private placements are used to enlarge capital expenditures. This also helps to
explain the disparate stock performances around the announcements of these two
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types of equity offerings.
Goh et al. (1999) identified the information content of private placements by
examining analysts’ revisions in post-offering earnings forecasts. Security analysts
tend to adjust their earnings forecasts for the placement year upward. Goh et al. also
report that this upward revision in earnings forecasts has a causal relationship with the
positive announcement returns of the offerings. This adds evidence to the information
certification effect of private placements.
In the context of China, Liu et al. (2016) examined how the market reacts to
various methods of equity refinancing, namely SEOs, rights issues, private
placements and convertible bonds in the period from 1991 to 2010. Similar to the
experience of the US market, they find that public offerings of SEOs and rights issues
gain negative announcement returns in China. This stock underperformance is viewed
as a reflection of the adverse-selection costs associated with the risk of the underlying
assets.
As to private placements in China, Liu et al. noticed that the market reacts
unfavourably during the pre-announcement period, while positive market reactions
are observed during the post-announcement period. They interpret these contrasting
market reactions as the concern of investors being alleviated by the strategic
deployment of asset allocation, or cash invested by experienced investors via private
placements. In short, the ultimate announcement effect of private placements is
positive based on observations of the Chinese market. It is possible that this is due to
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investor confidence given the expected positive outcomes led by the proceeds of the
offerings (Liu et al., 2016).

3.3.4 The information effect of cash dividends
The signalling effect of cash dividends was first identified by Miller and
Modigliani (1961) who argue that dividends convey changes in managers’
expectations about the prospect of firms. One body of the literature examines how the
market reacts to dividend announcements. The findings include that the change in
cash dividends results in a change in the same direction in stock prices around the
announcement (John & Williams, 1985). Additionally, the cumulative abnormal
returns around the event window are positively related to the size of cash distributions
(Miller & Rock, 1985). The conclusion is that the market processes payouts as
providing corroborative evidence for the announced earnings.
A difficulty in identifying the information content of cash payouts lies in the fact
that dividends and earnings are usually simultaneously announced. Aharony and
Swary (1980) tested observations of dividends and earnings that are declared on
different dates within a given quarter. This helps to isolate the announcement effect of
cash dividends, which is difficult to achieve when a joint announcement is made.
They find that the market reaction is more pronounced for dividends than for the
subsequent earnings, and that the market gives more credit to changes in quarterly
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cash dividends than to the concurrent earnings figures. Kane et al. (1984) provide
further evidence that investors rely on cash payouts to revise their assessment on firm
values. When the information sent via earnings and dividends contradicts, investors
are more inclined to rely on the signal implied by cash dividends.
Given the institutional settings of the Chinese market, studies examining whether
cash dividends carry information content give different results. Cheng et al. (2009)
investigated the joint announcement effect of earnings and dividends before the NTS
reform. They find that the market responds to an unexpected increase in earnings
more positively when an unexpected drop or omission of cash dividends is
simultaneously announced. However, the market reacts positively to stock dividend
announcements regardless of the direction of the unexpected change in concurrent
earnings. Cheng et al. conclude that the evidence of the less favourable market
reactions to cash dividends when an unexpected growth in earnings is present
indicates the concern of tradable shareholders that cash dividends are used to transfer
funds to non-tradable shareholders. On the contrary, stock dividends that involve zero
cash-outflow are viewed as a trusted signal for earnings. Further, despite that the
unexpected increase in cash dividends is positively related to the announcement
returns, this relationship is insignificant. Therefore, they suggest that the commonly
accepted causal link between growth in cash dividends and higher announcement
returns could be weakly formed if such payouts are believed to be interests transfer by
non-tradable shareholders.
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Deng et al. (2017) examined the relationship between cash dividends and
earnings quality in the Chinese market using observations from 2000 to 2010. They
demonstrate that firms issuing dividends show more stable earnings, greater accrual
quality and more substantial earnings informativeness. All are consistent with the
signalling function of cash dividends in the context of China where earnings quality is
considered to be lower than that in developed markets (Allen et al., 2005). Deng et al.
(2017) make a further attempt to identify how the link between dividends and
earnings quality change when dividends deviate from being a signalling device and a
reward to shareholders. Given the institutional background which requires Chinese
listed firms pay cash dividends before applying to conduct public equity refinance,
Deng et al. (2017) find that the positive influence of cash distributions on earnings
quality weakens for firms issuing public offerings.
Efforts are also made to examine the interaction between firm-level asymmetric
information and cash dividends. Focusing on the Hong Kong market, Cheng,
Davidson and Leung (2011) tested the connection between abnormal returns of insider
trading and the following cash dividends given their mutual signalling function.
Insiders can trade and gain based on their knowledge of private price-sensitive
information about firm values. It follows that insider buys (sales) tend to be indicative
of future price appreciation (decreases) (Fishe & Robe, 2004; Jeng, Metrick &
Zeckhauser, 2003). Therefore, the magnitude of the abnormal returns around insider
trades can be a continuous measurement of the level of information asymmetry.
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According to Cheng et al. (2011), a positive correlation is found between insider
returns and dividend changes when insiders trade firm securities within 40 days
before announcements of payouts. This indicates that firms suffering from greater risk
of asymmetric information tend to issue higher cash dividends, lending support to
dividend signalling theory.
One of the other studies that tested the effect of the firm-level information
environment on the signalling role of dividends is that of Aggarwal, Cao and Chen
(2012). They chose foreign firms that cross-list on the US stock market in the form of
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) as these firms tend to have a poorer
information environment. First, this is because ADR firms are subject to different
accounting standards than domestic US firms and, therefore, US investors may have
less access to information about ADR firms for a given level of effort (e.g., Lang,
Lins & Miller, 2003; Lang, Raedy & Wilson, 2006). Second, ADR firms tend to have
limited channels to convey information to US investors. Therefore, Aggarwal et al.
(2012) argue that the signalling function of dividends may carry a larger weight for
ADR firms compared to signalling via dividends by domestic US firms. Aggarwal et
al. find that ADR firms are more likely to increase dividends, particularly by larger
amounts. This highlights the association between the larger firm-level information
asymmetry of ADR firms and their greater need to send signals via cash dividends.
Regulatory reforms that require a change in a firm’s operational transparency are
also used as experimental settings to examine the information content of cash
163

dividends. Hail et al. (2014) traced exogenous shocks that improve the market-level
information environment to investigate if such improvement results in lower pressure
to pay dividends. They chose the mandatory adoption of IFRS (global-wise) and the
initial enforcement of insider trading laws (country-wise) as two separate information
events. They observe that, following the above two events, firms are less inclined to
increase or pay cash dividends but are more likely to cut or stop these outflows. Hail
et al. attribute this result to the improved public information because: i) changes in
cash dividends tend to occur around the time of implementation of the relevant
regulatory reforms, and only for firms affected by the new regulations and ii) the
information content of cash dividends (signified by the 3-day absolute abnormal daily
returns around the announcement date) decreases significantly after the regulatory
reforms. The results suggest that if information about firm operations becomes more
transparent given the exogenous shocks, cash dividends tend to carry less information
content and therefore may be less needed.

3.4 Hypotheses development
3.4.1 Cash dividends as an information release before private placements
Although there is scant evidence documenting a link between pre-issue cash
payouts and private equity issues, the literature does offer evidence suggesting that
dividends as an information-releasing event are used by managers to lower the
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uncertainty about public equity offerings (Lin et al., 2008; Booth & Chang, 2011).
The signalling theory of cash dividends stresses that managers use payouts to convey
a positive signal about future earnings (John & Williams, 1985; Miller & Rock, 1985).
In the meantime, the level of information asymmetry is found to be directly related to
the extent of the negative SEO announcement-day returns (Korajczyk et al., 1991;
Dierkens, 1991; D’ Mello & Ferris, 2000). Booth and Chang (2011) connect these two
bodies of studies and address the connection between a firm’s dividend-paying status
and its SEO announcement effect in the US market. They demonstrate that when
dealing with asymmetric information, the market reacts less negatively to a firm’s
SEO announcement when a declaration of cash dividends is made in the year
preceding public offerings. That is, the information gap filled by cash dividends can
promote investors’ confidence in public equity offerings. Although this finding is
found to be less applicable to the Taiwanese market, Lin et al. (2008) still notice
evidence of increases in cash dividends lowering the negative trading volume
reactions around announcements of SEOs. Therefore, the studies of Booth and Chang
(2011) and Lin et al. (2008) motivate examination of the presence of a connection
between private placements and the pre-offering cash dividends in this present study.
This study first examines the cash dividends of PPC firms issued within a year
prior to private placements. This test is taken from a managerial perspective, as
managers hold the private information of the timing of private placements in advance
given the application system of equity refinances in China. The aim is to determine if
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managers of PPC firms time the payment of cash dividends to reduce information
uncertainty and therefore to promote the upcoming private placements. Similar to the
finding of Lin et al. (2008) about SEOs, managers should arrange cash dividends near
the offerings. This highlights the time interval between a firm’s private placement and
its pre-offering cash dividends. Furthermore, to increase the quality of the firm-level
information environment, managers are more likely to arrange an increase in cash
dividends when the date of private placements is near. Thus, this study expects that
the shorter this time interval, the greater the possibility of an increase in cash payouts
to establish a favourable information environment for the upcoming private
placements. Accordingly, the following hypothesis asserts:

Hypothesis 1. The shorter the time gap between pre-offering cash dividends and
private placements, the more likely the increase in cash dividends.

3.4.2 The treatment effects of private placements on post-offering cash dividends
3.4.2.1 A temporary increase in cash dividends within lockup periods: illiquidity
risk
Given the resale restriction following the subscription of private placements,
participating shareholders might demand cash dividends to provide liquidity. If this is
true, their reliance on cash payouts should diminish after the resale restriction has
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ended. Thus, if coping with illiquidity is one of the dominating determinants for a
PPC firm’s cash dividend practice, higher cash distributions should be identified
within lockup periods compared to the case of pre-offering. Still, given that this
increase is conditional on the resale restriction, it should be less relevant after the
restriction is ended. On such basis, Hypothesis 2a asserts:

Hypothesis 2a. The presence of lockup period should be positively related to cash
dividends.

This hypothesis, however, can be challenged when prospective investors of
private placements can directly communicate with managers and the trading
restriction can be acknowledged and prepared for before the issue is made. For
example, participating investors may demand higher discounts when future illiquidity
is anticipated. If liquidity risk is well managed before private placements, then
increases in cash dividends, especially those that continue even after lockup periods
are finalized, are less likely to be caused by the trading restriction.

3.4.2.2 An increase in cash dividends since private placements: tunnelling
Private placements as an event to change an ownership structure have the
potential to alter the quality of corporate governance. In the US studies, the
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observation that private placements create new blocks or strengthen the holdings of
existing blocks leads to incremental monitoring (Wruck, 1989). Yet, for the same
market, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) express their concern that managers
might purposely invite passive shareholders to guard the vested private interests.
From the perspective of corporate governance, the results of the current Chinese
studies on the link between private placements and the following cash dividends are
more in line with Barclay et al. (2007).
Zhao et al. (2015) and P. Li and G. Li (2014) suspect that private placements
aggravate the abuse of power by Chinese controlling shareholders. Similar to the case
of managerial entrenchment (Barclay et al., 2007), tunnelling-prone controlling
shareholders might invite passive investors to form a coalition (Zwiebel, 1995). Also,
if the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholders dominates, the incremental
monitoring associated with the increased holdings (Wruck, 1989) could be invalid.
Instead, this leaves cash dividend practice under the influence of foreseeable
tunnelling.
Zhao et al. (2015) document that cash dividends increase following private
placements in China. This increase is shown when compared to the pre-offering cash
dividends of PPC firms and to the post-offering cash dividends of non-PPC firms.
Under the premise of aggravated tunnelling, Zhao et al. interpret the increase in cash
dividends after private placements as evidence of self-serving fund transfer.
Through private placements, if an active tunnelling incentive is instigated by the
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strengthening of control power or by the coalition with participating shareholders, this
would have a long-term impact on cash dividends conditional on compromised
corporate governance. That is, compared to the time-sensitive need in alleviating
illiquidity within lockup periods, tunnelling-induced fund-transfer is expected to lead
to a sustained increase in cash dividends after private placements. Thus, the following
hypothesis argues:

Hypothesis 2b: Private placements should lead to higher post-offering cash dividends
(inclusive of those announced during the lockup period and post-lockup period).

Additionally, if liquidity risk and aggravated tunnelling both influence the
post-offering cash dividends, a more prominent increase in dividends during lock-up
periods should be observed. Still, a further examination of post-offering firm
performance is needed to assess the nature of the concurrent change in cash payouts.
It is considered that private placements have the potential to benefit firm profitability
by bringing in additional funds, new assets and sophisticated investors. Thus, apart
from the two incentives discussed above, an increase in cash dividends might also
occur if private placements contribute to funding profitable projects and inviting
incremental monitoring. That is, if an increase in cash payouts following private
placements is accompanied by enhanced post-offering firm performance, then this
alteration in cash dividend policy is somewhat truthful and consistent.
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It is noted that a shift in cash distributions may not be the only outcome after
private placements. The pre-acknowledged lock-up periods could be compensated by
placement terms and therefore may not require a rise in cash dividends. Aggravated
tunnelling established on the premise of enlarged holdings or collation could also be
constrained by the risk of negative market reactions, especially in the lockup period
when the trade of holdings is forbidden. Apart from the arguments inspired by resale
regulation and aggravated tunnelling, it seems necessary to discuss an alternative case
of decreased cash dividends after private placements.

3.4.2.3 A sustained decrease in cash dividends after private placements:
information certification
The signalling theory of cash dividends informs that a common motivation of
issuing cash payouts is to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information (John &
Williams, 1985; Miller & Rock, 1985). Cheng et al. (2011) used insider returns as the
proxy for information asymmetry and find this measurement to be positively related
to cash dividends announced in the 40-day interval after insider trades. In line with
Cheng et al., Aggarwal et al. (2012) demonstrate that ADR firms which face a less
desirable information environment show a greater reliance on cash dividends to signal
future performance. Thus, in order to reduce uncertainty, the firm-level asymmetric
information appears to have a positive relationship with the size of cash dividends
issued. Further, Hail et al. (2014) find that when the concern about information
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asymmetry is eased by reforms in regulations, managers tend to cut cash payouts.
This provides market-wise evidence that improved availability of information about
firm operations requires fewer cash dividends to serve the function of signalling.
Additionally, Hail et al. report that investors do not react negatively to decreases in
cash payouts when there is an improvement in public information. This also implies
that a reduction in cash dividends, if mainly driven by more readily available
information to assess firm value, should not be accompanied by weakened stock
performance.
Similar to the signalling function of cash dividends, several studies argue that
private placements can deliver previously unavailable information to the market. For
example, Hertzel and Smith (1993) attribute the positive announcement effect of
private placements to information production. They also show how undervalued firms
can adopt private placements to avoid the under-investment problem identified by
Myers and Majluf (1984). Therefore, a private placement can lead to a release of
positive information by inviting experienced investors who certify a firm’s true values
via block investments. That is, private placements can reduce the uncertainty about
future firm performance.
The present study searched for an information related link between private
placements and post-offering cash dividends. Managers might regard maintaining the
level of pre-offering cash dividends as a costlier choice for signalling after the
improvement in firm-level information environment is made by private placements.
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As a result, this could lead to a reduction in cash payouts after private placements.
The information-certification effect of private placements (Hertzel & Smith,
1993), if it leads to less reliance on cash dividends as a signalling device, can be
verified by the concurrent stock performance. According to Hail et al. (2014), if a
decrease in cash dividends is the result of the improved information environment, this
decrease should not disappoint shareholders. If the positive information conveyed by
private placements is indeed responsible for the reduced demand for cash dividends,
then a concurrent improvement in stock performance should follow. This not only
certifies the information of private placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993) but also
provides a reason to decrease cash payouts without negatively affecting investor
confidence. Following the information certification theory, this study develops a set of
hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: Private placements should lead to lower post-offering cash dividends
(inclusive of those announced during the lockup period and post-lockup period).

Hypothesis 3b: Private placements should positively affect post-offering stock
performance.

If the case of liquidity risk management (Hypothesis 2a) and the case of
172

information certification (Hypothesis 3a,b) are jointly supported, then the expected
decrease in post-offering cash dividends should be more prominent after the resale
restriction is over.

3.4.2.4 An increase in the announcement returns of post-offering cash dividends:
information certification
Dedman et al. (2015) examined the value relevance of cash dividends by relating
current year payouts to the market value of Chinese firms between 2003 and 2011.
During this sample period, the CSRC adopted the IFRS in 2007. Given this reform,
Dedman et al. (2015) established a comparison between firm-year observations before
the introduction of IFRS and firm-year observations after this standard was
implemented. Upon the adoption of the IFRS, they notice that the current year cash
dividend becomes a stronger predictor for the following year cash dividend and
earnings given the improvement in the information environment. On top of that, after
2007 cash dividends are more positively related to market values of firms. In short, in
China convergence with the IFRS contributes to a stronger signalling function served
by cash dividends.
It can be inferred from the results of Dedman et al. (2015) that a better
information environment may cause cash dividends to be a more informative signal.
This motivates this study to examine whether the market reacts to announcements of
cash dividends more favourably after private placements that have the potential to
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release previously unavailable information (e.g. undervaluation) and lead to less
asymmetric information (Hertzel and Smith, 1993).
Private placements might also affect the announcement effect of cash dividends
from their mutual function of predicting accounting performance. The information
contained in private placements is found to be credible for predicting future earnings.
Hertzel and Rees (1998) demonstrate that PPC firms tend to experience earnings
increases after private placements. This is consistent with the favourable market
reactions observed when offerings are announced. Financial analysts also rely on
private placements to adjust an issuing firm’s earnings forecast upward (Goh et al.,
1999). Therefore, the information conveyed by private placements can work jointly
with the signal sent by cash dividends. As a result, the market could be more
optimistic about cash dividend announcements made by PPC firms. That is, cash
payouts are more likely to be interpreted as a positive signal for future earnings and
therefore gain higher announcement returns after the positive information is hinted by
private placements.

Hypothesis 4. Private placements should increase the announcement returns of cash
dividends.

3.5 Data, methodology and measurements of variables
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3.5.1 Sample selection
Data used for testing the treatment effects of private placements was acquired
from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The
sample consists of all publicly listed A-share firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges from 2004 to 2015. Given that private placements were introduced to
the Chinese stock market in 2006, the sample starts in 2004 to allow two years as the
control (base) period. Firms that have been labelled as *ST or PT3, firms with missing
data and from financial industry are excluded.

3.5.2 Methodology
3.5.2.1 Propensity score matching (PSM) test
From the perspective of methodology, a reliable policy evaluation should avoid
being selective. For example, if a financially distressed PPC firm has lower cash
dividends compared to a financially healthy non-PPC firm, it is hard to determine how
much of this difference in cash dividends is led by private placements given the
pre-existing difference in accounting performance. Without controlling for selection
bias, the true effect of the policy might be amplified or shadowed (Jaffe, 2002;
Blundell & Costa Dias, 2000). In order to avoid the selectivity problem, this study
*ST is short for special treatment and is normally issued to firms which report financial loss and face the risk of
becoming delisted. PT stands for particular transfer. PT shares are not included in the market index. These two
categories of shares are subject to different trading rules compared to the ordinary outstanding shares and therefore
are excluded from the examined sample.
3
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adopts the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology. Recent studies have
demonstrated the competence of the PSM approach in firm-level research (Yasar &
Rejesus, 2005; Inha et al., 2009). Setting matching rules that control for pre-existing
conditions, a PSM approach pairs a treated firm with the most comparable non-treated
firm. That is, a PSM approach can help to estimate “what should have been”
according to the control group and then compare to the observations of “what it is
now” given by the treatment group.
The first step in sorting the data used in a PSM test is to set up the divisions of
the treatment group and the control group. Given that private placement is the
treatment event, the treatment group consists of firms that have implemented a private
placement between 2006 and 20154, while the control group includes firms that have
not done so within this period. Following Zhao et al. (2015), the treatment group and
the control group are compared with respect to firm characteristics of profitability,
firm size and industrial category. The matching rules listed below specify how the
treatment group and the control group are paired.

a) According to Zhao et al. (2015), a PPC firm’s matching non-PPC firm is
restricted to an A-share firm that has not carried out a private placement,
initial public offerings, rights offering, public offerings, or convertible bonds

For firms that have conducted multiple private placements during 2006 to 2015, their first private placements are
selected as the treatment event.
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during the period 2006 to 2015. The matching non-PPC firm should already
be listed before the year when the paired PPC firm conducted a private
placement. All non-PPC firms that fit rule a) are to be further selected by rule
b).
b) A PPC firm’s matching non-PPC firm should be in the same industry as
the PPC firm. The size of the matching non-PPC firm needs to be within 20%
to 200% of the size of its paired PPC firm. Lastly, the matching non-PPC
firm should have the most similar earning ability5 as its paired PPC firm
among all the potential choices of matching non-PPC firms.
c) If, with the idea of “most similar earning ability”, a matching non-PPC
firm cannot be found for a particular PPC firm using the rules a and b, the
restriction of "same industry" can be relaxed. In the meantime, the size of a
matching non-PPC firm is further restricted to 70% to 120% of the size of
this PPC firm.
d) For a particular PPC firm, if its matching non-PPC firm cannot be located
according to rules a) to c), then this PPC firm is excluded from the research
sample.
After selecting data according to rules a) to d), the final sample includes 15144

A firm’s earning ability is measured by earnings before interest and taxes scaled on the total assets at the end of
the year.
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firm-year observations6 that consist of 953 pairs of firms.

3.5.2.2 Fama-French three-factor model
The purpose of identifying the abnormal long-term stock performance
contributed by private placements is to determine whether non-participating investors
can benefit from trading on information conveyed by private placements. It also
provides insights about whether the information carried by private placements can be
certified by the resulting improvement in firm performance.
Following Fama and French (1993), firms’ long-term stock performances are
measured on a risk-adjusted basis using calendar-time regressions. Fama and French
demonstrate that a three-factor model that includes the market risk premium, the
return on a size factor, and the return on a book-to-market factor, may be more
efficient in explaining the stock returns than the CAPM model. The data used in the
Fama-French three-factor model is obtained from the CSMAR database. In the tested
sample, the event day is any given trading day from 2004 to 2015 which covers both
pre- and post-offering observations for both PPC firms and non-PPC firms.
The factor model that regresses a firm i’s daily excess stock return on day d in
year t (d represents one of the trading days in the sample year t) using the three
Fama-French (1993) factors (which are all daily measurements) is as follows:
The use of firm-year observations violates the independence assumption of OLS regression. To take this problem
into account, all regression analyses in this study uses and reports Newey-West adjusted t-statistics for all
regression results. Also, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level to control for the presence of
outliers.
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Daily observations of all the trading days of firm i in year t are put into the
regression. Each regression is performed at the firm-year level. For day d which is a
trading day of firm i in year t, the dependent variable is firm i’s stock return (Ri,d)
minus the risk-free rate (Rfd) on day d. The independent variables are the market
premium (Rmd - Rfd), SMBd and HMLd on day d. Particularly, market premium (Rmd Rfd) is the difference between the daily market return minus the risk-free daily rate on
day d. SMBd is the return on a zero-investment size portfolio on day d, computed as
the daily return on a portfolio of “small stocks” minus the daily return on a portfolio
of “big stocks”. HMLd is the return on a zero-investment book-to-market ratio
portfolio on day d, computed as the difference in daily return on a portfolio of high
book-to-market ratio firms and the daily return on a portfolio of low book-to-market
ratio firms.
The intercept of this regression is interpreted as the daily risk-adjusted abnormal
stock performance (DAYα) of firm i in year t (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). This daily
measurement is then converted to a yearly basis by adjusting for the number of the
actual trading days (N) of firm i in year t, which gives an estimation of firms’
long-term stock performance.
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This present study chose the Fama-French measurement instead of cumulated
abnormal returns (CARs) to measure stock performance. The control group does not
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have an event day for private placements, however, this group might experience other
firm events around the date of private placements conducted by the treatment group,
which might bring noises to the findings. Even for PPC firms, it is difficult to
determine the event day when the tested year is not a placement year. The stock
performance outside the placement year is crucial to determine the treatment effect of
private placements. These are the problems that cannot be addressed by CARs studies.
The superiority of using the intercept of Fama-French three-factor model as the proxy
for stock performance is that doing so provides valid observations of long-term stock
performance both before and after private placements for both treatment and control
groups.

3.5.2.3 Event study
The event study methodology is adopted to examine if the market reacts to
announcements of cash dividends differently before and after private placements.
Observations on non-PPC firms are also examined by this test to yield the treatment
effect of private placements.
In this event study, the magnitude of market reactions is defined as the abnormal
returns around various event windows, which is calculated as the difference between
the realized returns and expected returns. Particularly, daily individual stock returns
with dividends reinvested are used as the realized returns. Expected returns are given
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by the prediction made based on pre-event observations. The public announcement
day of cash dividends is the event day 0. Using pre-event observations from the [-89,
-11] window as the estimation event time period (Wu et al., 2005), a firm j that
announced above-zero cash dividends in year y has its announcement reaction to this
payment estimated using the market-model as follows:
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where Rj,t is the observed daily stock return of the common stock of firm j on an
estimation day t from the [-89, -11] window, αj,y is the intercept and β

j,y

is the

coefficient, and Rm,t is the same-day market returns with cash dividends reinvested on
the index of the stock exchange where the issuing firm is listed. The coefficients αj,y
and βj,y are ordinary least square estimates of the intercept and the slope of this model.
The estimated values of αj,y and βj,y for firm j that paid cash dividends in year y
are acquired to calculate the expected return (ER) of firm j on an event day t* as
follows:
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where ERj,t* is the expected daily return of the common stock of firm j on event day t*
assuming reinvested cash dividends. Rm,t* is the daily market returns on the day t*
with cash dividends reinvested on the index of the stock exchange where the issuing
firm is listed.
On an event day t* within the announcement period, the daily abnormal return
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ARj,t* for the cash dividend announcements made by firm j is defined as the difference
between the realized return Rj,t* and expected return ERj,t* :
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where Rj,t* is the realized return of the common stock of the firm j on day t* assuming
reinvested cash dividends.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR[t1, t2]) of the announcement of cash
dividends made by firm j from a multi-day announcement window [t1, t2] is defined
as the sum of the time-series of ARs within the event window [t1, t2], that is:
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The choices of event windows for this test are [-3, 0], [-1, 0] and [-1, +1]. To
control for the potential information overlap, observations of firms that issue
announcements of earnings (annual report), seasoned equity offerings, right issues,
mergers and acquisitions within the [-3, 0] announcement period of cash payouts are
excluded. After excluding firms with incomplete daily trading data, 9082 events are
selected to examine the announcement returns of cash dividends before and after
private equity issues for both PPC firms and non-PPC firms.

3.5.3 List of variables
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Dependent Variable
DY: Dividend yield, measured as the cash dividend per share divided by the stock
price at the end of the year. This measurement reflects the return from cash dividends
for investors who prefer payouts than capital gains when making investment plans.
CDPS: Cash dividend per share, calculated as the total cash dividend payment divided
by the total number of outstanding shares at the issue of cash dividends. It reflects the
amount of cash distributions scaled on the number of shares outstanding.
PAYOUT: Cash dividend payout ratio, depicted as cash dividend per share divided by
earning per share. This ratio informs the return on dividends for investors who are
more interested in the growth of stocks.
∆DY: The year-to-year difference in dividend yield.
∆CDPS: The year-to-year difference in cash dividend per share.
∆PAYOUT: The year-to-year difference in dividend payout ratio.
YEARα: For each sample firm, its abnormal long-term stock performance on a daily
basis is measured by the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama &
French, 1993). This intercept is obtained by regressing the firm’s daily excess return
(the firm’s daily return minus the risk-free daily rate) on the daily return of the market,
size and book-to-market ratio factors in a calendar year. The intercept of this model,
therefore, represents the average daily abnormal returns for the firm in a 12-month
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period. This daily abnormal return is then converted to a yearly return by adjusting for
the number of trading days a firm has within this calendar year.
CAR [t1, t2]: The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the cash dividends paid by a
firm from a multi-day announcement window [t1, t2]. It is defined as the sum of the
time-series of daily abnormal return within the event window [t1, t2]. The tested event
windows are [-1, +1], [-1, 0] and [-3, 0].
Key Independent Variables
LN(TIME-GAP): The natural logarithm of the time gap between the private placement
in question and its last pre-offering cash dividends within 365 days.
PP-GROUP: This variable takes a value of 1 for a PPC firm, and 0 for a non-PPC
firm,
LOCKUP: The timing dummy that controls for varying lockup periods which run for
three years for controlling shareholders and one year for non-controlling shareholders.
For a PPC firm, this variable takes a value of 1 when it is imposing a trading
restriction on their participants in private placements, and 0 otherwise. For a non-PPC
firm, this variable takes a value of 1 when its paired PPC firm is imposing a trading
restriction on their participants in private placements, and 0 otherwise.
POST-LOCKUP: The timing dummy for the post-lockup period. For a PPC firm, this
variable takes a value of 1 when the trading restriction on participating shareholders is
finalized, and 0 otherwise. For a non-PPC firm, this variable takes a value of 1 when
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its paired PPC firm has ended the trading restriction on participating shareholders, and
0 otherwise.
LOCKUP*PP-GROUP: A cross-term between LOCKUP and PP-GROUP.
POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP:

A

cross-term

between

POST-LOCKUP

and

PP-GROUP.
PP-TIME: The timing dummy for the post-private-placement period. For a PPC firm,
this variable takes a value of 1 if a private placement has occurred, and 0 otherwise.
For a non-PPC firm, this variable takes a value of 1 when its paired PPC firm has
conducted a private placement, and 0 otherwise.
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP: The cross-term between PP-TIME and PP-GROUP.
UCDPS/P0: The year-to-year change in CDPS adjusted by the industry-year average7,
and then scaled on the closing price on the announcement day (day 0). According to
Cheng et al. (2009), the unexpected cash dividends release previously unknown
information when the market expects regular cash payouts.
ΔSD: The year-to-year change in SD.
UEPS: The year-to-year change in earnings per share (EPS) adjusted by the
industry-year average.

Even though it is typical to use analyst forecasts to estimate earnings and dividends for markets where the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) provides enough coverage, very few A-share Chinese firms are
covered by the I/B/E/S. Therefore, this study uses industry-average as expected earnings and dividends.
7
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Control Variables
LARGEST: The holding percentage of the largest shareholder at the end of the year.
NC-LARGE: The ratio of the sum of percentage shareholdings from the second to the
fifth largest shareholders to the largest shareholder’s holding percentage at the end of
the year.
EXCESS: Difference between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash-flow
rights.
ROA: The ratio of return on assets. The net profits scaled on the total assets at the end
of the year.
CASH: Cash and marketable securities scaled on total assets at the end of the year.
LEVERAGE: The ratio of total debt to the total assets at the end of the year.
SIZE: The natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the year.
MB: Market-to-book ratio.
SD: Stock dividend per share issued by a firm in a particular year.
LN(ANN_DATE): The natural logarithm of the number of days from the year
beginning (January 1) to cash dividends announcement date. Chen et al. (2005) and
Haw et al. (2000) find that Chinese firms tend to accord their announcements with a
timing pattern. They are found to announce good news (such as growth in earnings)
earlier and bad news later in a year.
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LN(BOARD): The natural logarithm of the total number of board directors is used as a
determinant of firm performance. This figure is industry-adjusted to produce more
robust results. A larger board size is shown to generate higher agency cost and lower
efficiency, and therefore weaker firm performance (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack,
1996; Jensen, 2010).
IND-DIRECTOR: The ratio of the number of independent directors over the total
number of directors is used as a determinant of firm performance. The
industry-adjusted ratio is used to produce more robust results. Following Li et al.
(2015), the variable set of LN(BOARD) and IND-DIRECTOR are used as key
explanatory variables when testing the determinants of firm performance.
FIRM-RISK: The standard deviation of residual between actual returns and estimated
returns from the market model over 78 trading days in the estimation event period
from day -88 to day -11 relative to the announcement day 0 (Cheng et al., 2009). This
variable captures firm-specific risks.
The industry fixed effect is also controlled for according to the industry classification
provided by the CSMAR database.

3.5.4 Models
The last cash dividends before private placement
The analysis of the interaction between private placements and cash dividends
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begins with an examination of PPC firms that have announced non-zero cash
dividends within the preceding year before private placements. The changes in these
cash distributions, in particular, can help to identify whether firms coordinate
dividends in conjunction with the upcoming private placements. Models 3.1 to 3.3
which feature the timing of the last cash dividends within one year before private
placement are shown below.
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(Equation 3.1)
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(Equation 3.2)
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(Equation 3.3)

The change in examined cash dividend practice is computed as the difference
between the current payouts and payouts from the last accounting cycle. Three
measurements are used to control for this change: ∆DY, ∆CDPS and ∆PAYOUT.
LN(TIME-GAP) as the key independent variable is continuous, and therefore clearly
depicts the length of the time gap. If Hypothesis 1 holds, the coefficient of
LN(TIME-GAP) will be significantly negative, indicating cash dividends are more
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likely to increase when private placements are announced in the nearer future. The
control variables here are LARGEST, EXCESS, NC_LARGE, CASH, LEVERAGE,
SIZE, MB, SD and industry fixed effect.

The treatment effect of private placement on cash dividends
DY, CDPS and PAYOUT are used as dependent variables to investigate the
treatment effect of private placements on cash dividends. The lockup period is
controlled for to capture the presence of the resale restriction. In particular, the lockup
period is one year for participating shareholders who are non-controlling shareholders
while it is three years for those who are controlling shareholders. Given the crucial
status of controlling shareholders, if PPC firms invite both controlling and
non-controlling shareholders in the placement, this study views the lockup period as
three-year long. The key independent variables that help to interpret this treatment
effect within lockup and post-lockup periods are LOCKUP*PP-GROUP and
POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP.
Models 3.4 to 3.6 which simultaneously examine the within-lockup and
post-lockup treatment effects of private placements on different proxies of cash
dividend policy are:
u ri =
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If the treatment effect of private placements on cash dividends is heavily influenced
by the illiquidity caused by resale restriction (Hypothesis 2a), then the coefficient of
LOCKUP*PP-GROUP will be significantly positive while the coefficient of
POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP will not be. If the treatment effect is driven by interests
transfer of controlling shareholders (Hypothesis 2b), then the coefficients of these two
cross-terms will be significantly positive. If private placements lead to lower cash
dividends because of an improvement in the firm-level information environment
(Hypothesis 3a), then coefficients of cross-terms will be significantly negative.
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The treatment effect of private placement on firm performance
The measurement of stock performance is derived from the intercept of the
Fama-French three-factor model (please see more details in Section 3.5.2.2). The
change in stock performance contributed by private placements is examined to
investigate if the information certification effect of private placements is valid and if
the change in stock performance collaborates with the change in cash dividends.
Model 3.7 which tests the treatment effect of private placements on stock
performance is:
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If the risk of illiquidity is responsible for the increase in cash dividends caused by
private placements (Hypothesis 2a), this increase should be less related to the
treatment effect of private placements on stock performance. Therefore, the
coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP could either be positive or negative. If the
increase in cash dividends is determined by interests transfer of controlling
shareholders (Hypothesis 2b), then the coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is
expected to be significantly negative as the consequence of tunnelling. If private
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placements result in a decrease in cash dividends because of the information
certification effect of private placements (Hypothesis 3b), then the coefficient of
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is expected to be significantly positive. The relevant control
variables of Model 3.7 are LARGEST, EXCESS, NC_LARGE, CASH, LEVERAGE,
SIZE, MB and industry fixed effect.

The treatment effect of private placement on the announcement effect of cash
dividends
Cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of cash dividends are used
as a proxy for the announcement effect (please see more details in Section 3.5.2.2).
The announcement returns are gathered from event windows of [-3, 0], [-1, 0] and [-1,
+1] in relation to announcement day 0. Because investors who can trade around
announcements of cash dividends are those who are not subject to resale restrictions,
this test does not control for the presence of lockup periods. Therefore, the key
independent variable which captures the treatment effect of private placements is
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP. Models 3.8 to 3.10 which test the treatment effect of private
placements on announcement returns of cash dividends are:
H

r

hh ܴ 뻀 h ri
 i 

ri

=

ܽ ܽ݅ ܽ

hh ܴ 뻀 h ri

ri

hܩ香h

ri

ܩ

ri

hh

蒨羨 ri

羨h ܩri

hh

蒨羨 i

192

(Equation 3.8)
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Conditional on the improvement in the firm-level information environment
contributed by private placements, cash dividends could be more informative and
therefore more favoured by the market when issued by PPC firms (Hypothesis 4).
Accordingly, the coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP will be significantly positive.
Alternatively, if the post-offering cash distributions are a form of interests transfer to
large shareholders, the coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP will be significantly
negative, indicating that private placements have a negative impact on the usefulness
of cash dividends as a predictor of firm prospects. Following Cheng et al. (2009), key
explanatory variables for testing the market reaction of cash dividend announcements
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are unexpected changes in cash dividends per share scaled on the closing price of
announcement day (UCDPS/P0), year-to-year change in stock dividend per share
(ΔSD) and unexpected changes in earnings per share (UEPS). The control variables of
this test are LN(ANN-DATE), FIRM-RISK, SIZE, MB and industry fixed effect. The
data used by Models 3.8 to 3.10 are firm-year observations of PPC firms and non-PPC
firms which have valid CAR observations around announcements of cash payouts
from 2004 to 2015.

3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Univariate tests
This section discusses the results of the univariate analysis. In Table 3.2, the
individual group-trend of cash payouts for PPC and non-PPC firms and the common
time-trend

of

dividends

for

divisions

of

pre-private-placement

and

post-private-placement are investigated. This study uses three measurements of cash
dividends: dividend yield (DY), cash dividend per share (CDPS) and payout ratio
(PAYOUT). DY is computed as dividend per share relative to the share price, CDPS
measures the cash payments scaled on the number of shares outstanding, and
PAYOUT describes the ratio of dividend per share and earnings per share.
In Table 3.2, for the cross-group analysis on tests of difference in mean and
median, PPC firms tend to issue significantly lower cash dividends compared to their
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matching non-PPC firms throughout the sample period of 2004 to 2015. Notably, this
observation holds for the three measures of cash dividends. As to the cross-time
analysis, the joint sample of PPC firms and non-PPC firms, in general, experiences a
decrease in cash dividends after private placements. This result may be affected by an
exogenous market-level change, such as the 2005 NTS reform, which leads to a
systematic decrease in cash payouts discussed in Chapter 2. It should be noted that the
results of the cross-group (cross-time) analysis in Table 3.2 show the combination of
the treatment effect of private placements and the constant group trend (common time
trend) on cash dividends.
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Table 3.2 The difference in cash dividend payments between PPC firms and non-PPC firms, and between before and after private placements
This table presents the results of the cross-group (PPC and non-PPC firms) comparison of payouts in Panel A and the cross-time (before and after private placements)
comparison on cash dividends in Panel B. The proxies of cash distributions are dividend yield (DY), cash dividend per share (CDPS) and payout ratio (PAYOUT).
“Difference” columns report the mean (median) of group- and time-difference and the associated t-statistic (z-statistic) in testing the difference from zero (in parentheses). *,
** and *** represent the difference is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. The cross-group (PPC in relation to non-PPC) comparison of cash dividends
DY

CDPS

PAYOUT

PPC

Non-PPC

Difference

PPC

Non-PPC

Difference

PPC

Non-PPC

Difference

Observation

8238

6905

1333

8238

6905

1333

8238

6905

1333

Mean

0.010

0.011

-0.001 (-6.85)***

0.109

0.143

-0.034 (-11.39)***

0.0403

0.0476

-0.073 (-1.54)

Median

0.006

0.007

-0.001 (-7.55)***

0.074

0. 100

-0.026 (-8.53)***

0.199

0.263

-0.064 (-9.34)***

Panel B. The cross-time (Post-private-placement in relation to Pre-private-placement) comparison of cash dividends
Pre-private-

Post-private-

placement

placement

Observation

8210

6933

1277

8210

6933

1277

8210

6933

Mean

0.011

0.010

-0.001 (-1.80)*

0.127

0.121

-0.006 (-1.82)*

0.445

0.425

-0.020 (-0.41)

Median

0.006

0.006

-0.000 (-1.27)

0.100

0.078

-0.022 (-1.77)*

0.240

0.216

-0.024 (-2.89)***

Difference

Pre-private-

Post-private-

placement

placement

Difference

Pre-private-

Post-private-

placement

placement

Difference
1277
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Table 3.3 compares dividends of PPC firms and non-PPC firms before and after
private placements. Panel A reports results on DY and Panels B and C list results on
CDPS and PAYOUT, respectively. The results in Panel A show that PPC firms
experienced a drop in DY after the offerings, which is significant at the 5% level. Yet,
their matching non-PPC firms are found to maintain the level of DY after private
placements. The post-offering observation on non-PPC firm provides an indication of
what DY would be like for PPC firms if the offerings did not occur. In fact, PPC firms
are shown to have a similar level of DY compared to non-PPC firms before private
placements, but PPC firms change to having significantly lower DY compared to their
matching group after private placement (a t-statistic of -2.28). This suggests that the
post-offering observations of PPC firms are less affected by pre-existing group
conditions. Given the limitation of univariate analysis, current results are not able to
isolate the treatment effect of private placements. Still, it is shown that PPC firms are
not more likely to have higher dividend yields after the offerings.
The results in Panel B and C of Table 3.3 are consistent with the results in Panel
A. The only difference is that PPC firms are shown to have lower CDPS compared to
non-PPC firms since before private placements. Still, this cross-group difference in
mean of CDPS has been enlarged from -0.031 to -0.039 after private placements. It is
therefore safe to conclude that PPC firms tend to have lower cash dividends after
private placements compared to themselves and compared to their matching group.
And, it is more in line with the signalling/substitute argument (Hypothesis 3a).
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Table 3.3 The group trends and time trends of the payment of cash dividends
This table presents the results of cross-group (PPC and non-PPC firms) comparison both before and after private placements, and cross-time (before
and after private placements) within-group comparison on cash dividend policy. Panel A reports the comparison measured by dividend yield (DY),
Panel B by cash dividend per share (CDPS) and Panel C by payout ratio (PAYOUT). “Difference” columns/rows report the mean of difference and the
associated t-statistic in testing this difference from zero (in parentheses). *, ** and *** represent the difference is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A. The group trend and time trend of DY
Before Private Placement

After Private Placement

Difference

PPC Firms

0.011

0.010

-0.002 (-2.24)**

Non-PPC Firms

0.011

0.011

-0.003 (-0.47)

-0.000 (-0.65)

-0.001 (-2.28)**

Difference

Panel B. The group trend and time trend of CDPS
PPC Firms
Non-PPC Firms
Difference

Before Private Placement

After Private Placement

0.113

0.102

-0.012 (-3.48)***

0.144

0.141

-0.003 (-0.77)

-0.031 (-8.56)***

Difference

-0.039 (-7.84)***

Panel C. The group trend and time trend of PAYOUT
PPC Firms
Non-PPC Firms
Difference

Before Private Placement

After Private Placement

Difference

0.451

0.338

-0.113 (-1.81)*

0.437

0.515

-0.078 (1.07)

0.014 (0.23)

-0.177 (-2.40)***
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The univariate analysis shown in Table 3.4 examines the individual group-trend
of the announcement effect of cash payouts for PPC and non-PPC firms and the
common time-trend of this effect before and after private placements. Three event
periods are examined to determine the abnormal returns around announcements of
cash dividends. They are [-3, 0], [-1, 0] and [-1, +1] relative to the announcement day
0. In Table 3.4, announcement returns from all of the three event windows are positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In summary, the individual group trend
and the common time trend are consistent in showing that the market reacts positively
to cash dividend payments.
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Table 3.4 The announcement effect of cash dividends differentiated by PPC firms and non-PPC firms, and by before and after private placements
This table presents the results of the cross-group (PPC and non-PPC firms) comparison and the cross-time comparison (before and after private placements)
on the announcement returns of cash dividends from 2004 to 2015. The measurement of market reactions towards cash distributions is the difference between
the realized returns and expected returns predicted by the market model. The mean and the median of market reactions over three event periods are listed. The
announcement periods are set as [-3, 0], [-1, 0] and [-1, +1] relative to the announcement day 0. The associated t-statistic and z-statistic in testing the mean
and median from zero (in parentheses) is examined to determine the significance of the announcement returns. *, ** and *** represent the difference from
zero is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
CAR[-3,0]

CAR[-1,0]

CAR[-1,+1]

N

Mean

t-stat

Median

z-stat

Mean

t-stat

Median

z-stat

Mean

t-stat

Median

z-stat

PPC

4999

0.412%

5.23***

0.196%

4.60***

0.478%

8.70***

0.199%

7.09***

0.674%

9.55***

0.365%

8.62***

Non-PPC

4083

0.435%

4.83***

0.190%

4.06***

0.475%

8.04***

0.256%

7.54***

0.682%

8.05***

0.400%

8.50***

Pre-PP

4705

0.445%

5.77***

0.311%

5.70***

0.529%

9.81***

0.256%

8.43***

0.742%

9.89***

0.432%

9.62***

Post-PP

4377

0.398%

4.37***

0.084%

2.87***

0.421%

7.00***

0.194%

6.11***

0.608%

7.71***

0.350%

7.42***
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The next analysis is the comparison of the dividend announcement returns of
PPC and non-PPC firms before and after private placements. Given the result on
CAR[-3, 0] in Table 3.58, PPC firms experience a little increase in the announcement
effect of cash dividends after private placements. Non-PPC firms experience a minor
decrease in the announcement returns of payouts after private placements9. Both
results are insignificant. In short, the time trend on the announcement effect of cash
dividends is less shown for both PPC firms and non-PPC firms. The difference in
CAR[-3, 0] between PPC firms and non-PPC firms turns from being negative in the
pre-offering stage to becoming positive in the post-offering period, but the differences
are insignificant. The results in Table 3.5 show some consistency with the prediction
given by Hypothesis 4. This study relies on further multivariate analysis to provide
more conclusive results.

The results on CAR[-1, 0] and CAR[-1, +1] are omitted as they are highly consistent with the results on CAR[-3,
0].
9
The median of the post-offering announcement returns is indifferent from 0 (z-statistic of -0.57) for non-PPC
firms.
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Table 3.5 The group trends and time trends of the announcement effect of cash dividends
This table presents the results of the cross-group (PPC and non-PPC firms) comparison both before and after private placements, and the cross-time (before and
after private placements) comparison within groups of PPC firms and non-PPC firms on the announcement effect of cash dividends. The proxy for the
announcement returns is CAR[-3, 0]. “Difference” columns/rows report the mean of difference and the associated t-statistic in testing this difference from zero (in
parentheses). *, ** and *** represent the difference is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
CAR [-3,0] around cash dividends announcements
Before Private Placement

After Private Placement

PPC Firms

0.369%

0.464%

0.095% (0.60)

Non-PPC Firms

0.560%

0.320%

-0.240% (-1.33)

-0.191% (-1.22)

0.144% (0.79)

Difference

Difference

202

The last part of the univariate analysis reports the difference between PPC firms
and non-PPC firms based on other characteristics of firms. The results in Table 3.6
show that PPC firms are more leveraged (LEVERAGE) and have less cash (CASH) on
hand than non-PPC firms with differences significant at the 1% level.
Financially-constrained firms tend to have a smaller chance of being approved for
public issues under the regulation settings in China, therefore private placements
might be their only viable option to conduct equity refinance. It is noted that PPC
firms tend to have a less concentrated ownership structure (LARGEST), but a larger
board size (L(BOARD)) and fewer independent directors (IND-DIRECTOR) compared
to non-PPC firms. Chinese PPC firms also tend to have a larger asset scale (SIZE) and
lower growth opportunity (MB) compared to non-PPC firms.
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Table 3.6 Univariate tests of the cross-group analysis on firm characteristics
This table presents the results of univariate tests of characteristics of PPC firms and non-PPC firms. “Difference” columns report the mean of difference and the
associated t-statistic in testing its difference from zero. *, ** and *** represent the difference is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Firm characteristics
PPC Firms

non-PPC Firms

Difference

Mean

Median

STDV

Mean

Median

STDV

In mean

LARGEST

0.362

0.345

0.150

0.372

0.355

0.154

-3.87***

NC_LARGE

0.632

0.460

0.578

0.628

0.460

0.579

0.38

EXCESS

5.141%

0.000%

7.914%

5.150%

0.000%

8.012%

-0.01

CASH

0.182

0.148

0.128

0.212

0.165

0.158

-12.90***

LEVERAGE

0.468

0.481

0.193

0.389

0.379

0.204

24.47***

SIZE

21.976

21.776

1.239

21.741

21.553

1.148

12.02***

MB

3.386

2.678

2.413

3.486

2.657

2.594

-2.46**

SD

0.016

0.000

0.074

0.015

0.000

0.072

0.96

LN(BOARD)
INDDIRECTOR

-0.004

0.000

0.196

-0.026

0.000

0.215

6.36***

0.032

0.000

0.053

0.034

0.000

0.054

-1.92*
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3.6.2 Multivariate analysis
3.6.2.1 The most recent cash payouts before private placements
The multivariate analysis of this study begins with the examination of PPC
firms that have declared cash distributions within the 365-day before private
placements. Of 953 PPC firms, 695 (about 73%) announced non-zero cash dividends
within this timeframe, and these are the sample firms used by this test. It should be
noted that the CSRC’s assessment of applications of private placements asserts no
requirement on the pre-offering cash payouts. Still, the observation that up to 73% of
PPC firms choose to pay dividends within the year preceding private placements gives
some weight to the importance of these payments.
The test of the cash dividend practice within the year prior to private placements
uses LN(TIME-GAP) as the key explanatory variable to control for the length of the
time between the pre-offering cash dividends and private placements. The test uses
the timing measurement of LN(TIME-GAP) as it reflects the private information held
by managers, which is how soon are the future private placements. Column 1 of Table
3.7 shows the results when ∆DY measures the change in the last dividend issued
within the year before private placements (Model 3.1). The timing measurement
LN(TIME-GAP) has a negative coefficient which is significant at the 5% level. This
indicates that the smaller the time interval between the pre-offering cash dividends
and private placements, the larger the upward change in dividend yield compared to
the yield recorded in the previous accounting cycle.
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Table 3.7 The time gap between pre-offering cash dividends and private placements as a
determinant of cash dividend payments
This table presents the results of testing for a link between the last cash dividends before private
placements and the time gap between the announcements of these two events. Data used in this test
consists of the year-observation of PPC firms that announced non-zero cash payouts within 365 days
before the private placements in question. The dependent variables are ∆DY (in Column 1), ∆CDPS (in
Column 2) and ∆PAYOUT (in Column 3), respectively. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section
3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted.
Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.

Variable
C
Ln(TIME-GAP)
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
SD
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

(1).

(2).

(3).

∆DY

∆CDPS

∆PAYOUT

.042
(3.17)
-.001**
(-2.11)
-.004
(-1.23)
.000
(0.59)
.003
(0.67)
.007
(0.69)
.001
(0.38)
.004*
(1.76)
-.001***
(-2.88)
-.000***
(-3.86)
.007*
(1.90)
695
.297

.220**
(1.99)
-.010*
(-1.74)
-.027***
(-0.83)
.003
(0.25)
.039
(0.85)
.310***
(2.77)
.035
(1.02)
.090***
(3.78)
-.009*
(-1.88)
-.002
(-1.47)
-.041
(-.93)
695
.163

2.752***
(2.79)
-.127***
(-2.52)
-.745**
(-2.33)
-.130
(-1.58)
.296
(.62)
3.647***
(2.94)
.089
(.18)
.339
(1.25)
-.092**
(-2.45)
-.048***
(-2.58)
.534***
(2.61)
695
.324
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Next, this study examines whether the link between private placements and
pre-offering cash distributions is sensitive to alternative measurements of the change
in cash dividends. ∆DY is therefore replaced by ∆CDPS (Model 3.2 in Column 2 of
Table 3.7) and ∆PAYOUT (Model 3.3 in Column 3 of Table 3.7). When the change in
the last cash dividends before offerings is measured by the change in cash dividend
per share (∆CDPS), the negative association between dividend changes and
LN(TIME-GAP) is significant at the 10% level. A stronger form of this negative
association is observed when ∆PAYOUT is the dependent variable. As shown by
Model 3.3, the coefficient of LN(TIME-GAP) is negative and significant at the 1%
level. That is, using three different measurements of the change in cash dividends,
consistent evidence shows a larger increase in dividends when private placements are
to be announced in the nearer future. Following Lin et al. (2008) and Booth and
Chang (2011), this study interprets the negative coefficient of LN(TIME-GAP) as
managers tending to use growth in cash dividends to create a favourable information
environment based on their private information of the later announcements of private
placements. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.

3.6.2.2 The change in cash dividends led by private placements: illiquidity or
tunnelling?
This section discusses the treatment effect of private placements on cash
dividends with a particular interest in testing whether this effect varies between
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lockup and post-lockup periods. The proxies for cash dividend policy are DY, CDPS
and PAYOUT. The results are presented in Table 3.8. In Column 1 where DY serves as
the dependent variable (Model 3.4), the insignificant coefficient of PP-GROUP shows
that the difference in dividend yields between PPC firms and their matching non-PPC
firms before private placements is not statistically significant. This is consistent with
the univariate results in Table 3.3. The result on PP-GROUP suggests that the cash
dividend policies of PPC firms have a minimal pre-existing difference compared to
the policies of non-PPC firms. LOCKUP and POST_LOCKUP have negative
coefficients, but only the coefficient on POST_LOCKUP is significant. This shows
that dividend yields of the control group (non-PPC firms) decrease significantly in
years after the lockup periods of their matching PPC firms have been finalized. This
difference is possibly led by post-offering concurrent events that are unrelated to
private placements.
Examining the results for the interaction terms shown in Column 1, the
significant and negative coefficient of LOCKUP*PP-GROUP indicate that private
placements lead to a downward change in DY within lockup periods. The descending
trend in cash dividends within the lockup periods following private placements does
not support Hypothesis 2a which predicts that increased cash payouts within lockup
periods provide liquidity. The possible explanation is that illiquidity within lock-up
periods is anticipated and may be managed before private placements. This lowers
participating shareholders’ need to rely on cash dividends to provide liquidity.
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Table 3.8 The treatment effect of private placements on cash dividend payments
This table presents the results of PSM tests regarding the treatment effect of private placements on
cash dividends, with a focus on the consistency of this effect within lockup and post-lockup periods.
The sample period is 2004 to 2015 which covers an at least two-year pre-event period and post-event
period for both PPC firms and their matching non-PPC firms. The dependent variable from columns
1 to 3 in order is DY, CDPS and PAYOUT. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4.
The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized
beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Variable
C
PP-GROUP
LOCKUP
POST-LOCKUP
LOCKUP
*PP-GROUP
POST-LOCKUP
*PP-GROUP
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
SD
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

(1).

(2).

(3).

DY

CDPS

PAYOUT

-.029***
(-7.82)
-.000
(-0.35)
-.000
(-1.32)
-0.001**
(-2.02)
-.003***
(-5.18)
-.002***
(-2.63)
.015***
(11.50)
.003***
(9.24)
.001
(.82)
.061***
(20.54)
.003***
(3.04)
-.005***
(-5.32)
.002***
(9.06)
-.002***
(-31.17)
.005***
(3.62)
15143
.233

-.572***
(-11.91)
-.003
(-.70)
.001
(.22)
-.002
(-.25)
-.028***
(-4.71)
-.015*
(-1.77)
.146***
(9.46)
.033***
(9.54)
.057**
(2.38)
1.061***
(23.32)
.181***
(12.27)
-.088***
(-8.13)
.026***
(11.49)
-.002***
(-3.52)
-.043***
(-2.49)
15143
.320

.086
(.65)
.025
(1.61)
.045***
(2.66)
.034
(1.60)
-.107***
(-4.69)
-.076***
(-2.74)
.486***
(9.65)
.103***
(7.81)
.047
(.69)
-1.275***
(-9.76)
.179***
(4.17)
-.566***
(-13.51)
.017***
(2.54)
-.012***
(-6.16)
.339***
(4.38)
15143
.053

Given the negative coefficient, which is significant at the 5% level, for
POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP, the downward tendency of DY caused by private
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placements continues even after lockup periods are complete. This indicates that after
controlling for the effect of private placements over time and between groups, there is
evidence to suggest that private placements lead to a decrease in cash dividends
(measured by DY) which is observed in both the lockup and post-lockup periods. The
results

on

the

cross-terms

of

LOCKUP*PP-GROUP

and

POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP are in line with the prediction in Hypothesis 3a. It is not
a surprise that the results do not support Hypothesis 2b, the argument of tunnelling,
which predicts higher post-offering cash dividends as a means of interests transfer to
participating investors (Zhao et al., 2015; P. Li & G. Li, 2014). More equity at stake
for large shareholders could point to tunnelling as a less practical option in the
long-run.
The results on control variables in Column 1 are highly consistent with the
previous findings discussed in Chapter 2. In terms of ownership structure, more
extensive holdings of the largest shareholder (LARGEST) and more balanced
ownership among the top five large shareholders (NC_LARGE) result in higher cash
dividends. Firms in sound financial conditions, namely higher ROAs with greater
cash levels (CASH) and lower debt obligations (LEVERAGE), tend to have higher
cash distributions. The size factor (SIZE) is also highly relevant, as bigger firms are
more generous with payouts. It is also expected that firms with high-growth (MB)
have lower cash dividends and firms issuing stock dividends (SD) tend to announce
payouts simultaneously.
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The results listed in Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 3.8 are given by repeating
PSM tests on alternative cash dividend measurements; CDPS as tested by Model 3.5
and PAYOUT by Model 3.6. Consistent with the univariate results (Table 3.3), the
observation of the negative coefficients on cross-terms of LOCKUP*PP-GROUP and
POST-LOCKUP*PP-GROUP when tested on CDPS and PAYOUT is consistent with
the results using DY. That is, the decrease in cash dividends caused by private
placements is robust to the use of alternative measurements for payout practices.
Although the decrease in cash dividends led by private placements is evidential, the
mechanism regarding what might trigger this change requires further examination.
As the results on control variables obtained from Model 3.4 to Model 3.6 do not
vary much, most of the explanation is based on dependent variable DY, but opinions
are expressed wherever there are major differences. For example, the coefficient of
SD is significantly negative when tested on CDPS, indicating that stock dividends and
cash dividends might be considered as each other’s substitute.

3.6.2.3 The change in cash dividends led by private placements: information
certification
This section relies on the examination of the change in long-term stock
performance led by private placements to interpret the concurrent treatment effect on
PPC firms’ cash dividend practices. Following previous studies, the Fama-French
three-factor model is used to evaluate the abnormal long-term performance of both
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PPC and non-PPC firms (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck & Rees, 2002; Krishnamurthy,
Spindt, Subramaniam & Woidtke, 2005; Wruck & Wu, 2009).
A PSM test on sample firms’ abnormal long-term stock returns can demonstrate
whether private placements realize the information certification effect that is supposed
to benefit both participating and non-participating investors. This test design also
isolates the treatment effect of private placements from that of other concurrent
factors which might also affect stock performance during the sample period.
The results on the treatment effect of private placements on stock performance
(Model 3.7) is shown in Table 3.9. The proxy of the abnormal long-term stock returns
is firstly computed as the intercept from the Fama-French three-factor model using
daily data and then adjusted to the number of trading days within a year to convert to
YEARα. The insignificant coefficient of PP-GROUP suggests no substantial difference
in abnormal long-term stock performance of PPC firms and their matching PPC firms
before private placements. This also helps to relieve the concern that the effect of
private placements on stock performance is driven by pre-existing conditions. The
time dummy of PP-TIME reports a significantly negative coefficient. It is implied that
non-PPC firms experience weaker stock performance after the year of private
placements conducted by their matching PPC firms. The timing dummy of PP-TIME
captures the time trend in stock performance experienced by the control group, which
is not influenced by private placements.
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For the cross-term that measures the treatment effect of private placements on
stock performance, PP-TIME*PP-GROUP report significantly positive coefficients at
the 1% level. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3b and suggest that private
placements tend to lead to stronger long-term stock performance. This evidence does
not support the notion of aggravated tunnelling because of private placements,
otherwise active tunnelling is most likely to incur negative long-term abnormal stock
returns (Cheung, Jing, Rau & Stouraitis, 2006)10 following private placements.
Instead, the effect of private placements on long-term stock performance is more in
line with the positive information conveyed by private placements (Hertzel & Smith,
1993). The implication is that firms suffering from information asymmetry may
choose to issue equity privately to signal that they are undervalued.

Cheung et al. (2006) find that negative excess returns are earned by firms conducting tunnelling-related
connected-party transactions even after 12 months have passed.
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Table 3.9 The treatment effect of private placements on long-term stock performance
This table presents the results regarding the treatment effect of private placements on long-term stock
performance, with a focus on the consistency of this effect within lockup and post-lockup periods. The sample
period is 2004 to 2015 which covers a 2-year pre-event period and a post-event period for both PPC firms and
their matching non-PPC firms. The proxy of firm long-term stock performance (YEARα) is firstly computed as
the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model using daily observations and then adjusted for the trading
days within a sample year. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is
controlled for in the regression but the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported;
Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.

Variable
C
PP-GROUP
PP-TIME
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
LN(BOARD)
IND-DIRECTOR
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

YEARα
-1.030***
(-37.16)
.002
(.56)
-.015***
(-4.50)
.016***
(3.29)
.058***
(5.78)
.018***
(6.28)
-.006
(-.44)
-.079***
(-2.52)
-.054***
(-5.74)
.003
(.36)
.007***
(4.86)
.026***
(30.27)
-.010
(-1.56)
-.039
(-1.59)
15048
.195

Next, this study combines the findings regarding the impacts of private
placements on cash dividends and stock performance. As discussed earlier, private
placements can contribute to improving the information environment of issuing firms
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by releasing previously unavailable information (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). Given that
the size of dividends determined can be directly related to information asymmetry
(Cheng et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012), private placements may serve as a
justifiable reason to reduce cash payouts. On top of that, based on the evidence found
so far, the decrease in cash distributions following private placements does not seem
to be accompanied by stock underperformance. Instead, the evidence is more
consistent with the information certification effect of private placements that predicts
an improvement in stock performance (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). As a result, cash
dividends which serve a similar signalling function may be considered a costly
alternative (Hail et al., 2014). Consistent with Hypothesis 3a and 3b, a decrease in
post-offering cash dividends could be explained by the potential overlap in the
information contents carried by private placements and cash dividends; notably, the
information content of private placements is further supported by the resulting
improvement in stock performance.
From observations on other explanatory variables, a bigger stake of the largest
shareholders (LARGEST) and the presence of multiple large shareholders
(NC_LARGE) strengthen stock performance. This is expected, as large shareholders
are more likely to attach importance to firm values when doing so has the potential to
add to their financial gains. Larger firms (SIZE) and firms with a greater growth
prospect (MB) tend to have stronger stock performance.
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3.6.2.4 The treatment effect of private placements on the announcement effect of
cash dividends
Unlike the observations documented in Hail et al. (2014), private placements in
China, despite leading to lower cash dividends afterwards, do not necessarily induce
PPC firms to become non-payers. For the group of PPC firms, 72 out of 953 firms
changed from payers to non-payers after private placements (up to the year 2015); this
figure is 64 for non-PPC firms. This result suggests that as far as the signalling effect
is concerned, private placements may not be a perfect substitute for cash dividends.
In light of Dedman et al. (2015), cash dividends are found to have a stronger
positive connection with firm values after the adoption of the IRFS standard, which
represents an enhancement in information environment faced by Chinese listed firms.
Therefore, this study is motivated to examine whether investors react to
announcements of cash dividends differently given the potential relief in information
asymmetry contributed by private placements.
Using CAR[-3,0], the daily abnormal returns cumulated from day -3 to day 0
relative to the announcement date of cash dividends, the question of whether private
placements influence the market’s reactions to cash distributions is examined. The
results of Model 3.8 are shown in Column 1 of Table 3.10. The significantly negative
coefficient of PP-GROUP suggests that PPC firms tend to earn lower announcement
returns around the issue of cash payouts compared to non-PPC firms before private
placements are made. PP-TIME has a significantly negative coefficient, indicating a
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time trend of less favourable market reactions to cash distributions paid by non-PPC
firms.
As to the treatment effect of private placements identified in this test,
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is significantly positive, suggesting investors react to cash
dividend announcements more favourably given the private placements conducted.
Informed by the signal released by private placements, investors may deem cash
dividends to be a more reliable predictor for future earnings, which is shown by the
higher announcement returns. This observation is consistent with the univariate
results in Table 3.5 and the argument made by Dedman et al. (2015). It is also worth
mentioning that the positive shift in market reactions for cash dividends contradicts
the tunnelling argument raised by Zhao et al. (2015), as tunnelling-induced
post-offering cash dividends should carry less value-building information.
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Table 3.10 The treatment effect of private placements on the announcement effect of cash
dividends
This table presents the results regarding the treatment effect of private placements on the
announcement effect of cash dividends, with a focus on the consistency of this effect in lockup and
post-lockup periods. The sample period is 2004 to 2015 which covers an at least two-year pre-event
period and post-event period for both PPC firms and their matching non-PPC firms. The dependent
variables from columns 1 to 3 in order are CAR[-3, 0], CAR[-1, 0] and CAR[-1,+1]. Definitions of
variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions
but the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted
t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Variable
C
PP-GROUP
PP-TIME
TIME*GROUP
UCDPS/P0
UEPS
ΔSD
LN(ANN-DATE)
SIZE
FIRM-RISK
MB
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

(1).

(2).

(3).

CAR[-3, 0]

CAR[-1, 0]

CAR[-1, +1]

.109***
(7.01)
-.003*
(-1.92)
-.004**
(-2.37)
.005***
(2.51)
.404*
(1.69)
.000
(.34)
.018***
(3.26)
-.011***
(-4.49)
-.001***
(-2.68)
-.863***
(-10.19)
.002***
(4.79)
9082
.024

.106***
(7.21)
-.002
(-1.19)
-.003**
(-2.21)
.003*
(1.81)
.815***
(3.54)
.001
(.80)
.024***
(4.85)
-.012***
(-5.62)
-.001**
(-2.23)
-.650***
(-8.26)
.001***
(4.15)
9082
.022

.106***
(7.22)
-.002
(-1.19)
-.003**
(-2.21)
.003*
(1.81)
.815***
(3.54)
.001
(.80)
.024***
(4.83)
-.012***
(-5.63)
-.001**
(-2.23)
-.653***
(-8.28)
.001***
(4.14)
9082
.022
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Following Cheng et al. (2009), a set of control variables is chosen to examine the
announcement effect of cash dividends. They are UCDPS/P0, UEPS, ΔSD,
LN(ANN-DATE), FIRM-RISK and SIZE. In Column 1 of Table 3.10, UCDPS/P0 has a
significantly positive coefficient. This supports the notion that the signal carried by
the unexpected change in dividend yields leads to positive market reactions when the
change is upward and negative when it is downward. Given by the significantly
positive coefficient on ΔSD, the year-to-year differences in stock dividend per share
tend to positively affect the announcement returns of the concurrently issued cash
dividends. Consistent with Chen et al. (2005) and Haw et al. (2000), the negative
coefficient of LN(ANN-DATE) (significant at the 1% level) strongly supports the
notion that Chinese firms tend to announce good news earlier and bad news later in a
year. The size effect (SIZE), with a significantly negative coefficient, shows that
investors tend to react more positively to cash dividends issued by smaller firms.
Similar to the finding of Cheng et al. (2009), the significantly negative coefficient of
FIRM-RISK suggests that a higher level of firm-specific risks leads the market to
adjust their reactions to cash dividends downward11. Although firms with a
high-growth opportunity (MB) are known to issue lower cash dividends, payout
announcements made by these firms tend to earn higher returns.

According to Cheng et al. (2009), this study considers the possibility that firm-specific risk is correlated with
market-wide volatility. A robustness test is then conducted to ensure that the significant observation of FIRM-RISK
still holds after including a control variable to capture the market risk. Following Cheng et al. (2009), the market
volatility is computed as the standard deviation of the market returns over the 78-day estimation event period of
[-88, -11] in relation to dividend announcement day 0. The results are highly consistent with what is reported in
Table 3.11. That is, the firm-specific risk remains to be a significant determinant for the announcement effect of
cash dividends after controlling for market volatility.
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After testing Model 3.9 and 3.10 which use other event windows of [-1, 0]
(Column 2) and [-1, +1] (Column 3), the significantly positive coefficients on
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP remain. The results on control variables are also highly
consistent with those obtained from the event window of [-3, 0]. In conclusion, the
results listed in Table 3.11 are supportive of Hypothesis 4. That is, because of the
improved firm-level information environment following private placements, the
market seems to have a reason to be more optimistic about PPC firms’ cash dividend
announcements.

3.6.2.5 Robustness test
Private placements have a dual-purpose in the sense that they can be a
re-financing option as well as a strategic move of signalling (Hertzel & Smith, 1993).
Which purpose is a better fit might be firm-specific. Krishnamurthy et al. (2005)
identify financial distress as an essential determinant here, as it can block firms from
the public equity market and leave private placements as the only choice for
refinancing. Thus, information asymmetry and the associated underinvestment
problem may not be the primary reason for issuing equity privately when firms have
to deal with both financial difficulty and the need for extra funds.
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) highlight the notion that signalling purpose is more
likely to be a primary contributor in the choice of private placements for financially
healthy firms which can have access to both private and public equity markets. On the
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contrary, the information certification effect may not apply to financially distressed
firms. The robustness test, therefore, is designed to examine if the information
certification effect applies to the cases in which financial trouble is a leading cause of
private placements. To do so, only PPC firms that have reported negative earnings in
the two-year period before private placements and their matching non-PPC firms are
selected. The results of the robustness test of the treatment effect of private
placements on financially distressed firms’ cash dividend practices are listed in Table
3.11. The proxies of firm cash dividend policy remain DY (Column 1), CDPS
(Column 2) and PAYOUT (Column 3). The results suggest that the coefficient on the
key explanatory variable PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is insignificant for all three
regressions. This indicates that private placements hardly affect the cash payouts of
financially distressed PPC firms. According to Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), the
signalling function of private placements is less relevant for financially distressed
PPC firms which are more likely to rely on private placements to fulfil their financing
needs than to signal. Consistent with this argument, the results on financially
distressed PPC firms show that when private placements are less likely to fulfil the
role of signalling, financially distressed PPC firms might retain pressure to issue cash
payouts after the offerings.
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Table 3.11 Robustness test on the treatment effect of private placements on cash dividend
payments of financially distressed firms
This table presents the results regarding the treatment effect of private placements on cash dividends,
with a specialized focus on financially distressed PPC firms. The sample period is 2004 to 2015
which covers an at least two-year pre-event period and post-event period for both financially
distressed PPC firms and their matching non-PPC firms. The dependent variables from column 1 to
3 in order are DY, CDPS and PAYOUT. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The
industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized beta
coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable
C
PP-GROUP
PP-TIME
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
SD
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

(1).

(2).

(3).

DY

CDPS

PAYOUT

-.042***
(-4.55)
-.001
(-1.39)
-.002***
(-2.32)
-.001
(-1.04)
.020***
(6.59)
.003***
(3.55)
.002
(.43)
.050***
(7.18)
.003
(1.08)
-.006***
(-2.59)
.002***
(5.11)
-.001***
(-9.38)
.018***
(3.30)
2264
.251

-.416***
(-5.29)
-.029***
(-3.42)
-.029
(-2.96)
-.007
(-.59)
.156***
(5.09)
.027***
(3.63)
-.008
(-.18)
.684***
(9.30)
.113***
(4.18)
-.072***
(-3.53)
.022***
(5.47)
-.001
(-1.12)
.064
(1.37)
2264
.266

.071
(.21)
-.021
(-.43)
-.007
(-.15)
-.096
(-1.49)
.824***
(5.63)
.110***
(2.92)
-.062
(-0.28)
-.360
(-1.24)
.083
(.63)
-.580***
(-5.05)
.017
(1.03)
-.018***
(-2.74)
1.004**
(2.37)
2264
.586

Further supporting evidence can be found in the results testing the effect of
private placements on long-term stock performance (YEARα) shown in Table 3.12.
The coefficient on PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is insignificant suggesting that private
placements have little impact on the performance of financially distressed firms.
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Conditional on the main function of a refinancing tool, the signalling effect of private
placements may be less applicable for financially distressed firms. The performance
of firms posts private placements is consistent with this view. This, again, provides
less support for the information certification effect of private placements on
financially distressed PPC firms.12
Among 953 firms that have conducted private placements from 2006 to 2015,
279 firms have conducted multiple private placements. In previous PSM tests, the
year of placement (the benchmark year to define PP-TIME) is determined as the year
of the first private placement conducted by PPC firms. In these tests, the observations
after the second private placement (if present) are not identified in particular as they
are still the post-offering observations after the first private placement. Still, one may
concern the compounding effect of multiple private placements. To address this
concern, the last robustness test eliminates the observations after the second private
placements of PPC firms that have conducted multiple private placements. For these
firms’ matching non-PPC firms, their observations are up to the year before their
matching PPC firms conduct the second private placements. Observations of PPC
firms that have conducted only one private placement from 2004 to 2015 and those of
their matching non-PPC firms are kept for the test.
The results of PSM tests controlling for the possible compounding effect of
Repeated robustness tests are also performed on financially healthy PPC firms and their matching non-PPC
firms, and the results are highly consistent with those reported by the whole sample. This verifies that the
information certification effect of private placements is more present when financial difficulty is not in the way.
Also, the information certification effect confirmed by the full sample is mainly contributed by firms in relatively
sound financial conditions. This part of the results is not reported because of the high consistency with the results
on the full sample.
223
12

multiple private placements are listed in Table 3.13. In this table, Panel A lists the
results on cash dividend practice; Panel B features the results on long-term stock
performance and Panel C for the announcement effect of cash dividends. In Panel A,
the coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is significantly negative regardless of the
measurements of cash dividends. This indicates that private placements result in lower
cash dividends, which re-verifies Hypothesis 3a. In Panel B, the coefficient of
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP is significantly positive when tested on YEARα. This shows
that private placements benefit firms’ long-term stock performance, which is also in
line with Hypothesis 3b. Lastly, in Panel C, the coefficient of PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
stays significantly positive for three choices of event windows within which the
announcement returns of cash dividends are calculated. This lends additional support
to Hypothesis 4. Given the improvement in firm-level information environment led by
private placements, the signalling effect (proxied by announcement returns) of cash
dividends appears to be strengthened. This evidence adds more weight to the
information certification effect of private placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993).
Overall, the key conclusions remain valid after controlling for the possible
compounding effect led by multiple private placements.
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Table 3.12 Robustness test on the treatment effect of private placements on the long-term
stock performance of financially distressed firms
This table presents the results regarding the treatment effect of private placements on stock
performance, with a focus on financially distressed PPC firms. The sample period is 2004 to 2015
which covers an at least two-year pre-event period and a post-event period for both financially
distressed PPC firms and their matching non-PPC firms. The proxy of firm long-term stock
performance (YEARα) is firstly computed as the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model
using daily observations and then adjusted for the trading days within a sample year. Definitions of
variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression
but the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted
t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Variable
C
PP-GROUP
PP-TIME
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
LARGEST
NC_LARGE
EXCESS
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
LN(BOARD)
IND-DIRECTOR

YEARα
-.953***
(-14.49)
.008
(1.11)
.018*
(1.88)
.001
(.07)
.090***
(3.71)
.021***
(3.13)
.036
(1.00)
.262***
(3.20)
-.044
(-1.64)
.018
(.76)
.001
(.18)
.026***
(11.75)
.018
(1.10)
.076
(.93)

No. Obs.

2248

Adj. R2

.213
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Table 3.13 Robustness tests controlling for the presence of multiple private placements
Panel A. Robustness test on cash dividends controlling for the presence of multiple private
placements
Following a PSM approach, this table presents the results of a robustness test regarding the treatment
effect of private placements on cash dividends with a focus on firms that have conducted multiple
private placements. For PPC firms that have conducted multiple private placements from 2006 to
2015, this test only keeps the observations before the second private placements (the same with their
matching non-PPC firms). For PPC firms that have only conducted one private placement from 2006
to 2015, all observations are kept for the test (the same with their matching non-PPC firms). The
dependent variable from columns 1 to 3 in order is DY, CDPS and PAYOUT. Definitions of variables
are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the
results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Variable

(1).

(2).

(3).

DY

CDPS

PAYOUT

-.029***
-.589***
.118
(-7.54)
(-11.52)
(.86)
-.000
-.002
.026*
PP-GROUP
(-0.13)
(-.52)
(1.68)
-.001
.001
.044***
PP-TIME
(-1.63)
(.28)
(2.64)
PP-TIME
-.002***
-.022***
-.096***
*PP-GROUP
(-4.43)
(-3.68)
(-4.38)
.015***
.148***
.494***
LARGEST
(11.38)
(9.39)
(9.57)
.003***
.033***
.101***
NC_LARGE
(9.14)
(9.49)
(7.46)
.001
.055**
.033
EXCESS
(.52)
(2.20)
(.46)
.062***
1.056***
-1.274***
ROA
(19.62)
(22.11)
(-9.31)
.003***
.184***
.177***
CASH
(3.24)
(12.33)
(3.95)
-.005***
-.094***
-.569***
LEVERAGE
(-5.42)
(-8.44)
(-13.11)
.002***
.027***
.016**
SIZE
(8.83)
(11.21)
(2.32)
-.002***
-.003***
-.014***
MB
(-30.58)
(-3.66)
(-6.48)
.005***
-.042**
.339***
SD
(3.16)
(-2.28)
(4.07)
No. Obs.
13748
13748
13748
Adj. R2
.233
.323
.055
Panel B. Robustness test on long-term stock performance controlling for the presence of
multiple private placements
Following a PSM approach, this table presents the results of a robustness test regarding the treatment
effect of private placements on long-term stock performance with a focus on firms that have
conducted multiple private placements. For PPC firms that have conducted multiple private
placements from 2006 to 2015, this test only keeps the observations before the second private
placements (the same with their matching non-PPC firms). For PPC firms that have only conducted
one private placement from 2006 to 2015, all observations are kept for the test (the same with their
C

226

matching non-PPC firms). The proxy of firm long-term stock performance (YEARα) is firstly
computed as the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model using daily observations and then
adjusted for the trading days within a sample year. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section
3.5.2.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression but the results are omitted.
Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable

YEARα

-.993***
(-34.84)
.002
PP-GROUP
(.53)
-.014***
PP-TIME
(-3.91)
.011**
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
(2.12)
.068***
LARGEST
(6.59)
.019***
NC_LARGE
(6.48)
-.010
EXCESS
(-.65)
-.050
ROA
(-1.48)
-.050***
CASH
(-5.11)
.016*
LEVERAGE
(1.83)
.004***
SIZE
(3.27)
.025***
MB
(27.41)
-.006
LN(BOARD)
(-.84)
-.046*
IND-DIRECTOR
(-1.81)
No. Obs.
13657
Adj. R2
.185
Panel C. Robustness test on announcement returns of cash dividends controlling for the
presence of multiple private placements
Following a PSM approach, this table presents the results of a robustness test regarding the treatment
effect of private placements on announcement returns of cash dividends with a focus on firms that
have conducted multiple private placements. For PPC firms that have conducted multiple private
placements from 2006 to 2015, this test only keeps the observations before the second private
placements (the same with their matching non-PPC firms). For PPC firms that have only conducted
one private placement from 2006 to 2015, all observations are kept for the test (the same with their
matching non-PPC firms). The dependent variables from columns 1 to 3 in order are CAR[-3, 0],
CAR[-1, 0] and CAR[-1,+1]. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 3.5.2.4. The industry
fixed effect is controlled for in all regressions but the results are omitted. Standardized beta
coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
C

Variable

(1).

(2).

(3).

CAR[-3, 0]

CAR[-1, 0]

CAR[-1, +1]
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C
PP-GROUP
PP-TIME
PP-TIME*PP-GROUP
UCDPS/P0
UEPS
ΔSD
LN(ANN-DATE)
SIZE
FIRM-RISK
MB
No. Obs.
Adj. R2

.110***
(6.77)
-.003*
(-1.89)
-.003**
(-2.00)
.006***
(2.47)
.423*
(1.66)
.001
(.46)
.016***
(2.72)
-.009***
(-3.86)
-.002***
(-3.18)
-.889***
(-10.12)
.002***
(4.26)
8174
.025

.086***
(6.61)
-.002
(-1.51)
-.003**
(-2.18)
.003**
(1.95)
.461**
(2.35)
.001
(1.03)
.021***
(4.48)
-.008***
(-4.27)
-.001***
(-3.28)
-.454***
(-6.61)
.001***
(3.06)
8174
.017

.113***
(6.40)
-.002
(-1.51)
-.004**
(-2.07)
.004*
(1.69)
.886***
(3.51)
.000
(.15)
.023***
(3.97)
-.012***
(-4.87)
-.001**
(-2.35)
-.747***
(-7.80)
.002***
(2.88)
8174
.022
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3.7 Summaries and conclusions
Previous research documents positive announcement effects for both cash
dividends (John & Williams, 1985; Miller & Rock, 1985; Aharony & Swary, 1980)
and private placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). Yet, few studies examine the
information-based interactions between these two events. This chapter, then, considers
the effect of private placements on firms’ cash dividend policies conditional on their
mutual function of signalling.
Similar to the findings of Booth and Chang (2011) which demonstrate that US
firms time the announcements of cash dividends before public equity offerings to
reduce information uncertainty, the present study finds a similar pattern of cash
dividend practices in China. It is not just that most firms choose to pay cash dividends
within the year before private placements; a more significant increase in payouts is
also observed when the offerings are in the nearer future. This part of the interaction
between cash dividends and private placements is consistent with the notion that cash
payouts are used to relieve asymmetric information.
With the aim of determining the treatment effect of private placements on cash
dividends, a propensity score matching (PSM) method is adopted to test 15143
firm-year

observations

from

2004

to

2015.

This

sample

consists

of

private-placement-conducting (PPC) firms and their matching non-PPC firms, and
covers the periods of pre-offering, lockup and post-lockup periods. Contrary to Zhao
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et al. (2015) which mainly relies on univariate tests to find an increase in
post-offering cash dividends among PPC firms, this study employs a PSM approach
in regression analysis and provides a new finding that private placements reduce firms’
cash payouts. Notably, the findings of the present study are robust to different
measurements of cash dividends, namely dividend yield (DY), cash dividend per share
(CDPS) and payout ratio (PAYOUT).
This study relies on the change in stock performance led by private placements
to identify the cause of the concurrent change in cash dividends. The results show that
private placements result in enhanced stock performance. This is in support of the
information certification effect of private placements, as the resulting positive impact
on PPC firms’ performance is inconsistent with the tunnelling argument raised by
Zhao et al. (2015). Further, these results support the notion of Hail et al. (2014) that
managers tend to decrease cash payouts following an improved information
environment. That is, managers of PPC firms might face less pressure to issue cash
dividends with the signal sent by private placements being verified by stronger
post-offering performances.
This study makes a further attempt to examine whether private placements alter
the signalling function of cash distributions. Given the improvement in the
information environment of firms following the IFRS, cash dividends are found to be
more informative in assessing firm values in China (Dedman et al., 2015). Consistent
with the notion that the information certification effect of private placements helps to
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validate the signal sent by cash dividends, announcements of cash payouts are found
to be associated with higher abnormal returns because of private placements. This,
again, is in line with the signalling function of private placements and indicates that
an improvement in firm-level information environment adds to the credibility of the
information conveyed by cash dividends.
This

study

makes

two

main

contributions

to

the

literature.

First,

information-based interaction exists between private placements and pre-offering cash
dividends. That is, issuing firms are found to time cash dividend increases to promote
the forthcoming private placements. Second, contrary to the belief that the intention to
tunnel triggers the increase in payouts after private placements (Zhao et al., 2015),
this study finds private offerings decrease cash dividends. Given the positive
signalling effect served by both private placement and cash dividends, an
improvement in the firm-level information environment contributed by private
placements may justify the decrease in cash dividends following private placements.
The results discussed in this chapter are consistent with this view. This study is among
the first to examine the effects of private placements on long-term stock performance
and on the announcement returns of cash dividends to identify the nature of the
change in post-offering payouts. The implications of this study are twofold. First, the
interaction between two information events is dynamic, especially when they both
serve a signalling function. Second, to examine the treatment effect of private
placements on cash dividends, one may need to examine whether, and how, this event
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affects concurrent stock performance to identify the incentive behind the change in
payouts.
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE IDENTITY OF PRIVATE
PLACEMENT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR
ASSOCIATED DISCOUNTS AS DETERMINANTS OF
CASH DIVIDEND POLICY
4.1 Introduction
According to Wruck (1989), private placements that increase ownership
concentration can highlight the link between large shareholders’ financial status and
firm performance, and therefore improve corporate governance. The expected
incremental monitoring offered by participating investors contributes to favourable
market reactions around announcements of private placements. The compensation for
additional monitoring can also be reflected by the discount in the offering price of
private placements. Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that in addition to the
incremental monitoring effect which is more applicable to large firms, the information
certification effect better explains the positive market reactions around private
placements issued by small firms. Small issuers present higher uncertainty for growth
prospects, thus participating investors are offered bigger discounts in private
placements because of their higher information acquisition costs. Consistent with
US-based studies, Fonseka, Colombage and Tian (2014) support the roles of both
incremental monitoring and information certification being served by Chinese
institutional investors in private placements.
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Unlike the studies by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) that focus on
short-term announcement returns, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) extend the
examined event window to 120 trading days post offering and find significant stock
underperformance after private placements. Given this observation, Barclay et al.
argue that investors participating in private placements are typically passive and
inclined to form a coalition with entrenched managers.
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) find that private placements issued to shareholders
who do not have a pre-existing affiliation with issuing firms have higher discounts but
are associated with lower short-term and long-term returns for non-participating
shareholders. They interpret this observation as affiliated shareholders tending to
avoid overvalued issuing firms. When the offering discounts allow affiliated
shareholders to avoid a loss from the post-offering underperformance, there is the risk
of lawsuits for insider trading. Additionally, the information effect of private
placements appears to weaken when financial distress impedes firms from conducting
public equity offerings. Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) conclude that the long-term
underperformance

following

private

placements

is

mainly

observed

in

financially-distressed firms which place the offerings with unaffiliated shareholders.
The contention that private placements foster aggravated tunnelling also attracts
some attention in China. Liu et al. (2016) find that the announcement effect of private
placements tends to be less positive when controlling shareholders participate in the
offerings. They interpret the observation provided by the [-2, +2] event window (in
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relation to the announcement day 0) as suggesting controlling shareholders are more
likely to engage in tunnelling when their position is protected by increased holdings.
Another study supporting this account of tunnelling is from Zhao et al. (2015). They
consider the positive association between the participation of controlling shareholders
and the post-offering cash dividends as evidence of interests transfer.
In the context of China, mixed results are provided as to whether private
placements lead to incremental monitoring or aggravated tunnelling under the frame
of corporate governance (Fonseka et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016).
This study provides clarity by including the discount received by various participants
as a quantified incentive measurement. It considers two competing arguments:
offering discounts are compensation for incremental monitoring and discounts allow a
lower price to be paid by large shareholders to aggravate tunnelling. It is also worth
mentioning that, because of the entrenchment in place, the discounts of private
placements can prevent a loss for tunnelling-prone participating shareholders when
the post-offering stock prices decrease. Still, the benefits of incremental monitoring
can manifest through better firm performance and stronger corporate governance,
while the tunnelling argument predicts quite the opposite.
Unlike previous Chinese studies that mainly focus on participating controlling
shareholders, this study subdivides private placements into four exclusive and
exhaustive categories according to their key participants. Representing a case of
strong pre-existing affiliation, the first category is of firms issuing private placements
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to existing controlling shareholders. Representing the case of strong post-offering
affiliation, the second category gathers firms conducting private placements that elect
new controlling shareholders. The third category collects firms that place offerings
with a single shareholder who is not a controlling shareholder either before or after
the offerings. This category represents the case of semi-strong post-offering affiliation.
The last category applies to firms that only invite multiple non-controlling (passive)
shareholders to participate in private placements. This category represents a weak
affiliation.
The research focus is whether discounts offered to shareholders with various
forms of affiliations with issuing firms generate different impacts on firm decisions
and performance. If incremental monitoring exists and contributes, discounts offered
to existing controlling shareholders should lead to stronger stock performance, better
corporate governance, greater profitability and higher cash dividends compared to
when discounts were offered without the subscription of existing controlling
shareholders. On the contrary, if discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders
represent a safety net for future tunnelling, it should result in weaker firm
performance and corporate governance but possibly more cash distributions as
interests transfer (Zhao et al., 2015). That is, the examination of the differentiated
cash dividend behaviours across firms inviting various shareholders to participate in
private placements requires additional examination of concurrent earnings and
corporate governance, which is lacking in previous studies.
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In line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) who argue that investments made by
insiders via private placements assert the certification of firm values, and Wruck’s
(1989) assertion that offerings increasing ownership concentration highlight the
presence of incremental monitoring, the results show that the subscription of existing
controlling shareholders significantly increases short-term announcement returns of
private placements. In addition and consistent with the incremental monitoring
hypothesis (Wruck, 1989), this study finds that higher discounts for existing
controlling shareholders result in stronger long-term stock performance both around
and after private placements ([-1, +120] and [+1, +120] event windows) compared to
when discounts are only offered to multiple non-controlling shareholders. It appears
that the market tends to be more optimistic when discounts are offered to controlling
shareholders instead of non-controlling shareholders. It is worth mentioning that
discounts received by existing controlling shareholders tend to be greater than those
granted to passive shareholders (outsiders), this does not support the information cost
hypothesis (Hertzel & Smith, 1993).
Forming a consistent contrast with passive offerings, results testing on discounts
offered to existing controlling shareholders lend support to the incremental
monitoring argument (Wruck, 1989). This conclusion receives supporting evidence
when examining the stock performance tracing to 120 days after the announcement of
private placements. Observations of less inter-corporate loans and more capital
expenditure observed when higher discounts were granted to existing controlling
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shareholders support a case of more regulated fund allocations compared to when
discounts were only offered to passive shareholders. The argument that discounts are
the compensation for incremental monitoring, being more likely so for existing
controlling shareholders than for passive investors, receives further support from the
test on post-offering profitability. The results listed above consistently support the
incremental monitoring argument, which facilitates the understanding of determinants
of post-offering dividends. In relation to post-offering cash dividends, the results
show that higher discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders lead to higher
cash dividends compared to when discounts were only offered to passive shareholders.
This study interprets this observation as the outcome of incremental monitoring:
offering discounts interacting with existing controlling shareholders has a positive
incremental impact on cash dividends compared to passive offerings.
This study is among the first to examine the offering discount as a quantified
incentive measurement to investigate the post-offering cash dividends in China. It is
also the first Chinese study to examine the long-term announcement effect of private
placements. This study follows a non-overlapping fourfold categorization of private
placements by dividing the sample according to the time of formation and the strength
of the affiliation between key participating shareholders and issuing firms. Unlike
previous Chinese studies that mainly focus on the testing of the tunnelling theory
(Zhao et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016), this study considers three possible hypotheses,
namely incremental monitoring, information certification and entrenchment in
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examining the motivation to participate in private placements. In this study, the
post-offering earnings and activities related to corporate governance are examined
together with cash dividend behaviours. The overall results point to incremental
monitoring as the most likely explanation for higher cash dividends observed with
larger discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders. Without considering the
concurrent earnings and practice of corporate governance, this can be mistaken as a
sign of tunnelling.
The remainder of Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
existing literature that motivates the discussion about how the identity of participating
shareholders and their associated discounts affect cash dividends. Section 4.3
describes the theoretical path that builds the tested hypotheses. Section 4.4 specifies
data selection, definition of variables and methodology. Section 4.5 discusses the
results, and Section 4.6 concludes the findings.

4.2 Literature review on the identity of participating shareholders and their
associated discounts in private placements
4.2.1 Discounts of private placements as the compensation for incremental
monitoring
Unlike the negative impact on stock performance around announcements of
public equity issues, Wruck (1989) finds private placements in the US market increase
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shareholder wealth by 4.5% on average. The types of new securities issued by these
two forms of equity offerings make no difference, but public offerings result in voting
rights being distributed to market-wise dispersed purchasers and a private sale of
equity is offered to a small number of targeted investors. Assuming the absence of
other concurrent changes in ownership structure, a private placement issued to
controlling shareholders reinforces their control and dilutes the voting power of other
blocks. By comparison, public equity issued to a much broader scale of investors
merely dilutes the voting powers of all existing blocks. Wruck (1989) then argues that
the various changes in a firm’s controlling ownership might account for the opposite
stock reactions around public and private sales of equity.
One focus of Wruck (1989) is on whether a shift in controlling ownership
following private placements is accompanied by an improvement in firm value
assessments. Under the frame of corporate governance, an explicit controlling
position of shareholders could increase firm values if it makes the interests of
managers and shareholders more closely aligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Alternatively, firm values would drop if controlling rights indulge managerial
entrenchments that include misallocations of resources and purposely blocking
attempted takeovers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Wruck (1989) examined the applicability
of both arguments by testing the impact of a higher level of ownership concentration
on firm values around announcements of private placements. Wruck finds that an
increase in ownership concentration, defined as the percentage holdings of the largest
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shareholders, is positively related to a firms’ stock performance around the issue of
private placements. This fits the argument that block holders serve as catalysts to
align the interests of managers and shareholders. Wruck also argues that a greater
ownership concentration may be treated as a positive event if it reveals new
information to the market and results in a change in the allocation of corporate
resources.
Wruck (1989) also looks into the pricing of private equity offerings and the issue
of why a particular discount or premium is applied. Two-thirds of Wruck’s tested
private placements issued newly registered shares, while the rest issued previously
registered shares. Unregistered shares are expected to receive a discount relative to
the market price because these shares were bound with a two-year minimum holding
period for participating investors when the study was conducted. During the lockup
period, shareholders’ financial interests are closely tied to firm values, which
motivates active monitoring. On the contrary, registered shares have a resemblance to
currently outstanding shares and should not be associated with the discount that
represents the compensation for resale restrictions. As expected, Wruck (1989)
observes that unregistered shares are offered with a larger discount than registered
shares; only the unregistered shares have significant discounts.
Wruck (1989) does not treat the discount of private placements as evidence of
inefficiency. Instead, Wruck considers the offering price represents the cost of a
unique transaction that cannot be replaced by trades finalized in the open market. A
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rational investor will not pay a premium for privately issued shares when they
represent the same prospect as the currently listed shares. Managers who value firm
performance and the wealth of existing shareholders will not offer shares at a discount
unless this sale is needed and would not be otherwise executable. Wruck (1989)
argues that an explanation for the discount offered to privately issued shares is that
firms receive additional value beyond the raised funds. Supporting this argument,
registration status, or the marketability of shares issued by private placements, cannot
account for why a specific discount is offered. This indicates that the discount of
private placements is less likely to be compensation for the temporary liquidity risk.
Instead, given the direct association between the shift in ownership concentration and
the increase in firm values at the announcement of private placements, the discount is
considered as the compensation for monitoring. The favourable announcement returns
further certify the market’s anticipation of this incremental monitoring.

4.2.2 Discounts of private placements as the compensation for information
certification
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers of undervalued firms will
forego the chance of raising equity publicly when the wealth of existing shareholders
can be transferred to new shareholders under asymmetric information. This
underinvestment problem, however, can be managed if managers are able to convey
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their private information to the market at a lower cost. Following this contention,
Hertzel and Smith (1993) examined whether the private information exchanged
between managers and targeted investors during private placements can help solve the
underinvestment problem.
Under the information certification hypothesis, investors are granted large
discounts when it is difficult to assess the value of a firm. Hertzel and Smith (1993)
identify larger fractions of new shares, higher values for intangible assets, greater
exposure to financial distress risk, smaller firm sizes and longer lock-up periods as
leading to more difficulties in value assessment. These are the cases that are entitled
to larger discounts. Accordingly, private issues to insiders have lower discounts
because of lower information acquisition costs. Investors also have weaker bargaining
power when offerings are larger in size measured by dollar amounts, as information
production is subject to economies of scales. Hertzel and Smith (1993) simultaneously
tested the monitoring hypothesis of Wruck (1989) by examining placements with
single investors and measurements of ownership structure; namely the changes in
managerial ownership and holdings of directors and non-controlling blocks. The
fraction of new shares, firm intangibles and financial distress are also used to test the
monitoring hypothesis. The cross-terms between single investors and these
monitoring proxies help to differentiate the effect of incremental monitoring from that
of information production.
Consistent with the information certification hypothesis, Hertzel and Smith
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(1993) find evidence that private placements obtain favourable announcement returns
because of the confirmation of undervaluation. Also, in line with the monitoring
hypothesis by Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith report that higher discounts are
granted to investors who are more likely to engage in active monitoring. The positive
association between discounts and the abnormal returns around announcements of
private placements supports the arguments of both monitoring and information
certification. Still, Hertzel and Smith (1993) report an insignificant interaction
between the increased block holdings and the value-added monitoring. This suggests
the effect of information production, rather than monitoring, to be the dominating
determinant for the announcement effect of their selected private placements.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) attribute the difference between their results and
Wruck’s results to sample selection. Wruck (1989) examined private placements
conducted by large issuers, while Hertzel and Smith (1993) mainly focused on smaller
firms. That is, the role of resolving information asymmetries might be more
pronounced compared to that of active monitoring when a small firm size generates
more doubt about future performance and liquidity. Additionally, managerial
ownership tends to be higher among small firms, and therefore the effect of increased
ownership on monitoring might be marginal. As summarized by Hertzel and Smith,
their observations of small firms indicate that private equity issues are mainly used for
raising capital rather than for creating or enhancing block-holdings. The offering
discount and the positive announcement effect of private placements are therefore
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more related to information production when incremental monitoring is suppressed by
small firm size.

4.2.3 Offering discounts, the affiliation between participating shareholders and
issuing firms, and their relationship with entrenchment
The initial evidence documenting the entrenchment facilitated by private
placements can be found in Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Wruck (1989). Dann and
DeAngelo find that when private equity issues represent the response to attempted
hostile takeovers or defensive changes in ownership structure, these responses earn
negative announcement returns in the US market. Using the technique of piecewise
regression, Wruck (1989) finds that a direct relationship between ownership
concentration and firm values only applies to the low and high ranges of ownership
concentration. With Wruck’s research framework, the argument of entrenchment is
not fully explored because the negative association within the intermediate range of
ownership concentration might be firm-specific.
Barclay et al. (2007) address the question about what type of private placements
might provide an opportunity to foster entrenchment. They argue that managers could
have an incentive to place private issues to friendly (passive) investors who will guard
rather than intervene in the concurrent entrenchment. The private placements in
question harm the wealth of non-participating shareholders. By analyzing a much
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larger sample of private placements than used in previous US-based research, Barclay
et al. (2007) tested the applicability of three hypotheses associated with private
placements under the corporate governance framework. These hypotheses focus on
the arguments of monitoring, information certification and entrenchment. In addition
to examining the short-term and long-term abnormal stock returns around
announcements of private placements, they include discounts of private issues and the
role served by participating investors in assessing post-offering firm performance.
Barclay et al. adopted a threefold categorization for their sample of 594 private
placements based on the role served by participating investors. The first category
gathers investors who become active in firm affairs following private placements and
is designed to test the monitoring argument. The second category includes investors
who are already top managers before private issues. The last category refers to
investors who serve no current or subsequent roles in issuing firms and therefore are
likely to perform passive monitoring and is used to demonstrate the account of
entrenchment.
The results of their study suggest that short-term (-1 day to announcement day 0)
market reactions to private placements are positive, but longer term (-10 to +120 days
around the announcement) market reactions are negative. Using the threefold
categorization of private placements, they find new evidence that both short-term and
long-term market reactions are related to the type of buyers. In particular, private
issues to investors who express the intention to be active in firm affairs gain more
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positive responses at the announcement of private placements. Also, in line with the
monitoring argument, placements to active investors experience an insignificant drop
in stock price in the long-term. Yet, this type of placements only accounts for
approximately 12% of all placements tested by Barclay et al. The most representative
(83%) category of private placements is the category of placements issued to passive
investors who display a minimum public interaction with issuing firms. This category
of events, as expected, receives insignificant (non-event) market reactions around the
announcement of private placements and is followed by significantly negative stock
returns in the long-run.
Similar to the finding by Wruck (1989), Barclay et al. (2007) noticed that shares
issued by private placements are typically granted with an average discount of 18.7%
and the price treatment differs depending on the identity of participating shareholders.
Issues to active investors have lower discounts with a mean of 1.8% compared to
those issued to incumbent managers (mean = 24.2%) and those to passive investors
(mean = 20.8%). This finding contradicts the monitoring argument (Wruck, 1989) that
predicts higher discounts for active investors and the information certification effect
(Hertzel & Smith, 1993) that suggests lower discounts for insiders. That is, Barclay et
al. (2007) find that issuing firms tend to offer a significant discount to passive
investors who present little to none evidence of active monitoring on management. On
the contrary, non-management investors who indeed engage in post-issue firm affairs
are granted the lowest discounts. Thus, Barclay et al. argue that the discount of private
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placements is less likely to be compensation for monitoring but is more likely to be a
reward for not interrupting the entrenched practice. Accordingly, passive shareholders
should be responsible for the decrease in firm values within long-term event windows.
Long-term stock underperformance is also inconsistent with the information
certification argument which predicts a rise in firm values following the assessment of
undervaluation (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). Thus, Barclay et al. (2007) posit that in cases
which passive investors are given substantial discounts, the reward in price treatment
is the compensation for not disturbing managerial entrenchment. In addition, the
monitoring and the information certification arguments can only apply to minority
cases where private placements are participated by active shareholders and existing
managers.
The study by Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) relies on investor identity, notably their
pre-offering affiliation with issuing firms, as a determinant for the short-term and
long-term abnormal market returns around announcements of private placements.
They consider participating shareholders’ affiliations with issuing firms grant access
to a lower cost of information acquisition and a more accurate estimation of firm
values. This assumption is supported by Leland & Pyle (1977). Investments made by
affiliated investors could be viewed as their approval of firm values and an indication
of aligned shareholder interests.
Accordingly, Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) find that unaffiliated investors have
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significantly higher discounts than do affiliated investors. This is consistent with the
assumption that connected shareholders face lower costs for information acquisition.
However, the long-term abnormal returns after private placements are insensitive to
participating investors’ affiliations with issuing firms. Hence, Krishnamurthy et al.
argue that this information advantage can be dismissed when former unaffiliated
investors become affiliated during private placements. The participation of affiliated
investors in private placements, however, does have an impact on the returns for
non-participating existing shareholders. Krishnamurthy et al. report that both the
short-term

and

long-term

abnormal

returns

are

significantly

higher

for

non-participating investors when firms place private issues with affiliated investors.
Apart from investor affiliation, to test the information certification theory
Krishnamurthy et al. also examined whether issuing firms were in financial distress
prior to private placements. When firms are less troubled by asymmetric information
and the associated under-investment problem, financial distress highlights private
equity issues as the only available option for refinancing. Hence, Krishnamurthy et al.
expect the certification effect of affiliated investors to be more pronounced for firms
that actually have a choice between private and public issues.
Similar to Barclay et al. (2007), Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) also find a
mismatch between the positive announcement effect and the following negative
long-term abnormal returns after private placements. Yet, Krishnamurthy et al. find
that the long-term stock underperformance is caused by firms that have more than
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private placements as a choice for refinancing but still choose to issue equity privately
and only to unaffiliated, (passive) investors. This is also the sub-sample that
experiences non-positive short-term announcement returns. Krishnamurthy et al. show
that financially healthy firms’ placements to affiliated investors tend to receive
positive announcement reactions and are followed by normal long-term stock returns
for both participating and non-participating shareholders. Thus, the inconsistency
between short-term and long-term abnormal returns around private placements
disappears after controlling for both financial distress and investor affiliation.
The conclusions of Krishnamurthy et al. are more in line with the conclusions of
Leland and Pyle (1977). Block purchases made by affiliated investors assert
certification instead of entrenchment. Connected investors are more likely to avoid
overvalued issuing firms. Facing the post-offering underperformance, the risk of
lawsuits from non-participating shareholders could be aggravated when affiliated
investors enjoy a substantial discount in private placements to secure their financial
gains. This also implies that private issues to unaffiliated shareholders by firms which
have public equity refinances as a potential choice are exposed to a higher risk of
entrenchment. The unaffiliated investors can earn normal returns given the discount
they receive during private issues. In this situation, it is the wealth of
non-participating investors that is reduced.
Consistent with Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), the more recent work of Wruck and
Wu (2009) reaffirms that the connection between participating investors and issuing
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firms

can

contribute

to

value-creation

around

private

placements.

The

manually-collected data of Wruck and Wu (2009) provides an accurate and
comprehensive description of participating investors in private equity issues. The
description informs the nature of shareholders’ relationships with issuing firms. The
relationship in question is categorized as pre-existing, new, and no previous or new
relationship. Wruck and Wu summarize four sub-categories of pre-existing
relationships, namely managerial positions, major business partners, directors and
block investors with holdings of 5% or more. They identify more cases of an active
relationship formed around private placements than Barclay et al. (2007) do. Wruck
and Wu report that 86% of their selected private equity issues invite at least one
existing or new affiliated investor, among which 64% exclude outsiders.
Wruck and Wu (2009) find that most new relationships established around
private placements are associated with board positions or significant holdings (5%
and above), which they consider to be governance-related. Consistent with this point,
significantly positive announcement returns are earned by private placements with
new relationships. Private issues to outsiders, on the other hand, have insignificant
short-term announcement returns.
By extending the examination of abnormal stock returns to 120 days after the
announcement of private placements, Wruck and Wu observe that the whole sample
shows negative long-term stock returns, and this is similar to the findings of
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) and Barclay et al. (2007). Still, the negative abnormal
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returns are mostly driven by issues with no new relationships as issues with new
relationships earn normal returns. Despite that issuing firms, in general, earn negative
operational profits scaled by the industry average, new relationships lead to relatively
stronger post-issue profitability and stock performance. Wruck and Wu (2009)
interpret their observations as a result of newly established governance relationships
enhancing firm performance.
Contradicting the view of Barclay et al. (2007) that discounts of private issues
are a reward to passiveness and not acting upon existing entrenchment, Wruck and
Wu (2009) demonstrate that higher discounts are offered following an expectation of
incremental monitoring and reduced agency costs. They also confirm that investors’
affiliations with issuing firms are more likely to be governance-driven, which
generally incurs a change in directors around the announcement of private placements.
The market also reacts to this affiliation more favourably when it grants a directorship
or block-holding to participating investors.
In summary, the evidence obtained from the US market suggests that governance
relationships formed by participating investors in private placements vary depending
on their affiliation with issuing firms. Despite the difference in defining affiliated
investors, the results of Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) and Wruck and Wu (2009) are
consistent in asserting a more active monitoring function served by investors
connected to issuing firms. The media-sourced data used by Barclay et al. (2007)
indicates that the majority of private placements are issued to passive investors to
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protect the existing managerial entrenchment. Yet, more vibrant details from the
sample of Wruck and Wu (2009) suggest the opposite because they identify a more
substantial proportion of private placements that reaffirm existing relationships and
establish new relationships. For this group of private placements, stronger
post-offering performance is observed compared to issues to non-affiliated investors.
All in all, the US-based studies are generally inclined to the notion that the
participation of affiliated investors in private placements benefits issuing firms.

4.2.4

The

implications

of

the

arguments

of

incremental

monitoring,

entrenchment and information certification in the context of China
Using data from 2006 to 2010, Fonseka et al. (2014) find that the Chinese stock
market reacts positively to announcements of private placement applications, approval
and finalization, but announcements of withdrawals and rejections are non-events.
They follow two arguments to explain the observed announcement returns. They are
the information certification hypothesis (Hertzel & Smith, 1993) and the incremental
monitoring hypothesis (Wruck, 1989).
Following Hertzel and Smith (1993), Fonseka et al. (2014) define the discount of
a private placement as relative to the closing price on the 10th trading day after the
announcement date (day 0). As suggested by Hertzel and Smith (1993), the post-issue
"with information" price should provide the closest estimation of the information
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acquisition cost faced by participating investors and the cost of placements for issuing
firms. Accordingly, both discounts and proceeds of private placements are considered
as proxies for information production in Fonseka et al. (2014).
Similar to the observations from the US market, announcements of private
placement applications tend to gain positive market reactions in China. Further,
Fonseka et al. (2014) show that this positive market reaction is directly related to
larger discounts, higher raised funds and a bigger fraction of placed shares. That is,
active monitoring (measured by discounts) and information production (measured by
discounts and the fraction of placement shares) can be identified and rewarded by the
market. This supports both the arguments of monitoring and information certification
in the context of China.
To further examine the monitoring hypothesis raised by Wruck (1989), Fonseka
et al. (2014) focused on the identity of participating investors, namely the government,
private financial institutions, management and individuals. Fonseka et al. expect the
government to bring fewer benefits to issuing firms because state ownership is
considered to be associated with weak corporate governance in China (Fan et al.,
2007; Gul et al., 2010; Hou & Moore, 2010). They also predict that private financial
institutions should invite favourable announcement returns around private placements
given their expertise and active participation in firm operations.
Fonseka et al. (2014) find that announcement returns improve when a private
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placement creates a more considerable block-holding for institutional investors but is
less likely to improve when this offering leads to a higher state or managerial
ownership. It is worth mentioning that Fonseka et al. (2014) report an increase in
government ownership led by private placements as having a positive impact on
announcement returns, although this tendency is not statistically significant.
A potential drawback of the research by Fonseka et al. (2014) is the lack of
concern for the endogeneity of an issuing firm’s choice in selecting participating
investors. State-controlled firms might be more willing to invite governmental
agencies to participate in private placements, which helps to maintain the controlling
position of the state. This can also save issuing firms from higher costs generated by
informing non-state investors. A similar case can apply to firms held by private
financial institutions. That is, the behaviours of controlling shareholders deserve
particular attention when examining the announcement effect of private placements,
especially considering the concentrated ownership structure in China.
A later study by Liu et al. (2016) investigates how the market reacts to
announcements of different types of equity refinancing in China. Their research focus
is on whether, and why, the announcement effect is specific to the type of issues. They
find that the Chinese stock market generally responds negatively to announcements of
public equity offerings, namely rights issues and seasonal equity offerings. On the
contrary, firms that conducted private placements from 2006 to 2010 tended to receive
positive abnormal returns after announcements. Based on these contrasting results,
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Liu et al. (2016) argue that funds raised by public offerings might be misused by
controlling shareholders and managers when outside shareholders are the main
contributors, but target issues (private placements) to large blocks can alleviate this
concern.
Based on the examined private equity issues, Liu et al. demonstrate that the
identity of participating shareholders and their associated discounts affect
announcement returns. Evidence shows that the Chinese market favours private
placements issued to institutional investors, possibly with the expectation that such
targeted issues help to boost performance and inspire strategic changes. They also find
that this positive market reaction can be highlighted with asset injection by controlling
shareholders. Next, Liu et al. (2016) differentiated discounts obtained by controlling
shareholders and institutions. The joint impact of controlling shareholders and their
discounts is highly relevant when lower announcement returns are generated, while
deeper discounts can be associated with higher announcement returns when granting
to institutions. Additionally, Liu et al. find that the subscription of controlling
shareholders alone is a strong determinant of unfavourable market reactions after
private placements. In line with the tunnelling theory, they interpret these
observations as resulting from relation-building and opportunity seeking.
Focusing on controlling shareholders, Zhao et al. (2015) studied the relationship
between private placements and the post-offering cash dividends in China. Their
research covers two questions. First, do private placements alter a firm’s payout level?
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Second, do participating controlling shareholders play a role in the change in cash
dividends? As introduced in Chapter 3, Zhao et al. (2015) report that firms tend to
experience an increase in cash payouts after private placements. Despite a lack of
examination of the concurrent changes in post-issue firm performance, they rule the
observed increases in cash dividends as interests transfer to participating investors in
private placements.
As to their second research question, Zhao et al. (2015) consider controlling
shareholders to be active participators in private equity issues. Compared to public
offerings, the trading pattern of outside investors around private placements is a less
relevant variable for announcement reactions when issues are conducted off the
market. This means less uncertainty for market reactions and provides more securities
for the vested interests of controlling shareholders. Thus, Zhao et al. explain
controlling shareholders’ preferences in private placements as adding to both the
long-term gains based on enlarged holdings and the short-term gains from
announcement returns.
Apart from capital gains, Zhao et al. (2015) argue that cash dividends can be a
significant component of a controlling shareholder’s benefits after private offerings. It
could be problematic if generous post-offering cash distributions send funds (raised
by private placements) back to controlling shareholders. Following the tunnelling
theory, they predict higher cash dividends after private placements with the
participation of controlling shareholders.
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In their research design, Zhao et al. adopt a dummy variable to capture the
subscription of controlling shareholders and test on firms that issued a private
placement between 2006 and 2009. Their results report a significantly positive
association between the participation of controlling shareholders and post-issue cash
payouts. This supports the prediction given by the tunnelling theory. These payouts
are seemingly legal interests shared by all investors, but in fact, they represent a
means of interests transfer by controlling shareholders. Zhao et al. also express their
concern that the tunnelling-related post-offering cash payments are unlikely to incur
negative financial consequences for controlling shareholders, as cash dividends
usually please the authority and the market.

4.3 Hypotheses development
4.3.1 The tunnelling argument
Liu et al. (2016) argue that if controlling shareholders intend to enhance their
control to facilitate aggravated tunnelling, they might choose private placements as an
alternative for public offerings when increasing their holdings. By doing so avoids the
negative market reactions around public equity issues.
Controlling shareholders are demonstrated to have strong bargaining power in
China (Cumming & Hou, 2014). The discount of private equity issues provides a less
costly option for enhancing control. Following this reasoning, discounts offered to
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controlling shareholders can be interpreted as a value loss arising from the risk of
aggravated tunnelling. The results of Liu et al. (2016) show that the participation of
controlling shareholders in private placements tend to receive lower announcement
returns and this tendency can be aggravated when higher discounts are offered.
The discount effect, as suggested by Liu et al. (2016), might differ according to
the targeted investors. Assuming that non-controlling shareholders hold a strong
tunnelling incentive, lacking the strong bargaining power entitled by a controlling
position (Cumming & Hou, 2014), non-controlling shareholders are less likely to
obtain a discount which is deep enough to cover a likely loss in stock price caused by
tunnelling.
As stated earlier, if shareholders use private placements to secure block holdings
and proceed with tunnelling, they should acquire significant discounts to avoid losses
in case firm values take a hit following the tunnelling. Liu et al. (2016) suggest that
discounts received by controlling shareholders in private placements can provide a
direct measurement of their tunnelling incentive, but it is less likely so when discounts
are granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders. With the market’s
anticipation of aggravated tunnelling, higher discounts offered to controlling
shareholders should lead to weaker market performance around private placements,
while such a tendency should be less at present when discounts are offered without
the subscription of controlling shareholders. Hence, this study presents the following
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1a. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in weaker market performance around the offerings compared
to when discounts are granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

In Liu et al. (2016), higher discounts granted to controlling shareholders are
shown to lead to lower announcement returns of private placements compared to
when discounts were offered to institutional investors. Liu et al. interpret this
observation as the market expecting controlling shareholders to engage in
value-compromising related-party transactions and over-investments more often after
the placements. A potential deficiency in the thinking of Liu et al. (2016) is that they
predict controlling shareholders’ long-term behaviours using an event study on the
observations of 5-day window ([-2, +2] in relation to announce day 0) around private
placements. They have not examined the post-offering tunnelling activity nor have
they verified if discounts interacting with controlling shareholders are associated with
weakened firm performance as consequences of tunnelling. This calls for a follow-up
examination of the long-term post-offering firm performance.
Firm resources can serve to tunnel, to invest and to distribute (dividends). This
present study relies on these three aspects to assess how differently the price treatment
of controlling shareholders in private placements affects the fund allocation compared
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to when the treatment is unrelated to controlling shareholders. Following Jiang et al.
(2010), this present study uses inter-corporate loans, which can be misused to transfer
funds to controlling shareholders’ related parties, as a measurement of tunnelling. If
price treatments of controlling shareholders in private placements indeed reveal a
tunnelling mechanism, lower prices for the subscription of controlling shareholders
should cause higher inter-corporate loans compared to when price treatments were
granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

Hypothesis 1b. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in higher post-offering inter-corporate loans compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

Post-offering investment activities are concerned, because the need to conduct
private placements is often listed as undertaking value-building projects in firms’
applications of offerings. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine the post-offering
investment activities in relation to whether a strong form of tunnelling, if present,
would hinder the investments. A relevant study by Liu et al. (2015) has confirmed that
the active tunnelling incentive of Chinese family business owners lowers capital
expenditure. Proceeding with the tunnelling argument, higher discounts granted to
controlling shareholders should signify a greater tunnelling risk and therefore a lower
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level of capital expenditure compared to when discounts were received by
non-controlling shareholders only.

Hypothesis 1c. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in lower post-offering capital expenditure compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

Tunnelling could negatively affect profitability. Using the deviation of cash-flow
right from control right as a proxy for the likelihood of expropriation, Joh (2003)
finds that higher excessive control rights for controlling shareholders are associated
with lower earnings. Also, more resources transferred to affiliated firms (which is the
nature of inter-corporate loans) weaken firm profitability. These results confirm a
negative impact of tunnelling on profitability. In the present study, one key
assumption in the tunnelling argument is that discounts granted to controlling
shareholders in private placements are a direct measurement of tunnelling. Following
Joh (2003), deeper discounts received by controlling shareholders should be
associated with weaker post-offering profitability compared to the case in which
discounts are obtained simply by non-controlling shareholders. Therefore, the next
hypothesis states:
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Hypothesis 1d. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in weaker post-offering profitability compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

Though it is less likely to be the main purpose, a part of funds raised by private
placements might be paid out as cash dividends. Zhao et al. (2015) notice that Chinese
controlling shareholders actively participate in private placements. And, controlling
shareholders might be keen on private placements because of the post-offering cash
dividends (Zhao et al., 2015). Notably, these cash distributions have the potential to
transfer the proceeds of private equity issues back to participating controlling
shareholders. Consistent with this reasoning, Zhao et al. find that among issuing firms,
those that place shares privately with controlling shareholders tend to have higher
cash dividends compared to when such participation is absent. Notably, this tendency
is still shown in the fourth year after the conduction of private placements.
If controlling shareholders indeed use high cash dividends to transfer invested
funds back, instead of using these funds to invest, this forms a case of tunnelling.
According to the tunnelling assumption, a stronger tunnelling incentive of controlling
shareholders, indicated by a larger offering discount, should be associated with larger
cash distributions compared to when the discount was granted without the
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subscription of controlling shareholders. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1e. Following the tunnelling argument, larger discounts received by
controlling shareholders in private placements will lead to higher post-offering cash
dividends compared to when discounts were granted without the subscription of
controlling shareholders.

4.3.2 The incremental monitoring argument
The previous section discusses a case of tunnelling aggravated by private
placements that grant high discounts to controlling shareholders. However, if
tunnelling-prone shareholders are already in an absolute controlling position before
private placements, their prominent status within firms would require little to no extra
holdings to secure the vested private interests. Essentially, it is being in absolute
control that grants the ability to tunnel instead of the holding percentage which is a
direct measurement of how closely the financial interests of controlling shareholders
are attached to firm values.
In fact, private placements without the subscription of controlling shareholders
may not guarantee lower tunnelling risk. Barclay et al. (2007) find that passive
shareholders, who tend to share a weak affiliation with issuing firms after private
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placements, are targeted investors in many private placements in the US market.
These shareholders tend to form a coalition with entrenched managers and will give
consent to the existing entrenchment (Barclay et al., 2007).
This present study intends to determine if the passive investor-based explanation
of Barclay et al. (2007) also applies to the Chinese market in which the origin of
tunnelling is more likely to be controlling shareholders rather than entrenched
managers (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002).
Chinese firms under the influence of tunnelling might adopt the strategy of only
inviting passive subscribers to form a coalition with controlling shareholders. This can
effectively disguise the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholders who excuse
themselves from the offerings. Moreover, given the coalition between controlling
shareholders and passive investors, controlling shareholders’ power over firm
operations is actually strengthened without directly investing in private placements. In
a way, only inviting passive investors in private placements counts as a more efficient
method of tunnelling compared to controlling shareholders demanding excessive
discounts in private placements. The latter method is much less obscured and involves
actual capital input by controlling shareholders.
For firms troubled by tunnelling, this study considers a less likely case of
incremental

monitoring

followed

by

private

placements

that

only

invite

non-controlling shareholders. The most essential feature of Chinese listed firms is the
concentration of control. Private placements issued to non-controlling shareholders
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are more likely to create small block holders relative to the largest block, namely
controlling shareholders. Under the dominance of tunnelling by the ultimate control,
the monitoring provided by small blocks could be trivial.
The presence of controlling shareholders in private placements might not
necessarily intensify their conflicts with minority shareholders. Instead, this might
lead to a stronger alignment between these two groups of investors. According to
Wruck (1989), within a minimum lockup period up to three years, the wealth of
controlling shareholders is closely tied to firm values that are substantially determined
by the trading behaviours of non-participating investors. It is reasonable for
controlling shareholders to attach more importance to firm operations after private
placements to avoid a loss in their financial interests during lockups. And, the
discounts of private placements can be viewed as the compensation for the
incremental monitoring.
Other evidence that supports regulated practice of controlling shareholders after
private placements can be found in Krishnamurthy et al. (2005). They notice that
investors who have an existing relationship with issuing firms before the offerings
tend to avoid investing in overvalued issuing firms. This is especially the case when
affiliated shareholders receive a substantial discount in the offerings. They suggest
that if non-participating shareholders lose from the stock underperformance after
private placements while participating affiliated shareholders earn non-negative
returns because of the offering discount, the threat of lawsuits, such as for the
266

violation of insider trading laws, is likely to form.
Following Wruck (1989) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), the presence of
controlling shareholders in private placements might benefit non-participating
investors because of the incremental monitoring and the pre-existing affiliation.
Despite that the above-mentioned studies are US-based, the requirement of the
three-year holding period and the risk of lawsuits for insider trading also exist in the
Chinese stock market. This is expected to promote active monitoring by controlling
shareholders who participate in private placements and suggests an alternative to the
tunnelling argument in the context of China. The discounts for private placements,
then, could be viewed as the compensation to controlling shareholders for their
incremental monitoring (Wruck, 1989). This beneficial price treatment could also
restrain controlling shareholders from value-damaging behaviours in case of a lawsuit
for insider trading (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the discount received by controlling shareholders reassures the non-participating
minority shareholders who are concerned about tunnelling. This should especially be
the case compared to when discounts are only offered to unaffiliated investors who
face less legal pressure for post-offering stock underperformance (Krishnamurthy et
al., 2005) and might form a coalition with tunnelling-prone controlling shareholders
(Barclay et al., 2007). Thus, this study proposes another hypothesis as to how
discounts received by controlling shareholders differentiate the market performance
around private placements compared to when discounts are offered without the
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subscription of controlling shareholders:

Hypothesis 2a. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in stronger market performance around the offerings compared
to when discounts are granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

The incremental monitoring argument, compared to the tunnelling argument,
predicts the opposite tendency led by discounts received by controlling shareholders
in determining the post-offering tunnelling activities. The risk of lawsuits for insider
tradings forms when high discounts protect controlling shareholders from
post-offering stock underperformance (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). That is, facing
post-offering stock underperformance, higher discounts indicate greater legal pressure
for controlling shareholders compared to unaffiliated investors. Therefore, controlling
shareholders should be more willing to curb tunnelling to avoid unfavourable market
performance when they received high discounts from previous private placements. On
the contrary, the “monitoring pressure” of discounts experienced by insiders has a
smaller chance to form when discounts are unrelated to controlling shareholders in the
first place. Further, if controlling shareholders waive to participate in private
placements but to invite passive investors who receive high offering discounts as the
compensation for forming a coalition, the use of inter-corporate loans could be less
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regulated. This leads to another hypothesis for the post-offering inter-corporate loans:

Hypothesis 2b. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in lower post-offering inter-corporate loans compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

As suggested by Wruck (1989), extra efforts are required for more active
monitoring, therefore large investors who are more likely to benefit firm operations
(because of the substantial equity at stake) could be rewarded with higher discounts in
private placements. Upon the expectation of incremental monitoring, controlling
shareholders should be more willing to promote investments which can add to firm
values as well as controlling shareholders’ wealth. In comparison, when discounts are
only offered to passive shareholders to form a coalition with controlling shareholders
(Barclay et al., 2007), the funds to be invested might be diverted for a tunnelling
purpose. Accordingly, this study suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2c. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in higher post-offering capital expenditure compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.
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The funds raised by private placements and the subsequent investments can
expand firm operations and therefore may increase earnings. The incremental
monitoring, if successfully introduced by private placements (Wruck, 1989), should
reveal itself by facilitating stronger profitability compared to when such an
improvement in corporate governance is absent. Following the assumption that
discounts are rewards for more active monitoring, greater earnings are more likely to
show when higher discounts are received by controlling shareholders instead of
non-controlling shareholders. For offerings without the participation of controlling
shareholders, incremental monitoring provided by large stakeholders is less likely to
form. The goal of stronger profitability might even be hindered if passive subscribers
receive discounts in exchange for guarding the tunnelling in place (Barclay et al.,
2007). This predicts an alternative hypothesis on post-offering profitability:

Hypothesis 2d. Higher discounts offered to controlling shareholders in private
placements will result in stronger post-offering profitability compared to when
discounts were granted without the subscription of controlling shareholders.

Allocations of the funds raised by private placements include being paid out as
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cash dividends. Zhao et al. (2015) find that post-offering cash dividends tend to be
higher when controlling shareholders subscribe to private placements, which is
interpreted as a case of interests transfer via payouts. A potential drawback of the
research framework in Zhao et al. (2015) is that to identify the reason why controlling
shareholders’ participation in private placements leads to higher cash dividends may
require further examinations of firms’ concurrent accounting performance and
corporate governance.
If controlling shareholders intend to tunnel the proceeds of private placements
through cash payouts, then they could do so with or without being a subscriber to
placements. After all, the power to demand high cash dividends is granted by the
controlling position, not the participation in equity offerings. As a matter of fact,
controlling shareholders are more likely to earn a higher rate of return from
post-offering cash dividends when they waive participation in private placements. On
the contrary, a given level of cash dividends may bring a lower rate of return if
controlling shareholders enlarge their investments in private placements. On top of
that, cash dividends are to be shared by all investors. Controlling shareholders can
only collect payouts according to their cash-flow rights.
This study proposes the argument of incremental monitoring to interpret the cash
dividend behaviours after private placements. Ideally, private placements are
conducted for the purpose of enhancing firm performance by asset injection and
strategic investments. If this purpose is efficiently fulfilled, higher cash dividends is a
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possible outcome. Notably, stronger firm performance and therefore higher cash
dividends should be promoted by incremental monitoring and hindered by the
tunnelling in place. Considering discounts as the compensation for incremental
monitoring, higher dividends should follow when better price treatments were offered
to controlling shareholders instead of only non-controlling shareholders. Especially,
under the dominance of tunnelling, offerings targeting non-controlling shareholders
might only invite trivial monitoring and be used to form a coalition with controlling
shareholders, which could harm firms’ payout ability. This study then informs the
following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2e. Following the incremental monitoring argument, larger discounts
received by controlling shareholders in private placements will lead to higher
post-offering cash dividends compared to when discounts were granted without the
subscription of controlling shareholders.

The tunnelling argument and the incremental monitoring argument both predict
higher cash dividends when larger discounts were offered to controlling shareholders
instead of non-controlling shareholders. Still, the beneficial impact of incremental
monitoring can be distinguished from the tunnelling impact because of the influences
controlling shareholders have over practice of corporate governance, investments and
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profitability.

4.4 Data, methodology and measurements of variables
4.4.1 Sample selection
The sample used for the event study that examines the announcement effect of
private placements gathers offerings from 2006 to 2015 on the Chinese stock market.
This was the most extended time frame available when this study commenced.
Regarding sample selection, firms that belong to the financial industry, firms with
missing trading data and those that did not disclose discount information are excluded.
This test controls for the potential information overlap by excluding firms that have
made announcements of earnings (annual report), cash dividends, seasonal equity
offerings, right issues, mergers or acquisitions within the [-3, 0] announcement period
relative to the announcement day 0 of private placements (Fonseka et al., 2014). This
event study also avoids the compounding effect of multiple private placements by
discarding firms that have issued another private placement within the estimation
event time period of [-89, -11] (Wu et al., 2005). Eventually, 1052 private placements
were selected to examine both short-term and long-term abnormal stock returns
around the announcements of offerings.
The sample used for the examination of cash dividend policy, profitability and
activities of issuing intercorporate loans and making capital expenditure only includes
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firms inviting existing controlling shareholders and passive shareholders (defined in
the Section 4.4.3) in private placements. Only these two categories of issuing firms
are examined, as they are representative issuers. Similar to the sampling rule applied
to the above event study, firms that belong to the financial industry, firms with
missing trading data and those that did not disclose discount information are excluded.
If firms have conducted multiple private placements within the sample period from
2006 to 2015, discounts are updated according to the schedule of private placements.
For example, if a firm has conducted two private placements, one in 2006 and one in
2009, the discount for 2006 offering will apply to observations in the period 2006 to
2008, and the discount for 2009 offering will apply to observations in the period 2009
to 2015.

4.4.2 Procedures of the event study on the abnormal stock returns around
private placements
This event study is used to interpret how private placements are viewed by
non-participating shareholders by identifying the size and significance of abnormal
stock returns around announcements of offerings. The public announcement day of a
private placement is the event day 0. The [-89, -11] time window is used as the
estimation event period (Wu et al., 2005). The daily trading data, namely daily stock
returns with dividend reinvested, within the estimation event period of firm j is tested
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by the market model as follows:
Rj,t = αj+βjRM,t
where Rj,t is the observed daily stock return of the common stock of firm j on an
estimation day t from the [-89, -11] window, αj is the constant term, βj is the
coefficient, and RMt is the same-day market return with cash dividends reinvested on
the index of the stock exchange where firm j is listed. α j and β j are ordinary least
square estimates of the intercept and the slope of the market model.
The estimated values of

and

for firm j are then obtained to calculate the

expected return (ER) of firm j on an event day t* within the announcement period of
[t1, t2] via the following equation:
ERj,t* = αj +βj RM,t*
where ERj,t* is defined as the expected daily return of the common stock of firm j on
day t* assuming reinvested cash dividends. RM,t* is the daily market return on day t*
with cash dividends reinvested on the index of the stock exchange where the issuing
firm j is listed.
On an event day t* within the announcement period [t1, t2], the daily abnormal
return ARj,t* of firm j is defined as the difference between the realized return (Rj,t*) and
the expected return (ERj,t*):
ARj,t* = Rj,t* − ERj,t*
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where Rj,t* is the observed return of the common stock of firm j on day t* assuming
reinvested cash dividends.
The cumulated abnormal return (CAR) for the private placement conducted by
firm j from a multi-day announcement window [t1, t2] is defined as the sum of the
time-series of ARs within the event window [t1, t2], that is:
t2

CARt1,t2   ARt
t  t1

The sample of CARs within the period of [t1, t2] of all tested private placements is
then examined to determine whether its mean is statistically different from 0.
Following Barclay et al. (2007) and Wruck and Wu (2009), this event study
examines both short-term and long-term CARs around private placements. The
short-term multi-day announcement windows are defined as [-1, 0], [-3, 0] (Wruck,
1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Fonseka et al., 2014), while the long-term multi-day
event windows are [-1, 120], [-10, 120] (Wruck & Wu, 2009) and [+1, 120] (Barclay
et al., 2007).

4.4.3 The key participating investors in private placements
In examining the announcement effect of private placements in China, Liu et al.
(2016) mainly tested two categories of participating shareholders, namely institutional
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shareholders and controlling shareholders. Their sample distribution reports that
27.51% of participating investors are controlling shareholders, while 40.56% are
institutional investors. Given that private placements allow up to 10 participating
investors, joint participation from controlling shareholders and institutional investors
in the same given offering is expected. The work of Liu et al. (2016), however, does
not disclose information regarding the overlap between the subscriptions of
controlling shareholders and institutional investors.
This present study examined 1052 selected private placements from 2006 to
2015. The sample reports that 551 (52.38%) offerings have participation from
controlling shareholders, while 844 (80.23%) involve institutional investors. Between
these two groups of offerings, an overlap of 359 events was participated in by both
controlling shareholders and institutions. This is nearly 70% of the offerings involving
controlling shareholders. That is, not controlling for the overlap between the
participation of controlling shareholders and institutional investors might shadow the
conclusions drawn by Liu et al. (2016).
Assuming institutional investors are non-controlling block shareholders, their
influence over firm operations might be trivial given the controlling shareholders in
place (Zwiebel, 1995). The present study shows that firms placing the offerings
without controlling shareholders report a mean of holdings of 37.32% by controlling
shareholders in the year before private placements. By the end of the year when
private placements are finalized, this figure drops to 31.36% but is still above 30%
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which is the benchmark of being in absolute control. That is, even when controlling
shareholders are excluded from private equity issues, their holdings can still be
significant enough to reject smaller blocks when a disagreement occurs, both before
and after the offerings. Thus, this study expects controlling shareholders to be more
prominent than institutional investors, or any new blocks in general, in private
placements. This contention finds support from Zhao et al. (2015) who focus on two
categories of private placements, those that invite controlling shareholders and those
that do not.
Of the 1052 tested private placements, 551 are issued to controlling shareholders.
Further information reveals that 36 out of 551 cases replaced the pre-offering
non-participating controlling shareholders with new controlling shareholders
participating in private placements. Because of the concern that the announcement
effect of private placements might be different for pre-existing controlling
shareholders and new controlling shareholders, this study distinguishes between
participating controlling shareholders and places them into two categories. They are
Existing Controlling Shareholders (515 cases) and New Controlling Shareholders
(36 cases).
Wruck (1989) demonstrates that private placements issued to only one investor
highlight the possibility of incremental monitoring. Following this suggestion,
offerings to single shareholders (34 cases) who are not in control of the firms (both
before and after the offerings) are used to test Wruck’s argument. The category of
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Single Shareholders does not extend to existing or new controlling shareholders as
there is the potential overlap by being both a sole investor in placements and a
controlling shareholder.
The last category of private placements consists of those that are without the
participation of controlling parties and are issued to multiple shareholders. This
category of offerings has 467 out of the total 1052 placement events. Among these
467 events, 409 events lead to 1346 shareholders becoming top 2 to 10 shareholders
(non-controlling large shareholders) in the year of private placements, and the rest (58
events) do not create new blocks. However, 99% of the above 1346 investors do not
share a strong affiliation with issuing firms because they do not have above 5%
holdings and are not in management positions (Wruck & Wu, 2009).
Notably, private equity issues to Multiple Non-controlling Shareholders tend
to appeal to investors with a relatively short investment horizon. Of 1346 shareholders,
778 withdrew from being non-controlling large shareholders in the second year after
the placements. Despite that the rest 568 shareholders stay in issuing firms longer than
their required holding period, the average holdings of these staying shareholders is
only 3.73% which is significantly lower than 5% (t-statistic -11.17). In this case, the
incremental monitoring function is likely to be suppressed by the short investment
horizon and the limited size of holdings. That is, private placements that only invite
multiple non-controlling shareholders tend to introduce passive shareholders who
share less pre-existing or subsequent affiliation with issuing firms.
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The division of the total 1052 private placements is set according to the features
of key participating investors. This fourfold categorization is exclusive and exhaustive.
Given that events inviting existing controlling shareholders (515 cases) and events
introducing passive shareholders (467 cases) account for 93.35% of the total sample,
they are selected as the main tested subjects for the examination of the post-offering
cash dividends and other firm operations. This tested sample is less disturbed by
different sizes of sub-samples, and therefore allows a fair contrast between existing
controlling shareholders and passive shareholders.

4.4.4 List of variables
Dependent Variables
CAR [t1, t2]: The cumulated abnormal return (CAR) led by the announcement of a
private placement from a multi-day event window [t1, t2]. It is defined as the sum of
the time-series of daily abnormal returns within the event window [t1, t2]. The tested
short-term announcement window includes [-3, 0] and [-1, 0] (Wruck,1989; Hertzel &
Smith, 1993; Fonseka et al., 2014). The tested long-term event window includes [-10,
+120], [-1, +120] (Wruck & Wu, 2009) and [+1, 120] (Barclay et al., 2007).
DY: Dividend yield, measured as the cash dividend per share divided by the stock
price at the end of the year. This measurement reflects the return from cash dividends
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for investors who prefer payouts to capital gains while making investment decisions.
CDPS: Cash dividend per share, calculated as the total cash dividend payment divided
by the total number of outstanding shares at the issue of cash dividends.
PAYOUT: Cash dividend payout ratio, depicted as cash dividend per share divided by
earnings per share.
ROE: Net profits scaled by the total equity invested by shareholders at the end of the
year.
ORTA: Following Jiang et al. (2010), inter-corporate loans, an indication of tunnelling
by controlling shareholders, are measured by other receivables scaled by the total
assets at the end of the year.
CapEx: Capital expenditure divided by the total asset at the end of the year.
Key Independent Variables
EXISTING_CONTROL: This variable takes a value of 1 if a private placement has the
participation of either direct or ultimate controlling shareholders who are already in
place before the offering, and 0 means otherwise.
NEW_CONTROL: This variable takes a value of 1 if an investor replaces the former
controlling shareholder of the issuing firm via a private placement, and 0 means
otherwise.
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SINGLE: This variable takes a value of 1 if a private placement is issued to only one
shareholder who is not in control of the issuing firm either before or after the offering,
and 0 means otherwise.
DISCOUNT1: Setting the average of the closing prices of 20 trading days before the
announcement day of a private placement as Pave[-20,-1], the final subscription price of
this private placement as Pactual, this variable is computed as (Pave[-20,-1] - Pactual)/
Pave[-20,-1] (Liu et al., 2016). This measurement reflects the bargaining power of
participating shareholders.
DISCOUNT2: Setting the closing price of the 10th trading day after the announcement
day of a private placement as P10, the final subscription price of this private placement
as Pactual, this variable is computed as (P10 - Pactual)/ P10 (Hertzel & Smith, 1993,
Fonseka et al., 2014).
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1(2): Cross-term between EXISTING_CONTROL
and DISCOUNT1(2). This cross-term captures the joint effect of the participation of
existing controlling shareholders and their associated discounts in private placements.
NEW_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1: A cross-term between NEW_CONTROL and
DISCOUNT1. This cross-term captures the joint effect of the participation of new
controlling shareholders and their associated discounts in private placements.
SINGLE*DISCOUNT1: A cross-term between SINGLE and DISCOUNT1. This
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cross-term captures the joint effect of the participation of single shareholders and their
associated discounts in private placements.
LN(BOARD): The natural logarithm of the total number of board directors is used as a
possible determinant of firm earnings and corporate governance. This figure is
industry-adjusted to produce more robust results. A larger board size is shown to
generate higher agency costs and lower efficiency, and therefore weaker firm
performance (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 2010).
IND_DIRECTOR: The ratio of the number of independent directors over the total
number of directors is used as a possible determinant of firm earnings and corporate
governance. The industry-adjusted ratio is used to produce more robust results.
Following Li et al. (2015), LN(BOARD) and IND_DIRECTOR are used as key
explanatory variables when testing the determinants of firm earnings and corporate
governance.
MARKETIZATION: Following Jiang et al. (2010), regional disparity arising from the
differences in progress towards a market economy across provinces is considered for
the examination of the use of inter-corporate loans. According to Fan et al. (2001),
this variable is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, and each tested firm is assigned the value
of the province where it is registered.
Control Variables
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Fraction_of_Shares: The number of newly issued shares scaled by the total number of
outstanding shares after a private placement (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Fonseka et al.,
2014).
Size_of_Fund: The gross amount of money raised by a private placement scaled by
the total assets at the end of the issuing year.
SIZE: The natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the year.
TOBIN’S Q: The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of long-term
debt over the book value of total assets.
LARGEST: The holding percentage of the largest shareholder at the end of the year.
NC_LARGE: The ratio of the total percentage of shareholdings from the second to the
fifth largest shareholders to the largest shareholder’s holding percentage at the end of
the year.
EXCESS: Difference between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash-flow
rights.
ROA: The ratio of return on asset. The net profits scaled by the total assets at the end
of the year.
CASH: Cash and marketable securities scaled by the total assets at the end of the year.
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LEVERAGE: The ratio of total debt to the total assets at the end of the year.
MB: Market-to-book ratio of the year.
SD: Stock dividend per share issued by a firm in a particular year.
LOCKUP: This variable takes the value of 1 if this is the year of lockup (resale
restriction) for participating investors in private placements, and 0 otherwise.
4.4.5 Models
This study mainly examines if discounts of private placements offered to
different categories of investors have different impacts over the stock performance
around the offerings and the fund allocations. Specifically, the stock performance
during the announcement period of private placements and that during a longer event
period are both investigated; the examined allocations of funds are tunnelling,
investments and cash dividends.
The abnormal stock returns around private placements
The cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around announcements of private
placements are used to examine how the market reacts to the offerings. The model
that tests the determinants of short-term announcement returns of private placements
is:
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(Model 4.1)

Following Barclay et al. (2007), this study also examines the stock performance
around private placements within a longer event window. This also represents an
attempt to test the ultimate market reaction toward private placements. The relevant
model is as follows.
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(Model 4.2)
As a potential robustness check, this study explicitly tests the long-term
abnormal stock returns after private placements (Wruck & Wu, 2009). The model that
serves this function is as follows.
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(Model 4.3)
The dependent variables representing the market reactions are CARs within [-1, 0],
[-1, +120] and [+1, +120] in relation to the announcement day 0. The key explanatory
variables of the market reactions to private placement announcements are the
categories of key participating shareholders and the cross-terms. Under the
incremental monitoring hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a), discounts offered to existing
controlling shareholders are more likely to represent compensations for additional
monitoring compared to when discounts are offered to multiple non-controlling
shareholders and, therefore, should lead to favourable market reactions and a positive
coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. Under the tunnelling hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1a), discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders are more likely
to be viewed as a value loss compared to when discounts are offered without the
subscription of controlling shareholders and, therefore, should lead to less favourable
market reactions and a negative coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1.

The determinant of post-offering inter-corporate loans
Inter-corporate loans can be used to transfer firm wealth to controlling
shareholders’ related parties (Jiang et al., 2010), thus is used as a proxy of tunnelling
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in the present study. The tested groups are firms that invite existing controlling
shareholders to take part in private placements and those that only invite multiple
non-controlling (passive) shareholders. These two groups are representative of the full
sample and exhibit different levels of affiliations with issuing firms. The model that
examines the post-offering inter-corporate loans is:
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(Model 4.4)

The key explanatory variable of Model 4.4 is EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1.
Incremental monitoring hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) predicts a negative coefficient of
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1.

Tunnelling

hypothesis

(Hypothesis

1b)

predicts a positive coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. LN(BOARD)
and IND_DIRECTORS are corporate-governance-related key explanatory variables.
Following Jiang et al. (2010), the province market index (MARKETIZATION) is used
to control for the regional disparity. The control variables of Model 4.4 are
Size_of_Fund, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALE GROWTH, MB and industry fixed
effect.
The determinant of post-offering capital expenditure
The study next examines firms’ investment activities. The tested groups are firms
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that invite existing controlling shareholders to take part in private placements and
those that only invite multiple non-controlling (passive) shareholders. The tested
model is as follows.
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(Model 4.5)

The key explanatory variable of Model 4.5 is EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1.
Incremental monitoring hypothesis (Hypothesis 2c) predicts a positive coefficient of
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. Tunnelling hypothesis (Hypothesis 1c) predicts
a negative coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. LN(BOARD) and
IND_DIRECTORS are corporate-governance-related key explanatory variables. The
control variables of Model 4.5 are Size_of_Fund, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALE
GROWTH, MB and industry fixed effect.
The determinants of post-offering accounting performance
The next research focus is post-offering accounting performance. The tested
groups are firms that invite existing controlling shareholders to take part in private
placements and those that only invite multiple non-controlling (passive) shareholders.
The model that examines the post-offering earnings is:
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The proxy of earnings is the ratio of net profits to equity invested by shareholders at
the end of the year (ROE). This measurement is chosen instead of return on assets as
it is less affected by the non-productive asset and is a reflection of the profitability
based on shareholders’ claims. The key explanatory variable of Model 4.6 is the
cross-term of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. The incremental monitoring
hypothesis

(Hypothesis

2d)

predicts

a

positive

coefficient

of

EXISTING

CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. Tunnelling hypothesis (Hypothesis 1d) predicts a negative
coefficient

of

EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1.

Also,

LN(BOARD)

and

IND_DIRECTORS are corporate-governance-related key explanatory variables. The
relevant control variables are Size_of_Fund, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALE
GROWTH, MB and industry fixed effect.
The determinants of post-offering cash dividends
This study chooses measurements of DY, CDPS and PAYOUT as dependent
variables to investigate whether the post-offering cash dividends receive different
impacts from discounts granted to different categories of investors. The tested groups
are firms that invite existing controlling shareholders to take part in private
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placements and those that only invite multiple non-controlling (passive) shareholders.
Models that examine the determinants of post-offering cash dividend policy are:
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Model

4.9

is

EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. The incremental monitoring hypothesis and
the

tunnelling

hypothesis

both

predict

a

positive

coefficient

of

EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. Prior examinations on profitability and other
allocations of funds are needed to distinguish between these two effects. The control
variables here are Size_of_Fund, ROA, CASH, LEVERAGE, SIZE, MB, SD, the
presence of a lockup period (LOCKUP) and industry fixed effect.
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4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Univariate tests
4.5.1.1 Issuing features of private placements in China
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the frequency and the size features of all the
tested private placements from 2006 to 2015 in the Chinese stock market. It shows
that private equity issues surged in frequency in the years 2013 to 2015. In contrast,
shares issued by private placements in relation to total outstanding shares
(Fraction_of_Shares) descended gradually from 26.37% in 2006 to 15.45% in 2015.
The average size of raised funds relative to the total asset (Size_of_Fund) has been
stable above 20% since 2008. This ratio reached a peak in 2012 at 30.63% and a
gradual decrease follows. Within the 10 year period from 2006 to 2015, the funds
generated by private placements, on average, occupy 25% of the total assets at the end
of the issuing year.
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Table 4.1 The frequency, size of raised funds and proportion of issued shares as issuing
characteristics of tested private placements from 2006 to 2015 in China
This table lists yearly observations of issuing characteristics of tested private placements conducted
from 2006 to 2015 in China. “N of PP” represents the number of tested private placements in each
year. For a private placement, Fraction_of_Shares is calculated as the number of newly issued shares
scaled by the total number of outstanding shares after a private placement (mean values reported);
Size_of _Fund is defined as the gross amount of money raised by a private placement scaled by the
total asset at the end of the issuing year (mean values reported).
Year

N of PP

Fraction_of_Shares

Size_of_Fund

2006

50

26.37%

18.50%

2007

140

20.18%

18.63%

2008

104

22.29%

28.48%

2009

177

26.27%

25.54%

2010

155

20.00%

20.70%

2011

180

22.90%

27.99%

2012

154

24.58%

30.63%

2013

266

21.49%

24.43%

2014

447

18.94%

23.98%

2015

770

15.45%

22.17%
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This study next examines whether the issuing features of the selected 1052
private placements are specific to the identity of key participating investors, namely
existing controlling shareholders (515), new-controlling shareholders (36), single
shareholders (34) and passive shareholders (467).
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) states that the offering
price of a private placement shall not be below 90% of the average price of the 20
trading days, that is a maximum 10% discount, preceding its announcement.
Following this requirement, DISCOUNT1 is measured relative to the average of the
closing prices of the 20 trading days before the announcement of private placements.
A positive value of DISCOUNT1 suggests that participating investors obtain a
discount for their subscription, while a negative value indicates investors pay a
premium. As shown in Table 4.2, all of the participating shareholders enjoyed
significant discounts in private placements. Still, only existing (0.228) and new
controlling shareholders (0.444) are found to obtain discounts which are significantly
above 10% (t-statistics are 9.70 and 8.59, respectively). This again verifies the
argument of Cumming & Hou (2014) and Liu et al. (2016) that controlling
shareholders tend to have stronger negotiation power. In the meantime, the high
discounts granted to existing controlling shareholders do not support the information
cost hypothesis which predicts that insiders have lower discounts in private
placements because they have lower information acquisition costs (Hertzel & Smith,
1993; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). It is also implied that the beneficial price treatment
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for existing controlling shareholders is likely to be a reward for activities other than
information certification.
Further cross-group comparisons show that new controlling shareholders
introduced by private placements tend to receive significantly higher discounts than
existing controlling shareholders (a difference of 0.216 with a t-statistic of 4.23). This
might be caused by the size factor. Offerings inviting new controlling shareholders on
average issue above 50% of the total outstanding shares. This is significantly higher
than that of offerings to existing controlling shareholders, or any other categories of
placements. Additionally, the funds provided by offerings to new controlling
shareholders occupy an average of 78% of the total asset at the placement year,
suggesting a strong negotiation position for the offering price.
As to private placements issued to existing controlling shareholders, their
involvement in offerings is associated with higher discounts (with a mean of 0.228)
compared to offerings to passive shareholders (with a mean of 0.115). This is different
from Barclay et al. (2007) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) who identify higher
discounts for passive shareholders. It is clear that in China, private offerings to
passive shareholders have the least prominent discounts. This study proposes the
following explanations. First, passive shareholders may have relatively weak
bargaining power because they are not insiders or share strong affiliations with
issuing firms before the placements. Second, they are less likely to form sufficient
monitoring incentive because of their relatively short investment horizon and
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insignificant holdings (discussed in Section 4.4.3). This further lowers the ceiling of
discounts. Third, offerings to passive shareholders tend to be smaller, which leads to a
less advantaged bargaining position. Therefore, compared to shareholders who are
more likely to share inactive previous and subsequent affiliations with firms, existing
controlling shareholders are more likely to be active monitors. The higher discounts
for existing controlling shareholders, therefore, are consistent with the monitoring
argument.
Still, strong bargaining power is not exclusive to controlling shareholders.
Private issues to a single shareholder have statistically indifferent discounts compared
to issues to existing controlling shareholders. Following Wruck (1989), a sole investor
in placements highlights the case of additional monitoring for issuing firms. That is,
both existing controlling shareholders and single investors are probable active
monitors, and their received discounts are not statistically different. This adds
credibility to the contention that discounts are a form of compensation for monitoring
because active investors are given similar rewards regardless of the size of their
shareholdings.
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Table 4.2 Discounts, size of raised funds and proportion of issued shares of different categories of private placements from 2006 to 2015
F-statistics for test of joint equality in means and t-statistics for test of equality in means are both in italics. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Means of issuing features of private issues

Existing Control vs

means

New Control

467

1052

551

549

982

0.166

0.115

3.32**

-0.216 (-4.23***)

0.062 (1.66)

0.113 (2.28**)

0.531

0.113

0.141

111.30***

-0.308 (-10.57***)

0.11 (3.84***)

0.082 (9.68***)

0.783

0.152

0.193

83.56***

-0.561 (-11.50***)

0.07 (2.03**)

0.029 (2.79***)

New

Single

Control

Control

Non-Control

N

515

36

34

Discount

0.228

0.444

0.223
0.222

shares
Size of
Funds

Existing Control vs

equality in

Existing

Fraction of

Tests of equality in means

Test of joint

Passive

Single NonControl

Existing Control vs
Passive
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4.5.1.2 Univariate features of the short- and long-term CARs
This study provides univariate analysis regarding the significance of the
abnormal returns around announcements of private placements and to determine
whether the identity of key participating shareholders affects the announcement
reaction. These results are listed in Table 4.3. For the full sample of 1052 private
placements, the announcement returns are significantly positive within the short-term
announcement windows of [-3, 0] and [-1, 0]. It appears that announcements of
private placements in China generally gain favourable market reactions. This is
similar to the US market (Wruck 1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Wruck & Wu, 2009)
and is consistent with previous studies of the Chinese market (e.g. Liu et al., 2016).
Disparities in short-term announcement returns are observed across the
sub-categories of private placements. Only placements that include existing
controlling shareholders gain strongly significant and positive CARs for both
short-term announcement windows of [-3, 0] and [-1, 0]. It reveals that the market
reacts favourably to the announcement of private placements that invite existing
controlling shareholders. This supports the positive expectation of the market and is in
line with the incremental monitoring hypothesis (Wruck, 1989) while contradicting
the tunnelling hypothesis (Zhao et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016). In the meantime, the
finding of existing controlling shareholders who are affiliated shareholders also
supports the information certification theory. That is, block purchases of connected
shareholders are perceived as their approval of firm values (Leland & Pyle, 1977;
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Krishnamurthy et al. 2005). Private issues to single shareholders also gain
significantly positive market reactions but only within the [-3, 0] event period. This
positive outcome is more likely to be formed by the market’s anticipation of
incremental monitoring from this sole investor (Wruck, 1989).
Announcements of private placements to passive shareholders are non-events
given the insignificant CARs. This indicates that such offerings carry little
information and show weak evidence that the market expects incremental monitoring.
Private placements with participating from new controlling shareholders also gain
insignificant announcement returns. However, because of the small size of the
sub-sample (36 cases), this result might be firm-specific.
The observed positive short-term announcement returns of private placements,
however, are not sustainable. For the full sample, the CARs within the long-term
event windows of [-10, +120], [-1, +120] and [+1, +120] are all significantly negative,
which indicates stock underperformance compared to the prediction given by the
market model. This is similar to the observations of Wruck and Wu (2009) of the US
market. Antweiler and Frank (2004) find that various firm events follow a return
pattern

which

shows

positive

short-term

returns

followed

by

long-term

underperformance. They interpret this pattern as being a response to overly optimistic
initial assessments of these events. Although the present study does not further
investigate this puzzling return pattern, it supports the implication that to extend event
windows might help reveal the ultimate announcement effect of private placements.
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Table 4.3 Comparison of abnormal stock returns around announcements of different categories of private placements from 2006 to 2015
CAR(%) is calculated using a market-model regression of firm stock returns. The estimation window is [-89, −11], with day 0 being the public announcement day. The test
of means is of four mutually exclusive sub-categories of private placements issued to existing control, new control, single shareholder, and passive shareholders. For the full
sample and each sub-sample, the mean of abnormal returns within multiple event windows, the results of t-tests (in parentheses) on whether the means of returns are
statistically different from zero are reported. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
All private placements
(n=1052)
CARs from
day -3 to day 0
CARs from
day -1 to day 0
CARs from
day -10 to day 120
CARs from
day -1 to day 120
CARs from
day +1 to day 120

Placements to existing
control
(n=515)

Placements to new control
(n=36)

Placements to single

Placements to

non-controlling shareholder

passive shareholders

(n=34)

(n=467)

0.404%

0.653%

0.082%

1.826%

0.024%

(2.43)**

(2.46)***

(0.07)

(2.05)**

(0.10)

0.491%

0.798%

1.174%

0.99%

.073%

(3.86)***

(4.37)***

(1.44)

(1.46)

(0.37)

-8.650%

-7.202%

-16.269%

1.996%

-10.802%

(-6.36)***

(-3.48)***

(-1.53)

(0.34)

(-5.25)***

-8.685%

-7.298%

-18.366%

0.044%

-10.372%

(-6.74)***

(-3.75)***

(-1.77)*

(0.01)

(-5.33)***

-9.236%

-8.035%

-19.165%

-.903%

-10.401%

(-6.91)***

(-4.16)***

(-1.87)*

(-.15)

(-5.39)***
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Contrasting long-term CARs are observed across offerings issued to different
key participating shareholders. Private equity offerings to existing controlling
shareholders and passive shareholders both gain significantly negative long-term
CARs regardless of the event window. Placements to new controlling shareholders
also obtain significantly negative long-term CARs but only for event windows of [-1,
+120] and [+1, +120]. Firms that issue equity privately to sole investors earn normal
long-term returns. Despite the above disparity, results from a joint test in means
indicate that the differences in the long-term CARs of the four categories of
placements are small. This indicates that the identity of key participating shareholders
cannot differentiate the long-term abnormal stock returns around and after private
placements at the univariate level.
A plot (Figure 4.1) showing CARs of various categories of private placements is
generated to present the comparison of offerings issued to four types of key
participating shareholders. Following Barclay et al. (2007), each dot is located by
summing and then averaging the cumulated daily prediction errors dated to public
announcement date (day 0) of private placements. As shown by Figure 4.1, four
groups of private placements share the similar experience of an upward movement in
unexpected returns within the 10 days before the announcements, suggesting a certain
level of information leakage. In particular, offerings to new controlling shareholders
present the most significant short-term climb in abnormal returns, and issues to
passive shareholders experience the lowest level of unexpected positive returns. In
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general, after day 10, the CARs dated to day 0 stabilize around zero for the four types
of offerings, suggesting that the market has absorbed the information released by
private placements.

4.5.1.3 Univariate features of post-offering firm characteristics
This study next examines the descriptive feature of the post-offering cash
dividend policy and other firm characteristics. Table 4.4 shows three measurements of
cash dividends, namely payout ratio, dividend yield and cash dividend per share, and
all report that cash distributions are different across firms inviting various types of
shareholders to private placements. Using CDPS, firms placing the offerings to
existing controlling shareholders are shown to have the highest level of cash
dividends with a mean of ￥0.159 per share (t-statistic of 9.52 when compared to the
category of passive placements not reported in Table 4.4). This observation is
consistent with the results of Zhao et al. (2015) which use CDPS as their main proxy
for payout policy. Yet, using PAYOUT and DY, cash dividends following placements
to existing controlling shareholders are not statistically different from cash distributed
by firms having single shareholders and passive shareholders in placements. That is,
the apparent tendency of higher cash dividends to be associated with existing
controlling shareholders’ subscriptions given by the measurement of CDPS is absent
with changes of measurements to PAYOUT and DY.

302

Figure 4.1 The tendency of long-term abnormal stock performance around private placements
Cumulative daily abnormal stock returns are obtained by summing and then averaging the cumulative daily prediction errors dated to the announcement date (Day 0). The
category of Existing Control refers to those private placements that include existing controlling shareholders. The New Control category gathers those private placements in
which new controlling shareholders are elected. The Single Non-control category features those private placements in which a non-controlling shareholder is the only buyer.
Passive placements are those private placements in which only multiple non-controlling shareholders are invited. The four categories above are exclusive and exhaustive.
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Table 4.4 Post-offering firm characteristics of different categories of private placement issuers
This table lists the means of post-issue cash dividends (PAYOUT, DY, CDPS), earnings (ROE),
inter-corporate loans (ORTA) and capital expenditure (CapEx) of firms issuing private placements to
existing controlling shareholders, new controlling shareholders, one single non-controlling shareholder
and passive shareholders, respectively. The results from F-tests of difference in means are also reported
in the last column. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Existing
New
Single
Test of joint equity in
Passive
Control
Control
Non-control
means
N

1770

78

90

1632

3570

PAYOUT

0.318

0.156

0.307

0.308

2.47*

DY

0.009

0.003

0.009

0.009

7.69***

CDPS

0.159

0.107

0.103

0.125

30.86***

ROE

1.769

0.952

1.811

1.443

17.27**

ORTA

0.015

0.055

0.017

0.017

73.48***

CapEx

0.056

0.092

0.042

0.060

14.83***

As to firms that introduce new controlling shareholders via private placements,
they have the lowest level of cash dividends according to measurements of PAYOUT
and DY. Yet, using CDPS, their post-offering cash dividends are not statistically
different from those of firms issuing private placements to single non-controlling
shareholders and passive shareholders (a joint t-statistic of 1.37).
Private issues to existing controlling shareholders and single shareholders have a
similar level of post-offering earnings (a t-statistic of -0.22). These two groups also
have a significantly stronger accounting performance compared to offerings to new
controlling shareholders and passive shareholders. For example, the mean of ROEs
after private placements participated by existing controlling shareholders is
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statistically higher than those earned by firms that issue private offerings to passive
shareholders (a t-statistic of 18.76 which is significant at the 1% level). This
observation is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis that placements inviting
controlling shareholders and single shareholders are more likely to gain incremental
monitoring (Wruck 1989). Also, in line with the monitoring hypothesis, firms that
include existing controlling shareholders in private issues have the lowest level of
inter-corporate loans (ORTA) than any other categories of issuing firms. For example,
the mean of ORTA after private placements participated by existing controlling
shareholders is statistically lower than those for firms offering equity privately to
passive shareholders (a t-statistic of -2.48 which is significant at the 1% level). This
also supports the idea that the subscription of existing controlling shareholders is
associated with less tunnelling than when such subscription is absent. This result
contradicts the tunnelling argument raised by Liu et al. (2016).
Liu et al. (2015) demonstrate that tunnelling by controlling shareholders usually
incurs scant capital investments (CapEx). Given the results in the bottom row of Table
4.4, firms with existing controlling shareholders in private placements are in the
middle range in term of capital expenditure (the case of single shareholders have the
lowest CapEx). Despite that this observation is not particularly informative under the
absence of controls for growth opportunity, firm size and other relevant characteristics,
it notably does not support the prediction of tunnelling raised by Liu et al. (2016).
Overall, results of this present study thus far are more inclined to the idea of
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incremental monitoring by existing controlling shareholders (Wruck, 1989) than to the
argument of tunnelling (Liu et al., 2016).

4.5.2 Multivariate analysis
4.5.2.1 The determinants of the short- and long-term abnormal stock returns
around private placements
The multivariate analysis begins with the examination of the announcement
effect of private placements. Considering that private placements conducted by
different issuers in different years might be subject to fixed time-effects and
group-effects, period-fixed and cross-section-fixed (two-way fixed) panel regression
is used to study the determinants of announcement CARs. The use of this regression
method is supported by the Hausman test. Taking the regression on CAR[-1, 0] as an
example, the Chi-square statistic testing for random cross-section effects is 18.01
(p<0.04) and 34.60 (p<0.01) for random period effects. This supports the alternative,
a fixed-effect model, as more consistent than the random-effect model. Further
evidence supporting the use of a two-way fixed effect model can be found in the joint
F-statistic on testing the applicability of fixed cross-section and period effects. This
figure is 1.29 which is significant at the 1% level.
As shown in Table 4.5, the CARs within both short-term [-1, 0] and long-term
[-1, 120] and [+1, 120] event periods are investigated. The interested explanatory
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variables are the cross-terms between discounts and identities of key participating
shareholders who are categorized as existing controlling shareholders (EXISTING
CONTROL),

new

controlling

shareholders

(NEW

CONTROL)

and

single

non-controlling shareholders (SINGLE). Private placements issued to multiple
non-controlling shareholders (passive shareholders) are used as the control group.
The results testing on CAR[-1, 0] are listed in Column 1 of Table 4.5. The
coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL is significantly positive at the 1% level,
indicating that offerings to existing controlling shareholders tend to generate more
favourable short-term market reactions than issues to multiple unaffiliated
shareholders (the control group). This is similar to the findings of Krishnamurthy et al.
(2005) that participation of affiliated shareholders in private placements is perceived
as certification of firm investment values and therefore tends to receive higher
announcement returns. This result is also consistent with the findings from univariate
tests and fits the contention that the market gives more credit to private equity
offerings that highlight the possibility of incremental monitoring from block
shareholders (Wruck, 1989). Further, this result opposes the contention that the
subscription of controlling shareholders raises the concern of aggravated tunnelling
(Liu et al., 2016). The positive coefficient of NEW CONTROL is also significant. It
appears that both existing and new controlling shareholders are favoured by the
market when they are known to participate in private placements. Contrary to the
results of Wruck (1989) based on the US market, sole investors (SINGLE) in private
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placements have a negative but insignificant impact on the short-term announcement
returns in China. It is possible that under a concentrated ownership structure, the
incremental monitoring provided by single non-controlling investors is trivial given
the controlling shareholder in place.
The positive impact of existing controlling shareholders’ subscriptions on
short-term announcement returns of private placements, however, might be shadowed
by

their

discounts.

Given

the

significantly

negative

coefficient

of

EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1, higher discounts for existing controlling
shareholders lead to lower announcement returns compared to when discounts are
offered without the subscription of existing controlling shareholders. It shows that the
short-term market reactions are less in favour of the subscription of existing
controlling shareholders when higher discounts are offered. This negative incremental
effect of discounts only applies to existing controlling shareholders. That is, despite
that the market welcomes existing controlling shareholders in private placements
(which is not in line with the tunnelling argument), the market receives a negative
shock when the associated discounts are high. The market might need more time to
process this shock. Hence, this study next examines the long-term CARs around
private placements for further evidence.
The results of the first proxy of long-term abnormal returns, CAR[-1, 120], are
displayed in Column 2 of Table 4.5. The testing method remains a two-way fixed
panel regression which has an F-statistic of 1.35 (p<0.01) for the joint significance of
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fixed cross-section and fixed period effects. The coefficients of EXISTING CONTROL,
NEW CONTROL and SINGLE are all insignificant, suggesting that the identity of key
participating shareholders only has a weak effect on the long-term CARs around
private placements.
Recall that when private placements are just announced (CAR[-1, 0]), the
discounts offered to passive shareholders (DISCOUNT1 in Column 1) do not affect
how the market views the related offerings. However, the coefficient on DISCOUNT1
becomes significantly negative when tested on CAR[-1, 120] (Column 2). That is,
observations from the long event window reveal that the market tends to be
disappointed by offerings that grant high discounts to passive shareholders. This study
finds that passive shareholders tend to be small block holders with a relatively short
investment horizon, which signifies that they are less likely to provide additional
monitoring for issuing firms.

309

Table 4.5 The determinants of the short-term and long-term abnormal stock returns around
announcements of private placements
This table lists the results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the short-term and
long-terms of abnormal stock returns (CARs) around the announcement of private placements. Data
used in this test is provided by firms inviting existing controlling shareholders and firms inviting
passive shareholders (the control group) in private placements conducted from 2006 to 2015. The
testing method is fixed cross-section and fixed period effects (two-way fixed) panel regression. The
dependent variable is CAR[-1,0], CAR[-1,120] and CAR[+1,120] from Columns 1 to 3. Definitions of
variables are detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industrial effect is reported as “Yes” if statistically
significant and “No” if insignificant. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted
t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1).

(2).

(3).

Car[-1, 0]

Car[-1, 120]

Car[+1, 120]

-2.997

3.878**

3.842**

(-.17)

(2.20)

(2.18)

EXISTING_

2.681***

-.078

-.107

CONTROL

(3.56)

(-1.06)

(-1.44)

NEW_

7.042*

.622

.543

CONTROL

(1.79)

(1.60)

(1.40)

-.137

-.151

-.153

(- .11)

(-1.22)

(-1.23)

DISCOUNT1

3.219
（1.44）

-.452**

-.502**

(-2.05)

(-2.27)

EXISTING_

-6.143**

.406*

.485**

（-2.50）

(1.67)

(2.00)

-11.29

-.610

-.475

*DISCOUNT1

（-1.47）

(-.81)

(-.63)

SINGLE_

-2.253
（- .51）

.634

.684

(1.46)

(1.57)

0.088
（.11）

-.168**

-.166**

(-2.16)

(-2.13)

.071

-.058*

-.056*

(.22)

(-1.84)

(-1.79)

1052

1052

1052

.196

.241

.226

C

SINGLE

CONTROL
*DISCOUNT1
NEW_
CONTROL

*DISCOUNT1
SIZE
TOBIN’S Q
N
Adj. R

2
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Contrary to the observation from short-term CARs, the significantly positive
coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 indicates that higher discounts
granted to existing controlling shareholders are associated with better long-term stock
returns compared to when discounts are offered to passive shareholders. This
indicates that after absorbing the shock of discounts, the market feels more optimistic
when higher discounts are received by existing controlling shareholders rather than by
passive shareholders. This is against the tunnelling argument which predicts that the
market senses a lower tunnelling risk when offerings give higher discounts to smaller
blocks instead of the largest block (Liu et al., 2016). When controlling shareholders
invest in private placements, an enlarged scale of equity is at stake. Therefore,
controlling shareholders are likely to be more active in monitoring even from a
self-concerned point of view (Wruck, 1989). The observations on long-term CARs fit
the argument of incremental monitoring raised by Hypothesis 2a. It is also implied
that the incremental monitoring provided by small blocks is less likely to build up the
confidence of the market especially with high discounts granted. Following Antweiler
and Frank (2004), this study leans toward the evidence from an extended event
window. That is, with a longer event window during which the market has relatively
sufficient time to process shocks, more favourable reactions are formed when higher
discounts are offered to existing controlling shareholders instead of multiple
non-controlling shareholders. This supports the argument of incremental monitoring
raised by Hypothesis 2a instead of the argument of tunnelling raised by Hypothesis
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1a.
It is hard to disentangle the incremental monitoring effect from the information
certification effect when both arguments predict higher announcement returns for the
participation of existing controlling shareholders in private placements (Wruck, 1989;
Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). Still, this study is more inclined to identify the beneficial
effect of high discounts granted to existing controlling shareholders as the market’s
expectation of incremental monitoring. This is because existing controlling
shareholders as insiders are granted large discounts in private placements (a mean of
0.228 compared to a mean of 0.115 for passive issues), which is against the
information cost hypothesis since existing controlling shareholders should have low
information acquisition costs.
As a potential robustness test, this study also examines the post-offering long
event window stock performance (CAR[+1,+120]) using a two-way fixed panel
regression. The results are listed in Column 3 of Table 4.5. Showing a high
consistency with the results for CAR[-1,+120] in Column 2, the coefficient of
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 remains significantly positive.

4.5.2.2 The post-offering use of inter-corporate loans
The purpose of this test is to investigate whether the post-offering tunnelling
activities differentiate between discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders
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and discounts offered to passive shareholders. The results of this test can provide
further evidence of whether the practice of post-offering corporate governance of
firms that offered high discounts to existing controlling shareholders in private
placements is consistent with the incremental monitoring argument (Wruck, 1989) or
the tunnelling argument (Liu et al., 2016). Following Jiang et al. (2010),
inter-corporate loans proxied by other receivables scaled by the total asset (ORTA) is
used as a measurement of tunnelling via direct fund transfer.
The comparison is held between firms issuing private placements to existing
controlling shareholders and firms placing the offerings with passive shareholders.
These two types of private placements naturally present the comparison between
offerings to deeply affiliated shareholders (existing controlling shareholder) and
offerings to weakly affiliated shareholders (multiple non-controlling shareholders).
On top of that, firms issuing private placements to existing controlling shareholders
and passive shareholders occupy about 95% of the post-offering observations of total
sample firms. Besides, offerings to new controlling shareholders could be
firm-specific, and the monitoring role of single non-controlling shareholders may not
be pronounced under concentrated ownership (Zwiebel, 1995), they are therefore
excluded from the following tests.
Shown in Table 4.6, the coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL is negative but
insignificant. As to observations on discount-related variables, DISCOUNT1 has a
positive coefficient with the 5% level of significance. This indicates that larger
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discounts given to passive shareholders are associated with higher inter-corporate
loans, which signifies greater tunnelling risk. Passive investors might be favoured by
issuing firms that intend to preserve vested interests of controlling parties (Barclay et
al., 2007). In this case, the offering discount is compensation for passive shareholders
to establish a coalition with controlling shareholders. The result of DISCOUNT1
testing on inter-corporate loans shows that the larger the discounts offered to passive
shareholders, the more likely tunnelling is active. This supports the passive investor
argument of Barclay et al. (2007).
Forming a contrasting comparison, EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 has a
negative coefficient which is significant at the 5% level. This provides evidence that
higher discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders are followed by less use
of inter-corporate loans compared to when discounts were only offered to passive
shareholders. This evidence suggests a case of more regulated use of inter-corporate
loans. The disparate signs of the coefficients on DISCOUNT1 (+) and
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1

(-)

signify

how

discounts

offered

to

shareholders with various levels of affiliation with issuing firms result in different
impacts on tunnelling. Higher discounts for existing controlling shareholders are
associated with less use of inter-corporate loans and therefore better quality of
corporate governance compared to when discounts were only offered to passive
shareholders. This result provides support for the incremental monitoring hypothesis
(Hypothesis 2b) rather than the tunnelling hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b).
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Table 4.6 Discounts received by existing controlling shareholders and by passive shareholders as
determinants for post-offering issues of inter-corporate loans
This table lists the results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the post-issue
inter-corporate loans. The sample includes the post-offering observations of firms issuing private
placements to existing controlling shareholders and firms placing offerings with multiple
non-controlling shareholders between 2006 and 2015. The dependent variable is ORTA. Definitions of
variables are detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and
the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable

ORTA
.057***

C

(3.83)

EXSITING_CONTROL
DISCOUNT1

-.000
(-.13)
.010**
(2.28)

EXSITING_CONTROL*

-.010**

DISCOUNT1

(-2.19)

SIZE_OF_FUNDS

-.001
(-.34)
-.009

ROA

(-.90)
-.006

CASH

(-1.21)

LEVERAGE

.016***
(4.51)
-.001**

SIZE

(-2.38)
.001***

MB

(3.10)

LN_BOARD
IND_DIRECTOR
MARKETIZATION

-.001
(-.29)
.008
(.81)
.000
(.58)

No. obs.

3402

Adj. R

.134

2

4.5.2.3 The post-offering capital expenditure
The next post-offering allocation of funds examined by this study is capital
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expenditure. This test is also relevant to corporate governance because Liu et al. (2015)
find that Chinese family firms which suffer more from tunnelling tend to have less
capital expenditure. The results examining capital expenditure is listed in Table 4.7.
Similar to previous findings on inter-corporate loans, the impact of offering discounts
on capital expenditure also varies based on who the discount in question is offered to.
The coefficient of DISCOUNT1 is negative and significant at the 5% level,
suggesting higher discounts offered to passive shareholders can be indicative of lower
capital expenditure. The positive coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1
(a t-statistic of 2.56) shows that existing controlling shareholders who obtained a
larger discount in placements refrain less from enlarging long-term investments
compared to when discounts were only offered to passive shareholders. This indicates
that discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders serve a more promotive role
for the expenditure on capital investments compared to when discounts were offered
to multiple non-controlling shareholders. This contradicts the tunnelling argument
(Hypothesis 1c). Instead, this evidence shows consistency with the incremental
monitoring prediction given by Hypothesis 2c. The results of control variables are, in
general, as expected. Stronger accounting performance (ROA) is associated with
higher capital expenditure. Firms that are more interested in long-term asset
investment tend to have less cash (CASH) at hand and smaller firm size (SIZE).
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Table 4.7 Discounts received by existing controlling shareholders and by passive shareholders as
determinants for post-offering capital expenditure
This table lists the results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the post-issue capital
investments. The sample includes the post-offering observations of firms issuing private placements to
existing controlling shareholders and firms placing offerings with multiple non-controlling
shareholders between 2006 and 2015. The dependent variable is CapEx. Definitions of variables are
detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and the results are
omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *,
**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable

CapEx
.090***

C

(2.90)

EXSITING_CONTROL
DISCOUNT1

-.009**
(-2.37)
-.026**
(-2.17)

EXSITING_CONTROL*

.035***

DISCOUNT1

(2.56)

SIZE_OF_FUNDS

-.015
(-1.46)
.138***

ROA

(4.58)
-.080***

CASH

(-7.63)

LEVERAGE

.005
(.52)
-.005***

SIZE

(-3.31)
-.000

MB

(-.58)

LN_BOARD
IND_DIRECTOR

.024***
(3.04)
.020
(.76)

MARKETIZATION

—

No. obs.

3402

Adj. R

.113

2
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4.5.2.4 The determinants of post-offering profitability
Under the corporate governance setting, this study uses the ratio of net profits
scaled by equity (ROE) at the end of the year as a measurement of profitability. This
measurement highlights firm accounting performance in relation to capital provided
by shareholders. The incremental impact of discounts received by existing controlling
shareholders on profitability may facilitate the interpretation of how this incremental
impact affects cash dividends.
The results of the test on ROE are listed in Table 4.8. The coefficient of
DISCOUNT1 is significantly negative, indicating that higher discounts offered to
multiple non-controlling shareholders are associated with lower earnings. This fits the
expectation that discounts offered to multiple shareholders who have a weak
affiliation with issuing firms have less benefit for firm performance. The evidence fits
the notion that discounts offered to multiple non-controlling shareholders are less
likely to bring in additional monitoring, which, again, fits the passive investor
argument (Barclay et al., 2007).
The coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 is positive, which is
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that higher offering discounts for existing
controlling shareholders result in stronger profitability compared to when discounts
were only offered to passive investors. The result is against the tunnelling argument
which views discounts as the safety net for the consequence of tunnelling and predicts
weaker firm performance when discounts were offered to controlling shareholders
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rather than non-controlling shareholders. Forming a contrasting result compared to
passive offerings, discounts interacting with existing controlling shareholders
represent a more likely case of incremental monitoring given the additional
contribution it makes to earnings. This result brings further support to the notion of
incremental monitoring suggested by Hypothesis 2d.
The coefficient of LEVERAGE is positive and significant at the 1% level. Firms
that rely on debt financing tend to have less equity capital, suggesting a smaller
denominator and therefore a larger value of ROE for a given level of earnings. The
cash level (CASH) has a significantly positive impact on earnings. LN(BOARD) has a
negative coefficient which is significant at the 5% level. This shows that larger board
sizes, as an indication of greater agency conflicts and lower efficiency (Jensen, 2010),
reduce earnings.
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Table 4.8 Discounts received by existing controlling shareholders and by passive shareholders as
determinants for post-offering profitability
This table lists the results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting firms’ post-issue
earnings. The sample includes the post-offering observations of firms issuing private placements to
existing controlling shareholders and firms placing offerings with multiple non-controlling
shareholders between 2006 and 2015. The dependent variable is ROE. Definitions of variables are
detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and the results are
omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *,
**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
ROE
-.205

C

(-.17)

EXISTING_CONTROL
DISCOUNT1

0.039
(.38)
-.625***
(-2.62)

EXISTING_CONTROL

.958***

*DISCOUNT1

(2.94)

SIZE_OF_FUNDS
CASH
LEVERAGE

-.596
(-1.62)
2.049***
(4.05)
4.654***
(12.94)
.003

SIZE

(.06)
.028

MB

(1.40)

LN_BOARD
IND_DIRECTOR

-.670**
(-2.21)
-.688
(-.63)

No. obs.

3402

Adj. R

.307

2

4.5.2.5 The determinants of post-offering cash dividend policies
The purpose of this test is to investigate whether the post-offering cash dividends
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differentiate between discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders and
discounts offered to passive shareholders. The results of regression testing for
post-offering cash dividend behaviours are listed in Table 4.9. Three measurements of
payout policy are adopted: dividend yield (Column 1), payout ratio (Column 2) and
cash dividend per share (Column 3).
In Column 1, the significantly negative coefficient on EXISTING_CONTROL
provides evidence that the presence of existing controlling shareholders in private
placements leads to lower dividend yields when compared to observations from firms
that only invite multiple non-affiliated shareholders. The discounts offered to multiple
non-affiliated shareholders (DISCOUNT1) have a significantly negative association
with post-offering dividend yields. Given the significantly positive coefficient of
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1, placements that offered higher discounts to
existing controlling shareholders tend to have higher post-offering dividend yields
compared to when discounts were only received by passive shareholders.
After replacing DY with PAYOUT, an accounting-based measurement of cash
dividends (Column 2 of Table 4.6), the coefficients on EXISTING_CONTROL and
DISCOUNT1 remain negative but become insignificant. Still, the coefficient of
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 remains significantly positive. The last tested
measurement of cash distributions is cash dividend per share (CDPS) which is also
the main tested dependent variable of Zhao et al. (2015). In Column 3, the coefficient
of EXISTING_CONTROL becomes positive and significant at the 1% level. This is
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similar to the results documented by Zhao et al. (2015). That is, private placements
participated by existing controlling shareholders tend to have higher CDPS compared
to cases without such participation; interpreted as interests transfer by Zhao et al.
(2015). Yet, using DY and PAYOUT, the positive coefficient of EXISTING_CONTROL
is reversed. Therefore, the present study is unable to form a definitive opinion
regarding how the subscription of existing controlling shareholders itself affects cash
dividend practice.
Still, the use of CDPS produces consistent results on DISCOUNT1 and
EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1. Higher offering discounts (DISCOUNT1) for
multiple non-affiliated shareholders tend to lead to significantly lower cash dividends
per share. Yet, when larger discounts were offered to existing controlling shareholders,
higher post-offering cash dividends per share are generated compared to when only
passive shareholders received the discounts. That is, the finding that the incremental
impact of discounts received by existing controlling shareholders results in higher
cash payouts is robust to the choices of measurements of dividends (DY, PAYOUT,
CDPS).
If the offering discount is the compensation for additional monitoring provided
by existing controlling shareholders (Hypothesis 2e), the positive incremental
influence over cash dividends could be the outcome of the concurrently enhanced firm
performance. Alternatively, if controlling shareholders demand a larger discount to
control the cost of aggravated tunnelling (Hypothesis 1e), the positive incremental
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influence over cash dividends can be a form of interests transfer. The prior results
show that stronger profitability is observed when higher discounts were offered to
existing controlling shareholders instead of only passive shareholders, which is in line
with the incremental monitoring argument. This indicates that the positive incremental
influence of existing controlling shareholders’ received discounts over cash dividends
is financially-founded and less likely to be a result of aggravated tunnelling.
Therefore, this study interprets the observation that higher cash dividends follow
offerings that granted higher discounts to existing controlling shareholders instead of
only passive shareholders as the outcome of incremental monitoring (Hypothesis 2e).
The results of control variables are generally consistent across the tested
measurements of cash dividends. Firms with stronger accounting performance (ROA),
less debt (LEVERAGE), larger firm size (SIZE) and simultaneously issuing stock
dividends (SD) are shown to pay higher cash dividends. A larger growth opportunity
(MB) leads to fewer cash dividends. The lockup period (LOCKUP) which imposes a
resale restriction on participating investors in private placements has an insignificant
impact on post-offering cash dividends. This suggests that the anticipated illiquidity
within lockup periods might be managed before the offerings, such as via negotiation
terms and offering discounts, and therefore shows a weak connection with
post-offering cash dividends.
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Table 4.9 Discounts received by existing controlling shareholders and by passive shareholders as
determinants for post-offering cash dividend behaviours
This table lists results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the post-offering cash
dividends. The sample includes the post-offering observations of firms issuing private placements to existing
controlling shareholders and firms placing offerings with multiple non-controlling shareholders from 2006 to
2015. The dependent variables from Columns 1 to 3 in order are DY, PAYOUT, CDPS. Definitions of variables
are detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and the results

are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

(1).

(2).

(3).

DY

PAYOUT

CDPS

-.040***

-.034

-.404***

(-6.04)

(-.15)

(-3.52)

EXSITING_

-.001*

-.004

.039***

CONTROL

(-1.73)

(-.15)

(3.66)

Variable
C

DISCOUNT1
EXSITING_
CONTROL*
DISCOUNT1
SIZE_OF_FUND
ROA
CASH

-.003*

-.101

-.043*

(-1.76)

(-1.32)

(-1.80)

.004*

.155*

.075**

(1.89)

(1.81)

(2.30)

-.002

-.172**

.010

(-.97)

(-2.42)

(.26)

.040***

-.766***

.529***

(6.52)

(-3.45)

(4.21)

-.002

-.112

.064

(-.82)

(-1.23)

(1.44)

-.010***

-.456***

-.128***

(-6.13)

(-7.11)

(-4.14)

.003***

.030***

.023***

(8.63)

(2.96)

(4.63)

-.001***

-.016***

.004*

(-13.78)

(-3.34)

(1.85)

.013***

.548***

.025

(4.12)

(4.69)

(.61)

-.000

-.012

.001

(-.49)

(-.58)

(.15)

No. obs.

3402

3402

3402

Adj. R2

.188

.026

.076

LEVERAGE
SIZE
MB
SD
LOCKUP
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4.5.2.6 Robustness check
Private placements as targeted equity issues can create new block shareholders or
reinforce the holdings of existing block shareholders. Large shareholders, therefore,
might use private placements to secure their controlling positions if they are keen to
protect their dominance over the board. Accordingly, they could be motivated to
increase their holdings to 30% (the baseline of being in absolute control) or higher if
the second largest shareholders also claim a substantial proportion of equity.
Shareholders may desire to be in absolute control of firms for strategic or operational
reasons. Alternatively, they may express this interest if to secure the controlling
position means that their intended tunnelling will not be constrained by other block
holders or potential takeovers. That is shareholders who are likely to seize private
placements to obtain a dominating position present a more likely case of tunnelling.
The first set of robustness tests is designed out of the concern that controlling
shareholders who are not in absolute control of firms or who can be suppressed by
other top shareholders might choose private placements for a non-operational cause.
This test, therefore, focuses on offerings to existing controlling shareholders whose
holdings in the year before the placement are below the legally defined 30% for
absolute control or whose holdings scaled by the holdings of the second largest
shareholder is below the 5% percentile given by the full observations. The tested
sample also includes observations of firms placing offerings with multiple
non-controlling shareholders as the control group.
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Shown by Table 4.10, the results of this robustness test are generally consistent
with previous results obtained from the full sample of firms issuing private
placements to existing controlling shareholders. The signs and the significance levels
of the coefficients on EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1 are highly comparable
with previous findings when re-tested on ORTA, CapEx, ROE and CDPS. That is, the
observations on existing controlling shareholders who are more likely to use targeted
issues of equity to pursue a dominant position within firms still support an account of
incremental monitoring compared to the case of passive offerings.
The second robustness test examines whether the joint impact of existing
controlling shareholders and their received discounts in private placements depends
on the measurements of discount. To do so, this test replaces DISCOUNT1 with
DISCOUNT2. This new discount measurement can verify if the use of market-driven
with-information prices on the 10th trading days after private placements (Hertzel &
Smith, 1993) produces consistent results. As shown in Table 4.11, the signs and the
significance levels of the coefficients on EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT2 are
highly consistent with the observations on EXISTING_CONTROL*DISCOUNT1
when re-tested on ORTA, CapEx, ROE and PAYOUT.
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Table 4.10 Robustness tests on participating controlling shareholders who were not in absolute control of firms before private placements
This table lists the robustness test results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the post-offering fund allocations of inter-corporate loans, capital
expenditure and cash dividends; and the post-offering probability using a reduced sample of offerings issued to existing controlling shareholders. The tested sample covers
the post-offering observations of firms issuing private placements to existing controlling shareholders who were not in absolute control before private placements and firms
placing offerings with multiple non-controlling shareholders between 2006 and 2015. The dependent variables from column 1 to 4 in order are ORTA, CapEx, ROE and
CDPS. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and the results are omitted. Standardized beta
coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1).

(2).

(3).

(4).

ORTA

CapEx

ROE

CDPS

.049**

.147***

-.270

-.285**

(2.42)

(4.92)

(-.39)

(-2.07)

EXSITING_

.001

-.013***

.096

.051***

CONTROL

(.51)

(-4.06)

(.91)

(2.71)

.011***

-.031***

-.400**

-.032

(2.45)

(-4.26)

(-2.32)

(-1.29)

-.010**

.030***

1.089***

.140***

(-1.93)

(3.09)

(4.81)

(3.02)

-.010**

.006

-1.792***

-.103**

(-1.94)

(.64)

(-7.81)

(-2.19)

-.011

.125***

(-.90)

(4.73)

-.008

-.080***

2.111***

.005

(-1.48)

(-7.71)

(8.67)

(.11)

.014***

.010

4.445***

-.140***

(3.07)

(1.27)

(25.69)

(-3.74)

Variable
C

DISCOUNT1
EXSITING_
CONTROL*
DISCOUNT1
SIZE_OF_FUND
ROA
CASH
LEVERAGE

—

.520***
(3.52)
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-.001

-.008***

.024

.020***

(-.97)

(-5.94)

(.78)

(3.29)

.000**

-.001

-.009

.001

(1.94)

(-1.30)

(-.75)

(.46)

SD

—

—

—

LOCKUP

—

—

—

-.000

.028***

(-.09)

(4.45)

-.734***
（-4.95）

—

.002

.029

(.20)

(1.35)

-1.388***
（-2.81）

—

—

—

—

SIZE
MB

LN(BOARD)
IN_DIRECTOR
MARKETIZATION

-.000
(-.05)

.038
(.94)
-.015
(-1.56)

No. obs.

2222

2222

2222

2222

Adj. R2

.140

.106

.350

.098
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Table 4.11 Robustness tests on an alternative measurement of the offering discount of private placements
This table lists the robustness test results showing the significance of determinants in interpreting the post-offering fund allocations of inter-corporate loans, capital
expenditure and cash dividends; and the post-offering probability using an alternative measurement of offering discounts. The sample covers the post-offering
observations of firms issuing private placements to existing controlling shareholders and firms placing offerings with multiple non-controlling shareholders between 2006
and 2015. The dependent variables from Column 1 to 4 in order are ORTA, CapEx, ROE and PAYOUT. Definitions of variables are detailed in Section 4.4.4. The industry
fixed effect is controlled for in the regression and the results are omitted. Standardized beta coefficients are reported; Newey-West adjusted t-values in parentheses. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1).
Variable

(2).

(3).

(4).

ORTA

CapEx

ROE

PAYOUT

.059***

.087***

-.315

-.027

(3.98)

(2.79)

(-.25)

(-.11)

EXSITING_

-.002

-.007**

.116

-.000

CONTROL

(-1.26)

(-1.97)

(1.20)

(-.01)

.005

-.017*

-.193

-.130*

(1.33)

(-1.83)

(-.99)

(-1.88)

-.003

.023**

.616**

.150*

(-.77)

(2.03)

(2.12)

(1.80)

-.002

-.016

-.704**

-.161*

(-.40)

(-1.53)

(-1.93)

(-1.87)

-.010

.142***

(-1.02)

(4.75)

C

DISCOUNT2
EXSITING_
CONTROL*
DISCOUNT2
SIZE_OF_FUND
ROA

—

-.738***
(-3.36)
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CASH
LEVERAGE

-.007

-.079***

2.046***

-.111

(-1.33)

(-7.57)

(4.03)

(-1.06)

.016***

.005

4.656***

-.459***

(4.49)

(.52)

(12.91)

(-6.22)

-.001***

-.005***

.004

.029***

(-2.44)

(-3.28)

(.08)

(2.59)

.001***

-.000

.025

-.015***

(2.96)

(-.54)

(1.22)

(-2.92)

SD

—

—

—

LOCKUP

—

—

—

-.001

.024***

(-.28)

(3.02)

-.668**
（-2.22）

—

.008

.020

(.82)

(.75)

-.661
（-.61）

—

—

—

—

SIZE
MB

LN(BOARD)
IND_DIRECTOR
MARKETIZATION

.000
(.51)

.546***
(3.09)
-.014
(-.65)

No. obs.

3402

3402

3402

3402

Adj. R

.132

.111

.307

.026

2
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4.6 Summary of results
Private placements as targeted equity offerings can create new block holders or
enhance the control of existing large shareholders who are found to provide
incremental monitoring for issuing firms (Wruck, 1989). However, current studies of
the Chinese stock market mostly assert that large shareholders participate in private
placements to preserve and aggravate tunnelling activities (Zhao et al., 2015; Liu et al.,
2016). This chapter discusses whether discounts offered to various investors generate
different influences over the abnormal stock returns around private placements, the
post-offering issues of inter-corporate loans, capital expenditure, profitability and cash
dividends.
This present study identifies and categorizes the identity of key participating
shareholders based on their affiliation with issuing firms. There are two aspects to
consider: the time when the affiliation was formed and the strength of the affiliation.
Accordingly, the key participating shareholders were divided into existing controlling
shareholders (strong affiliation formed before private placements), new controlling
shareholders

(strong

affiliation

formed

after

private

placements),

single

non-controlling shareholders (semi-strong affiliation formed after private placements)
and multiple non-controlling shareholders or passive shareholders (weak affiliation
after private placements). The main research focus lies in the comparison between
firms issuing private placements to existing controlling shareholders and firms placing
the offerings with multiple non-controlling shareholders (the control group).
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Part of the evidence supporting the tunnelling argument can be found in Liu et al.
(2016) who suggest that both the presence and the discounts received by controlling
shareholders cause less positive announcement returns of private placements. This
present study finds that the short-term announcement effect of private placements is
significantly positive. And, the subscription of existing controlling shareholders
contributes to a more favourable market reaction, which contradicts the findings of
Liu et al. (2016). This positive impact of the subscription of existing controlling
shareholders on the short-term announcement returns, however, can be suppressed
when high discounts are granted. Following Barclay et al. (2007) and Wruck and Wu
(2009), this study extends the examined event window to 120 trading days after the
announcement of private placements to identify stock performance of issuing firms
within longer event windows. Unlike the short-term stock performance, discounts
received by existing controlling shareholders result in stronger long-term stock
performance compared to when discounts were only offered to passive investors. That
is, the incremental impact of discounts received by existing controlling shareholders
influences stock returns differently depending on the lengths of event windows.
Compared to passive offerings, the incremental effect is negative within the
short-term and positive within the long-term. This indicates that the discounts offered
to existing controlling shareholders ultimately lead to better stock performance
compared to when only passive shareholders received the discounts. In other words,
the evidence supporting the tunnelling account fades away after extending the event
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window. The stronger market reactions towards higher discounts obtained by existing
controlling shareholders instead of passive shareholders are more in line with the
market’s anticipation of incremental monitoring.
Another body of literature argues that controlling shareholders are motivated to
invest in private placements because they can retrieve funds via high post-offering
cash dividends (Zhao et al., 2015). Yet, the results of the present study show that this
only appears to be valid when the measurement of payouts is cash dividend per share,
which is also the main tested dependent variable of Zhao et al. (2005). After replacing
the measurements of cash dividends with dividend yield and payout ratio, the
association between existing controlling shareholders’ subscriptions and high cash
dividends is absent or reversed. That is, the subscription of existing controlling
shareholders itself does not have a definitive impact on cash dividend policy. But,
when examining discounts granted to existing controlling shareholders (not controlled
by Zhao et al. 2015), it is evident that discounts interacting with existing controlling
shareholders leads to higher cash dividends regardless of the choices of measurement
of payouts.
This study relies on the examination of post-offering allocations of funds and
firm performance to provide a more definitive answer as to whether the observation
on cash dividends is due to tunnelling via payouts or stronger profitability via
incremental monitoring. The evidence is that higher discounts for existing controlling
shareholders are followed by fewer inter-corporate loans and therefore better
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corporate governance compared to when multiple non-controlling shareholders
received the discounts. Also, discounts received by existing controlling shareholders
are found to promote more capital expenditure compared to when discounts target
passive investors. Further results show that higher discounts for existing controlling
shareholders are associated with higher earnings compared to when discounts were
offered without the subscription of controlling shareholder. This verifies that higher
cash dividends led by larger discounts received by existing controlling shareholders,
instead of passive shareholders, are founded on the premise of better accounting
performance and are associated with more regulated fund allocations. These results
support the idea that incremental monitoring is served by existing controlling
shareholders participating in private placements.
This study concludes that shareholders who choose to increase their holdings
when they already have a controlling position are less likely to be involved in
tunnelling but have a stronger inclination for incremental monitoring. As a matter of
fact, the robustness test indicates that the above contention still holds even when
largest shareholders are not in absolute control of the issuing firms before
participating in private placements. Overall, the results are consistent with the view
that incremental monitoring is more effectively encouraged by the discounts granted
to existing controlling shareholders compared to the discounts granted to multiple
non-controlling shareholders.
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CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION
This thesis examined the impact of controlling shareholders on cash dividend
practices of Chinese listed firms, with respect to events which change controlling
shareholders’ holdings. Empirical evidence suggests that it is less common for
controlling shareholders to transfer firm wealth via cash dividends, especially after the
NTS reform. In addition, cash dividend practices are influenced by firm profitability
and the information environment, suggesting that the demands of controlling
shareholders may not be the ultimate determinant of cash dividend policies.

5.1 The NTS reform and the heterogeneity of controlling shareholders
Using the NTS reform as an experimental setting, Chapter 2 looks into the way
agency conflicts and capital constraints associated with controlling shareholders affect
cash dividend practices. The NTS reform is the exogenous event that removes the
discount and the non-tradability of controlling shareholders’ holdings, both of which
are considered to affect the preference of controlling shareholders for cash dividends
(Lee & Xiao, 2004; Chen et al., 2009a).
This thesis first examined how the market’s cash dividend practice reacts to the
NTS reform. The empirical test identifies a decrease in cash dividends after the
reform. This highlights the possibility that the united pricing of non-tradable and
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tradable shares and the granted tradability of controlling shareholders’ holdings
weaken controlling shareholders’ preference for cash dividends. It is also consistent
with the view that the NTS reform motivates the monitoring incentive of controlling
shareholders (Liu & Tian, 2012; Hou et al., 2012), which promotes a reduced
tunnelling incentive and a downward adjustment in cash dividends.
The study then examined the impact of the heterogeneity of controlling
shareholders on cash dividends. The categories of controlling shareholders were
formed according to the governance incentive of controlling shareholders for firms
(agency conflicts) and the financial condition of controlling shareholders (capital
constraints). The results suggest that SOEs directly funded and controlled by
cash-starved local governments distribute higher cash dividends. These payout
decisions appear to be little influenced by the NTS reform or non-controlling large
shareholders. This supports the argument that cash dividends can deviate from being a
fair reward to all shareholders and become a source of funding for local governments.
For SOEs that are controlled by local SASACs and the central government, the issue
of cash dividends appears to be promoted by non-controlling large shareholders. This
result is consistent with the traditional agency theory that suggests cash dividends are
a sign of regulated practice of corporate governance. Further results show that cash
dividends tend to be lower for family firms when controlling families own more
substantial holdings. Considering that family business owners are inclined to hoard
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excessive cash that is ready to be tunnelled (Liu et al., 2015), this may explain why
family business owners suppress the payment of cash dividends.
Additionally, whether cash dividends affect the issue of inter-corporate loans,
which are considered as a type of direct tunnelling (Jiang et al., 2010), was
investigated. Using a TSLS regression method, the results report a significant and
negative relationship between inter-corporate loans and cash payouts within
non-SOEs and local SOEs. For non-SOEs in which controlling shareholders can
accrue the benefits that come from private lending (in this case, via inter-corporate
loans), lower cash dividends are indicative of higher inter-corporate loans and can be
viewed as a sign of weaker corporate governance. For local governments who appear
to view cash dividends as one option to increase their incomes and are unable to
acquire private interests from inter-corporate loans, this relationship is still negative.
It is possible that cash dividends and inter-corporate loans compete under the given
level of free cash-flows. Only for central SOEs, is the link between cash dividends
and inter-corporate loans insignificant.
Overall, these findings support the argument that the attitude of controlling
shareholders towards cash dividends varies depending on whether they hold a
tunnelling incentive and what their preferred choice of tunnelling is. For some
tunnelling-prone non-state shareholders, it appears that they tend to adopt a
low-payout policy as cash dividends can reduce the cash available to be tunnelled by
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other methods. Alternatively, higher cash dividends could be paid to provide private
benefits to local governments that rely on these payments to supplement incomes.

5.2 The signalling function of private placements
In Chapter 3 the treatment effect of private placements on cash dividends is
identified. The chapter considers whether the information-releasing effect of private
placements interacts with the signalling effect of cash dividends. This interaction has
been largely overlooked in previous studies.
Focusing on the cash dividends issued in the year preceding private placements,
evidence suggests that managers tend to announce higher cash payouts when private
placements are in the nearer future. This is similar to the observation that firms raising
public equity tend to announce cash dividends before the offerings so as to reduce the
information uncertainty (Booth & Chang, 2011). It appears that cash dividends can
serve a similar function for private equity offerings.
The next focus is on how private placements affect cash dividends. Examine the
strictly matched treatment group and control group, the evidence given by PSM tests
is that private placements lead to lower cash dividends both within and after lockup
periods. These results are robust to alternative measurements of cash dividends. This
evidence removes the concern that higher cash dividends are used to provide liquidity
during lockup periods. Also, this does not support the view of Zhao et al. (2015) who
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identify private placements resulting in higher cash dividends as evidence of fund
transfers to large shareholders. Given that the results of Chapter 3 are inconsistent
with those from Zhao et al., the chapter examined the impact of private placements on
firm long-term stock performance for further evidence. Again, not supporting the
tunnelling hypothesis, further tests reveal that the long-term stock returns, proxied by
the constant term derived from the three-factor model (Fama & French, 1993), are
positively influenced by private placements. This is in line with the positive
information conveyed by private placements (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). It supports the
view that an improvement in the firm-level information environment resulting from
private placements reduces the need for cash dividends as a signalling tool (Cheng et
al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hail et al., 2014).
Lastly, the

chapter

examined

whether

private

placements

affect

the

announcement effect of cash dividends. This is also an attempt to verify the signalling
function of private placements. The evidence shows that the announcement returns of
cash dividends are enhanced by private placements. It supports the expectation that
the market acts more optimistically for the distribution of cash dividends given the
potential improvement in the firm-level information environment led by private
placements. This result also receives support from Dedman et al. (2015). This present
study then paid attention to financially constrained issuing firms in which private
placements are more likely to be a solution for financial stress than a signalling
mechanism (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). The results show that private placements
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have a weak connection with cash dividends and stock performance for financially
distressed issuing firms in which private placements tend to carry less information
content.
Overall, this adds new evidence to the literature. Private placements, as an
information-releasing event, lower the pressure to use cash dividends as an option of
signalling. It emphasizes the importance of a firm’s information environment in
relation to cash dividend policy.

5.3 Participating shareholders and discounts in private placements
Chapter 4 discusses whether, and how, discounts of private placements applied to
participating shareholders who vary in levels of affiliation with issuing firms result in
differences in firm performance and firm decisions. It is expected that shareholders
with a deep affiliation with issuing firms, such as existing controlling shareholders,
are more likely to perform active monitoring after private placements given the
increased investment at stake. This expected incremental monitoring is predicted to
positively affect cash payouts, stock performance and capital investment, and
negatively affect the use of inter-corporate loans (a form of tunnelling).
To identify how discounts of various participating shareholders are viewed by
the market, both short-event-window and long-event-window CARs around private
placements were examined. The results show that the subscription of existing
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controlling shareholders significantly adds to stock returns within the short-term
announcement period. Further, higher discounts offered to existing controlling
shareholders result in weaker announcement CARs but better long-event-window
CARs compared to when discounts are offered to multiple non-controlling
shareholders. This study presents the following interpretation for the contrasting
results. Given that the discounts received by existing controlling shareholders tend to
be larger, it is possible that this price treatment raises doubt in the market when the
discounts are first announced. But, when this information is fully processed in the
longer run, the market appears to become more optimistic when higher discounts are
offered to existing controlling shareholders compared to when discounts are only
granted to multiple non-controlling shareholders. This optimism of the market, by
contrast, reflects an expectation of incremental monitoring which is more likely to be
associated with large block holders (Wruck, 1989).
Analysis in this chapter shows that private placements that are without the
participation of controlling shareholders tend to invite passive investors. It finds that
non-controlling shareholders introduced by private placements tend to become small
blocks with a short investment horizon. Barclay et al. (2007) identify the incentive of
only inviting passive investors in private placements as protecting the entrenchment in
place. Under this circumstance, the offering discount tends to be the compensation for
not interfering but forming a coalition with controlling parties. This indicates
tunnelling risk when private placements are offered to multiple non-controlling
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(passive) shareholders.
Further tests show that when higher discounts were offered to existing
controlling shareholders in private placements, firms tend to pay higher cash
dividends compared to when discounts were only granted to passive investors.
Showing consistency with this result, higher discounts for existing controlling
shareholders are also found to result in stronger profitability compared to when
discounts were offered in passive offerings. The coherent upward tendencies of cash
dividends and earnings are both led by larger discounts for existing controlling
shareholders and provide less credibility to the tunnelling argument. In addition, this
chapter discusses the issue of inter-corporate loans (a measurement of direct
tunnelling) and capital expenditure. These two firm decisions together with cash
dividend policy cover three aspects of fund allocations: tunnelling, investments and
payouts. The findings show that larger discounts granted to existing controlling
shareholders result in less use of inter-corporate loans and more capital expenditure,
meaning more regulated fund allocations, compared to when discounts were received
by passive investors. Assuming this desirable practice of corporate governance is the
result of incremental monitoring, discounts offered to existing controlling
shareholders could be viewed as the reward for incremental monitoring. It is worth
mentioning that this beneficial outcome was also observed when existing controlling
shareholders were not in an absolute controlling position of firms before private
placements. This suggests that private placements are less likely to facilitate
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aggravated tunnelling by offering a further secured controlling status to large
shareholders.
The overall findings in Chapter 4 are consistent with the view that higher
discounts offered to existing controlling shareholders tend to lead to additional
monitoring, which is a less likely result when discounts were only offered to passive
investors. It appears that the increased holdings build stronger monitoring incentive
via a stronger link between the wealth of controlling shareholders and firm values.
This conclusion also receives support from performances of long-event-window
market reactions and profitability, and firm decisions of inter-corporate loans, capital
investments and cash dividends.

5.4 Implications of the findings
The implication of the findings of this thesis is that although controlling
shareholders can manipulate cash dividend policy, cash dividends tend to be the
outcome of desirable corporate governance, especially after the NTS reform. Before
the reform, the non-tradable feature of the holdings of controlling shareholders
prevented the opportunity for monitoring work to be rewarded by the market via
capital gains and this could promote tunnelling activities by controlling shareholders.
As a result, cash dividends once represented one of the most feasible ways to transfer
firm resources to controlling shareholders (Lee & Xiao, 2003). It is suggested that
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after the NTS reform, this tendency is restrained as cash dividends are reduced at the
market level. Therefore, the first implication of this thesis is that the formation of
aligned interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholder via the
NTS reform may contribute to regulations of the issue of cash dividends. It is
therefore suggested that for a functional corporate governance system, regulations
which lead to a stronger linkage between the wealth of controlling shareholders and
the wealth of minority shareholders should be promoted.
Concerning the function of signalling served by cash dividends, this thesis
demonstrates that the quality of the firm-level information environment affects the
optimal level of payouts. As an information-releasing event, private placements (the
treatment event) can fill the information gap about prospects of issuing firms (Hertzel
& Smith, 1993). Compared to matched non-treated firms, firms that have made
private placements are found to have lower cash dividends, yet better long-term stock
performance and stronger announcement returns for cash dividends because of the
placements. This leads to the second implication; that an improvement in the
information environment of firms could alleviate the pressure to use cash dividends as
a signalling tool and enhance the signalling effect of these cash distributions if used. It
is advised that firms might rely on informational transparency to manage their internal
financing system effectively. To promote the growth of the capital market, the
authority could consider policies that enable outside investors to be more informed.
A concentrated ownership structure has been a dominating phenomenon since the
344

beginning of the Chinese stock market. Even though the NTS reform systematically
decreased the holdings of controlling shareholders, most of them still maintain their
controlling status following the reform. Therefore, it is reasonable to view the
concentrated ownership structure as a long-standing trend in this market. This
highlights the importance and the role of controlling shareholders. Accordingly, this
thesis identifies two aspects that could affect the attitudes of controlling shareholders
to cash dividends: agency conflicts and capital constraints. For financially-constrained
local governments, SOEs under their direct control are shown to issue higher cash
dividends which appear to be neither favoured nor disputed by other large
shareholders. This implies that cash dividends serve a less reasonable function of
replenishing incomes of local governments and other large shareholders fail to bend
this tendency. In comparison, because of the supervision in place, SOEs controlled by
SASACs and the central government tend to have regulated management, and so cash
dividends are likely to be the outcome of efficient corporate governance. Also, for
family firms, a higher level of family control results in fewer cash dividends, which
can be a reflection of the preference of family business owners for large cash-holdings
(Liu et al., 2015). Therefore, the third implication is that in the face of poor corporate
governance, the influence of controlling shareholders over cash dividend practices is
subject to whether paying cash dividends or holding back cash distributions better
serves the private interests of controlling shareholders. Accordingly, when evaluating
the level of payouts, standardised tailoring to individual firms is advised, especially
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when firms are controlled by different categories of controlling shareholders.
Lastly, this thesis shows that although controlling shareholders are able to
acquire private interests via the abuse of power, a concentrated ownership structure
does not necessarily lead to tunnelling. Given that private placements are targeted
equity issues, private placements can lead to changes in block-holdings of issuing
firms. This thesis finds that private placements offering a higher discount to
controlling shareholders may invite more active monitoring. On the contrary, private
placements issued to multiple non-controlling shareholders lead to signs of weaker
corporate governance and firm performance. These findings suggest that more
concentrated ownership does not necessarily aggravate tunnelling; and less
concentrated ownership does not necessarily bend tunnelling, either. Still, it is evident
that given a stronger alignment between the interests of controlling shareholders and
firm values, an increase in the holdings of controlling shareholders is more likely to
result in incremental monitoring.
Although controlling shareholders are less likely to tunnel a firm’s resources via
cash dividends or to aggravate their abuse of power after participating in private
placements, this does not imply the absence of tunnelling. According to Barclay et al.
(2007), entrenched managers may invite passive shareholders who are willing to
guard the private interests in place to participate in private placements. This supports
the observations of Chinese firms that only invite non-controlling shareholders for
private placements. It seems that tunnelling activities can be insidious and may not be
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directly captured by public events. The authority may consider enhancing the
information transparency of firm operations to allow minority shareholders to be more
informed and more aware of the misconduct of large shareholders.
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